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Resumen 
 
Desde el punto de vista de seguridad, la certificación aeronáutica de 
aplicaciones críticas de vuelo requiere diferentes técnicas que son usadas 
para prevenir fallos en los equipos electrónicos. Los fallos de tipo hardware 
debido a la radiación solar que existe a las alturas standard de vuelo, como 
SEU (Single Event Upset) y MCU (Multiple Bit Upset), provocan un cambio 
de estado de los bits que soportan la información almacenada en memoria. 
Estos fallos se producen, por ejemplo, en la memoria de configuración de 
una FPGA, que es donde se definen todas las funcionalidades. Las técnicas 
de protección requieren normalmente de redundancias que incrementan el 
coste, número de componentes, tamaño de la memoria y peso.  
En la fase de desarrollo de aplicaciones críticas de vuelo, generalmente 
se utilizan una serie de estándares o recomendaciones de diseño como 
ABD100, RTCA DO-160, IEC62395, etc, y diferentes técnicas de protección 
para evitar fallos del tipo SEU o MCU. Estas técnicas están basadas en 
procesos tecnológicos específicos como memorias robustas, codificaciones 
para detección y corrección de errores (EDAC), redundancias software, 
redundancia modular triple (TMR) o soluciones a nivel sistema. 
Esta tesis está enfocada a minimizar e incluso suprimir los efectos de los 
SEUs y MCUs que particularmente ocurren en la electrónica de avión como 
consecuencia de la exposición a radiación de partículas no cargadas (como 
son los neutrones) que se encuentra potenciada a las típicas alturas de 
vuelo. La criticidad en vuelo que tienen determinados sistemas obligan a que 
dichos sistemas sean tolerantes a fallos, es decir, que garanticen un 
correcto funcionamiento aún cuando se produzca un fallo en ellos. Es por 
ello que soluciones como las presentadas en esta tesis tienen interés en el 
sector industrial. 
La Tesis incluye una descripción inicial de la física de la radiación 
incidente sobre aeronaves, y el análisis de sus efectos en los componentes 
electrónicos aeronaúticos basados en semiconductor, que desembocan en 
la generación de SEUs y MCUs. Este análisis permite dimensionar 
adecuadamente y optimizar los procedimientos de corrección que se 
propongan posteriormente. 
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La Tesis propone un sistema de corrección de fallos SEUs y MCUs que 
permita cumplir la condición de Sistema Tolerante a Fallos, a la vez que 
minimiza los niveles de redundancia y de complejidad de los códigos de 
corrección. El nivel de redundancia es minimizado con la introducción del 
concepto propuesto HSB (Hardwired Seed Bits), en la que se reduce la 
información esencial a unos pocos bits semilla, neutros frente a radiación. 
Los códigos de corrección requeridos se reducen a la corrección de un único 
error, gracias al uso del concepto de Distancia Virtual entre Bits, a partir del 
cual será posible corregir múltiples errores simultáneos (MCUs) a partir de 
códigos simples de corrección.  
Un ejemplo de aplicación de la Tesis es la implementación de una 
Protección Tolerante a Fallos sobre la memoria SRAM de una FPGA. Esto 
significa que queda protegida no sólo la información contenida en la 
memoria sino que también queda auto-protegida la función de protección 
misma almacenada en la propia SRAM. De esta forma, el sistema es capaz 
de auto-regenerarse ante un SEU o incluso un MCU, independientemente 
de la zona de la SRAM sobre la que impacte la radiación. Adicionalmente, 
esto se consigue con códigos simples tales como corrección por bit de 
paridad y Hamming, minimizando la dedicación de recursos de computación 
hacia tareas de supervisión del sistema. 
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Abstract 
 
For airborne safety critical applications certification, different techniques 
are implemented to prevent failures in electronic equipments. The HW 
failures at flying heights of aircrafts related to solar radiation such as SEU 
(Single-Event-Upset) and MCU (Multiple Bit Upset), causes bits alterations 
that corrupt the information at memories. These HW failures cause errors, for 
example, in the Configuration-Code of an FPGA that defines the 
functionalities. The protection techniques require classically redundant 
functionalities that increases the cost, components, memory space and 
weight.  
During the development phase for airborne safety critical applications, 
different aerospace standards are generally recommended as ABD100, 
RTCA-DO160, IEC62395, etc, and different techniques are classically used 
to avoid failures such as SEU or MCU. These techniques are based on 
specific technology processes, Hardened memories, error detection and 
correction codes (EDAC), SW redundancy, Triple Modular Redundancy 
(TMR) or System level solutions. 
This Thesis is focussed to minimize, and even to remove, the effects of 
SEUs and MCUs, that particularly occurs in the airborne electronics as a 
consequence of its exposition to solar radiation of non-charged particles (for 
example the neutrons). These non-charged particles are even powered at 
flying altitudes due to aircraft volume. The safety categorization of different 
equipments/functionalities requires a design based on fault-tolerant approach 
that means, the system will continue its normal operation even if a failure 
occurs. The solution proposed in this Thesis is relevant for the industrial 
sector because of its Fault-tolerant capability.  
Thesis includes an initial description for the physics of the solar radiation 
that affects into aircrafts, and also the analyses of their effects into the 
airborne electronics based on semiconductor components that create the 
SEUs and MCUs. This detailed analysis allows the correct sizing and also 
the optimization of the procedures used to correct the errors. 
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This Thesis proposes a system that corrects the SEUs and MCUs 
allowing the fulfilment of the Fault-Tolerant requirement, reducing the 
redundancy resources and also the complexity of the correction codes. The 
redundancy resources are minimized thanks to the introduction of the 
concept of HSB (Hardwired Seed Bits), in which the essential information is 
reduced to a few seed bits, neutral to radiation. The correction codes 
required are reduced to the correction of one error thanks to the use of the 
concept of interleaving distance between adjacent bits, this allows the 
simultaneous multiple error correction with simple single error correcting 
codes. 
An example of the application of this Thesis is the implementation of the 
Fault-tolerant architecture of an SRAM-based FPGA. That means that the 
information saved in the memory is protected but also the correction 
functionality is auto protected as well, also saved into SRAM memory. In this 
way, the system is able to self-regenerate the information lost in case of 
SEUs or MCUs. This is independent of the SRAM area affected by the 
radiation. Furthermore, this performance is achieved by means simple error 
correcting codes, as parity bits or Hamming, that minimize the use of 
computational resources to this supervision tasks for system.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY FRAMEWORK 
 
WORK TARGET 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aerospace industry's continued improvement of its global 
competitiveness consists of two main issues that have to be considered: the 
reduction of economic costs, and safe and reliable technological advances. 
Both provide additional value to the product developing more flexible, versatile, 
economical, better and simple systems.  
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The industry's continued development increasingly demands more complex 
electronic hardware. This demand is usually expressed in terms of optimizing 
both performance and cost. However, as Fault Tolerant is a design requirement, 
design optimization is constrained in critical applications.  
 
For instance, in avionics, safe/reliable and small/light products are targeted. 
Given that failures in some airborne electronics could cause fatal injuries to 
passengers, they are designed as a fault tolerant system. The certification 
process is a guarantee that proper operation will continue in the event of a 
failure in any of the components. 
 
Avionics systems normally work in a radiated environment that could 
produce a Single Event Upset (SEU) or even an MCU (Multiple Cell Upset). 
Several techniques are used nowadays to mitigate memory upsets, [26], [27], 
[28], [29], [34], [44]. These techniques are based on specific technological 
processes, such as hardened memories, EDACs, SW redundancy, TMR or 
system level solutions. 
 
Reconfiguration-based techniques are capable of detecting and correcting 
errors in an optimized operation. However, they do not meet fault-tolerant 
requirements because there is no guarantee they will be able to retrieve errors 
that may occur in the scrubbing function itself. 
 
TMR, [7], can be considered for a feasible solution as a fault-tolerant system, 
thanks to its high redundancy level. However, there are some applications (such 
as avionics), in which the increased volume and weight associated with the 
redundancy level are critical in terms of cost (particularly the weight).  
 
The state-of-the-art of avionics equipment based on complex electronics 
ruled by aeronautics industry standards [38], [39], [40], [41] and [42], that work 
in a radiated environment, defines maintenance strategies based on health 
monitoring systems and redundancies for determining the system status to 
detect early failure.  
 
In particular, airborne electronics systems are certified under several 
standards, among them, DO-254 [39] and DO-178C [38]. These standards 
define structured airborne certification guidance for complex electronics 
hardware and software-based systems, with statements such as any single 
failure that could cause a catastrophic event is not allowed. These standards 
define the Design Assurance Level (DAL) as the design procedure or rigor 
applied during Design development phase to avoid design errors in system. 
They are intimately related to the failure conditions of system. The failure 
probability of each functionality of system is included in the System Safety 
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Assessment by the aircraft manufacturer and they must comply with the 
qualitative requirement and DAL. 
 
This work proposes a hybrid optimized redundant EDAC system with a 
minimum redundancy level for meeting fault tolerant requirements under MCUs, 
which can be implemented as an additional firmware layer in any programmable 
memory that is transparent for the programmer. 
 
Figure 1.1 conceptually summarizes the process for attaining the proposed 
solution. Single Error Correction functions (SEC) are simple and effective, [6] 
and [7], even though only one error can be retrieved. Their operating 
performance can be improved if detection is added, serving as an EDAC 
function, [6] and [7], which only corrects when an actual error is detected. 
 
Facing not only single errors but MCUs is a challenge for the EDAC 
approach from the practical point of view. BCH code can correct this type of 
errors, although they are not suitable for practical implementations, [6] and [7]. 
A solution would be to apply the Interleaving concept, [35], [36], which allows 
reducing the problem from a multiple error to a single error correction. 
Interleaving guarantees that no more than one error is included in each 
scrubbing cycle, enabling MCUs to be retrieved from a set of SEC scrubbings. 
 
 
  
Figure. 1.1. State-of-Art of SEU-MCU protection methods, HSB included. 
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As a result, the EDAC-MCU approach is very effective, though it has no fault 
tolerant capabilities. This is because the EDAC function logic itself is exposed to 
MCUs. On the other hand, TMR is effective for fault tolerant applications, 
however, it is not efficient due to its redundancy level overhead. 
 
This work discusses the different aspects of both Single and Multiple Event 
Upset that particularly occurs in airborne electronics. This works proposes that 
the TMR approach can be hybridized with an EDAC-MCU approach, Fig. 1.1, 
giving as a result the 3x EDAC-MCU approach, which enables having a fault 
tolerant system with a low redundancy level, since it only triplicates the EDAC-
MCU function. This paper proposes a step forward, which is implementing a 2x 
EDAC-MCU function while keeping the fault tolerant performance, thanks to 
HSB, a new concept explained further down. 
 
As a summary to be expanded later, the new approach proposed in this work 
includes: 
• Novel multi-level correction architecture based on a permanent (not 
vulnerable to radiation) HSB reference that saves the essential 
information for error retrieval. 
• A novel algorithm, which enables autonomous self-detection/correction 
fault-tolerant capability, with just a 2x EDAC-MCU function approach 
(called the Control/Monitor in avionics).  
• Interleaving concept, [35], [36], which significantly simplifies the 
correction requirements regarding an MCU, Section IV, reducing the 
detection/correction action to a SEU approach. 
• Detection and correction decoupling, [26], to improve operating time 
consumption. 
 
1.1 AEROSPACE INDUSTRY FRAMEWORK 
 
The use of this kind of complex electronic hardware devices in the framework 
of development new products for aerospace applications involves other issues 
related to nature of these complex hardware electronics devices as ionizing 
radiation particles. The first failures due to the effects of cosmic rays were 
observed in electronics in 1975. This kind of radiation has been monitored at 
A/C flight altitudes since 1992, [25]. 
 
Development framework of Aerospace industry is based in a huge number of 
standards and references that define working procedures. Each of these 
standards is used for different aspect of design that should be followed by an 
equipment designer for equipment airborne certification. Some of the most 
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important ones that define specific requirements to be complied in terms of 
radiation effects in airborne electronics are: 
 
 RTCA DO-160 [42], Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures 
for Airborne Equipment is a standard for environmental test of 
avionics hardware published by RTCA, Incorporated. This document 
defines a set of minimal environmental test conditions of the entire 
spectrum of aircraft and test procedures to be tested in airborne 
equipments. The purpose of these tests is to define controlled 
(laboratory) characteristics for assuring the performance of airborne 
equipment in environmental conditions similar the ones encountered 
in aircraft operation. 
  
 ABDX00 [3]. Set of Airbus standards related to airborne equipment 
general design requirements. 
 
 IEC62395 [2]. Set of standards related to atmospheric radiation 
effects within avionics electronic equipments. These standards define 
the ionizing radiation environment that the equipments will be 
subjected into an aircraft and the potential single event effects (SEE) 
of the solar radiation environment would have into electronics. These 
standards also provide a more precise definition of the threat that 
thermal neutrons pose to avionics as a second mechanism for 
inducing single event upset (SEU) in microelectronics. The same 
atmospheric radiation (neutrons and protons) that is responsible for 
the radiation exposure to avionics electronic equipment is the same 
that affects to crew and passengers while flying.  
 
 JESD89A [1], JEDEC Standard, measurement of Alpha Particle and 
Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor 
Devices. It is directly related to soft errors in electronics by 
atmospheric radiation at altitudes less than 10 000 feet (3.040 m). 
This standard covers soft errors due to alpha particles, atmospheric 
neutrons, high-energy neutron and thermal neutron reactions with B10. 
 
 DO-178C/ EUROCAE ED-12 [38]. It defines the Software Certification 
considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. It is 
a document based on guidance and tasks in terms of safety for 
software used in airborne systems. It uses a structured guidance and 
requirements to determine that software performs reliably its intended 
activities according to the technical specification. 
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 DO-254 / EUROCAE ED-80 [39]. It defines the Hardware Certification 
considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. It is 
a structured guidance for complex electronic hardware design in 
airborne system in terms of safety requirements. It is intended for 
Complex electronic hardware devices as Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGAs), Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), and 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).  
 
 System safety assessment processes as SAE ARP-4761 [40] and 
Aircraft development process as SAE ARP-4754A [41] are used at 
aircraft system level to define the safety objectives applicable to the 
functionalities of a system design determining the criticism or the 
severity of each function of system. Atmospheric radiation effects are 
one factor that contributes to the system failure rates.  
 
Therefore, for an aerospace development framework, these standards shall 
be followed obtaining some general guidance on atmospheric radiation effects 
on airborne electronics working up to 40.000 feet (12 km). These standards 
define the ionizing radiation environment that will occur in airborne equipments. 
They also provide design considerations to calculate the contributions of those 
effects within avionics systems. 
 
Furthermore, these standards also define the Single Event Effects (SEE) of 
this cosmic radiation in electronic complex devices. As commented before, the 
first failure in complex electronics due to cosmic rays (ionizing radiation 
particles) was observed in 1975 and it is currently monitored in commercial 
fleets since 1992. This kind of failure is an Hardware issue that occurs when a 
bit is upset due to the radiation effects of particles as protons, neutrons, alpha 
particles or heavy ions that are present in airborne environment and produced 
interactions with hydrogenous materials within aircraft.  
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1.2 WORK TARGET 
 
Within the aerospace work frame, different mitigation approaches are 
classically included in the aerospace electronic systems in order to mitigate the 
effects of the SEU and/or MCU. All the potential SEU/MCU mitigation 
techniques require additional HW or SW added to the system. 
 
The solution intended in this Thesis is based on an error correcting technique 
with a novel permanent reference not affected by SEU/MCU, called “Hardwired 
Seed Bits”, HSB, physically soldered on the PCB. From this permanent 
reference, the retrieval of original code could be done with a reconstruction as 
soon as possible of the original values saved in the memory after SEE event. 
 
Main aim of the solution proposed is the MCU protection. As MCU appears in 
bits physically near each other, single-error correcting techniques fails in the 
detection of MCU events. Thus, the usual approach is to use a Multiple-error 
correcting codes, but resources required increase exponentially due to coding 
complexity. The proposal is to use an algorithm (interleaving distance) that 
suitably virtually separates the bits into groups to guarantee no more than one 
upset per group when correcting, even under an MCU event.  
 
Final goal of this work is also the application of this kind of strategy for MCU 
correction into fault tolerant systems. These kinds of systems are normally 
demanded into aerospace applications whose operating failure could cause 
catastrophic effects into the aircraft, crew and passengers. Fault tolerant feature 
is typically achieved by the triplication of systems, whereas this work allows 
achieving same protection as triplication fault tolerant systems with just a simple 
duplication, thanks to the self-detection capability offered by HSB. 
 
These weighted error correction procedures requires extra timing to proceed, 
based on a complex codification, to protect the memory. An optimization in 
terms of timing performances is also requested by simplifying the detection and 
correction procedures. Since correction process takes much longer computation 
timing than correction and most of times there is no error induced in memory 
under a normal (low) SEU rate, decoupling both processes would achieve a 
timing optimization, because correction could be only launched when an error is 
previously detected. 
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1.3 ACRONYMS 
 
BCH: Bose, Chaudhuri and Hocquenghem correction code 
BPSG: Boron Phosphor Silicate Glass 
CEH: Complex Electronic Hardware 
COTS: Commercial Off The Shelf hardware component 
CPLD: Complex programmable logic device 
DAL: Design Assurance Level 
DMR: Double Modular Redundancy 
EDAC: Error Detection And Correction code 
EHC: Electronic Hardware Component 
ExT: Exposition Time 
FFPA: Functional Failure Path Analysis 
FPGA: Field programmable gate array 
GCR: Galactic Cosmic Rays 
HDL: Hardware Description Languages 
HSB: Hardware Seed Bits 
IC: Integrate Circuit 
ID: Interleaving distance in Frame architecture 
IP: Impact probability 
IR: Impact rate  
LET: Linear Energy Transfer 
LRU: Line replaceable unit 
MBU: Multiple Bit Upset 
MCU: Multiple Cell Upset 
MEC: Multiple Error Correction code 
MTBU: Mean Time Between Upset 
n-MU-IP: n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impact Probability 
n-MU-IR: n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impact Rate 
OH: Operating Hours in fligh 
RTL: Register Transfer Level 
SC-IP: Single Correctable Impact Probability 
SC-IR: Single Correctable Impact Rate 
SU-IP: Single Uncorrectable Impact Probability 
SU-IR: Single Uncorrectable Impact Rate 
SEC: Single Error Correction Code 
SEE: Single Event Effect 
SEH: Simple Electronic Hardware 
SEU: Single Event Upset 
TFP: Total Failure Probability 
TFR: Total Failure Rate 
TMR: Triple Modular Redundancy  
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CHAPTER 2: STATE OF ART 
 
 
 
AIRBORNE ELECTRONICS NEUTRON RADIATION:  
PHYSICS OF THE PROBLEM 
 
SINGLE EVENT UPSET (SEU) 
 
MULTIPLE BIT UPSET (MCU) 
 
CURRENT SOLUTIONS IN AIRBORNE ELECTRONICS 
 
 
 
 
 
For the last 280 years, the sun activity cycle has been fixed around 11 years. 
The solar cycle is divided into two phases, solar minimum during 4.8 years and 
solar maximum about the rest 6.2 years. In these periods, energetic particles 
are emitted and, as interactions of Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR), the effects are 
attenuated by the Earth’s magnetosphere. 
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2.1 AIRBORNE ELECTRONICS NEUTRON RADIATION: PHYSICS OF 
THE PROBLEM 
 
Energetic particles are emitted as interactions of Galactic Cosmic Rays 
(GCR). These interactions against the upper atmosphere create a flux build-up 
of charged particles and neutrons at the altitude level called “Pfotzer maximum”, 
60.000 feets, that is not uniform around Earth (depends on altitude, latitude and 
magnetic field of Earth). In general, for avionics application purposes, a 
conservative approach is to use an estimated total flux around 9.200 n/cm2/h at 
40.000 feets and 45º latitude. It could have a peak up to 12.000 n/cm2/h that 
depends on altitude and Rigidity cut-off. These data commonly agree with 
different standards such as JEDEC [1], IEC62396 [2] and ABD100 [3]. This flux 
is approximately 300 times lower at ground level. Above “Pfotzer maximum” 
altitude, there is a significant abundance of cosmic ray heavy ions. 
 
When heavy ions pass through the silicon substrate of an electronic device 
[2] and [4], they deposit charge in matter (LET: Linear Energy Transfer, energy 
deposited per unit path length in a semiconductor along the path of the radiation 
expressed in MeV⋅cm2/mg.) along its range (µm) by direct ionization. When 
non-charged particles as neutrons pass through the silicon substrate of a 
device, it cannot deposit charge in matter, but interacts with matter causing 
indirect ionization. These indirect ionization interactions are neutron-nuclei 
reactions based mainly on absorption and scattering. 
 
When absorption of neutron occurs in indirect ionization [4], the excited 
nucleus breaks up into several lighter nuclei that deposits charge in matter 
(LET) along its range (µm) by direct ionization. LET is dependent on the mass, 
energy of the particle and the matter which it travels in. As a general rule linked 
to momentum and energy conservation laws, lighter particles have lower LET 
and higher range than heavier ones, emitted close to their Bragg peak [4],[19]. 
Lighter particles must travel some distance to reach their Bragg peak, occurring 
immediately before the particle come to rest. These effects have been 
calculated by means Ziegler’s range tables, where LET deposition in Silicon 
matter of different lighter particles as He and H are represented. In case of 
alpha particle, α, Bragg peak occurs because particle deposits more dose along 
its path in matter as kinetic energy decreases [4], [19]. Alpha particle captures 
two electrons being thus converted into a neutral atom no longer capable of 
producing ionization.  
 
LET deposited along ion range creates by direct ionization a track of 
electrical interactions that could be enough to remove the orbital electrons from 
atoms of matter, leaving behind a number of electron-hole pairs as it move on in 
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its track [4], [18], and [19]. A charge event occurs within a nanosecond. 
Electrons are grouped instantaneously by the electric field near to the final 
region of the track of ion range. This creates a transient of current that depends 
on the number of electron-hole pairs affected within the ion track [18]. In this 
scenario, if the transient charge is higher than critical value of the volume of bit, 
it could produce an upset. In this way, the information stored in this memory bit 
is corrupted.  
 
 Scattering interactions of mainly hi-energy neutrons outside the aircraft 
appear mainly because of the presence of hydrogenous materials inside aircraft 
[21]. Hydrogen is, by far, the main cause of the energy reduction of the fast 
neutrons coming from Cosmic Rays. These interactions are neutron-nuclei 
reactions based on scattering, where nucleus interactions reduces the neutron 
kinetic energy. As heavier the nucleus is, less energy is removed from neutron 
in each interaction. After a sufficient number of these interactions against 
hydrogenous materials, the kinetic energy of neutrons is reduced about seven 
orders of magnitude as explained later in Figure 2.5. The limit of interactions is 
defined by the molecules of the aircraft volume tempered at 20ºC that 
corresponds to a 0.025eV (neutrons at energies lower than 1eV are considered 
as Epithermal and Thermal neutrons).  
 
Shielding calculations have been performed to analyze neutron fluxes inside 
aircraft as represented in Figure 2.1.a and Figure 2.1.b. A medium-range twin-
engine transport plane has been simulated. Internal volume of this transport 
plane has been homogeneous distributed with humans, plastics, air, fuel and 
metal alloy. 
 
  
Figure 2.1a 
Cargo Bay model of a medium-range 
twin-engine transport plane 
Figure 2.1b 
Front view of Cargo Bay model of a 
medium-range twin-engine transport plane 
  
By means of these scattering interactions calculated, neutron energy 
spectrum varies inside aircraft. They reduce the proportion of hi-energy 
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neutrons by increasing the neutrons at lower energies. Thermal neutron (<1 eV) 
fraction increases while hi-energy neutrons are reduced (>1 MeV) inside aircraft 
volume, [21]. 
 
Model used in shielding calculation is a simplification of the real architecture 
of fuselage of the cargo bay composed by aluminum alloy based on (2024) 
whose thickness has been adjusted in such way as the outside neutron flux of 
aircraft cross over an equivalent mass of such aluminum alloy. Volume inside of 
aircraft fuselage models an homogeneous material mixture of humans, plastics 
and other materials based on (H, C, O) that have special interest in the 
scattering interactions of hi-energy neutrons (neutrons at kinetic energies 
typically between hundreds of KeV and tens of MeV). Scattering property of 
these materials comes from its content of light materials able to yield neutrons 
when nucleus collision occurs. Due to H2 nucleus have similar mass as 
neutrons, they are the ones with higher scattering capabilities. As mass 
increases in components as C, O, Al, scattering capabilities are reduced 
because of kinetic collision. Incident neutrons will lose less energy in scattering 
interactions in every collision. Table 2.1 shows the composition used in 
simulations including the materials located inside aircraft volume. 
Homogeneous material placed inside aircraft volume is composed by a 71,29% 
of steel, 14,26% of plastics, 14,26% of humans and a 0.002% of air. 
 
Element Al alloy Humans Steel Plastics Air 
Al 94.98     
Li 2.2     
Mg 0.12     
Cu 2.7     
H  10.15  4.84  
O  64.46   21 
N  3.14  56.72 79 
C  18.23 0.5 38.44  
Ca  1.99    
P  1.09    
Cl  0.17    
K  0.38    
S  0.26    
Na  0.11    
Mg  0.04    
Fe   99.5   
 
Table 2.1. Material distribution inside aircraft volume. 
 
The source of atmospheric neutrons used in shielding calculations have 
been obtained from NASA flight data at 40.000 fts (12 km approx.) and 45º 
latitude [2]. These atmospheric neutron fluxes from outside of aircraft have been 
used, Figure 2.2, in calculations to obtain the atmospheric neutron fluxes inside 
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aircraft once crossed over the fuselage and interacts with the homogenous 
volume inside aircraft.  
 
Hi-energy neutron range used from Figure 2.2 is only the ones in the range 
of energies between 1 to 20 MeV. In order not to disturb the results obtained in 
simulation, no other range of energies has been used as source in calculation. 
Therefore, results obtained in the complete energy distribution are exclusively 
obtained from the scattering interactions from this range of neutron energy, 1 to 
20 MeV. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Energy spectral distribution of neutron flux at 40.000 fts outside of aircraft.  
 
 Figure 2.3 represents the source of neutrons outside of aircraft used for 
calculations (NASA flight data) and also the flux inside aircraft obtained from the 
simulations at same range of energies, 1 to 20Mev. As shown in Figure 2.3 the 
flux inside aircraft is clearly reduced due to scattering interactions with the 
homogeneous medium inside aircraft volume. The flux is reduced more than 
one order of magnitude according to calculations performed. 
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Figure 2.3. Aircraft neutron energy spectral distribution at 40.000 fts  
 
As Figure 2.4 shows, elastic scattering is the most probabilistic reaction. In 
this reaction the neutron loses energy in the collision against the proton of 
Hydrogen nucleus. In the range of high energies, the probability of any other 
reaction is almost negligible being the radioactive capture (n, g) in range of 4 
orders of magnitude lower than elastic scattering.  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Comparison between total numbers of reactions,  
elastic reactions and radioactive capture reactions 
 
Figure 2.4 is confirmed in the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) obtained 
from National Nuclear Data Center (NNDC) [20]. This center includes a core 
nuclear reaction database containing evaluated cross sections, spectra, angular 
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distributions, fission product yields, thermal neutron scattering, photo-atomic 
and other data, with emphasis on neutron-induced reactions. Information used 
comes from libraries as ENDF/B-VII.1 (USA, 2011), ENDF/B-VII.0 (USA, 2006), 
JEFF-3.2 (Europe, 2014), JENDL-4.0 (Japan, 2010), JENDL-3.3 (Japan, 2002), 
CENDL-3.1 (China, 2009), ROSFOND (Russia, 2010), ENDF/B-VI.8 (USA, 
2001) and ENDF/B-V.2 (USA, 1994) [20]. 
 
According to results obtained in shielding calculation inside aircraft volume, 
all the interactions of a neutrons from the range 1 to 20 MeV against any of the 
nucleus proposed as homogeneous volume of aircraft (isotopes of Fe, Al, Ca, 
N, O, C, H, Mg, Cl, K…) do not increase the flux of neutrons in that range of 
energies, 1 to 20 MeV. In other hand, the initial neutron energy spectrum is 
reduced due to elastic scattering interaction of neutron with different nucleus. In 
those reactions, those neutrons loose kinetic energy generating neutrons with 
lower kinetic energy.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the neutron energy distribution calculated inside aircraft 
from a source of hi-energy neutrons within energies between 1 to 20 MeV. 
Thermal neutron flux appeared inside aircraft increases based on two factors, 
neutrons scattered from the source of hi-energy neutrons simulated and 
neutrons scattered from keV neutron range. By means of these scattering 
interactions, neutron energy spectrum varies inside aircraft. They reduce the 
proportion of hi-energy neutrons by increasing the neutrons at lower energies. 
Thermal neutron (<1eV) fraction increases up to 46% while hi-energy neutrons 
are reduced to 9% (1-10MeV) and 26% (>10MeV) respectively inside aircraft 
volume, [21]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Neutron differential flux calculated inside aircraft due to  
scattering interaction from an external source of neutron 1-20MeV 
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Neutron themselves do not create direct ionization in silicon since it is 
neutral. It strongly interacts with nuclei of materials of electronics matter. 
Several ions are generated under a probability basis depending on the incident 
neutron energy, direction and ion shower created. Lighter particles, as α, are 
dangerous around their Bragg peak which could occur several tens or hundreds 
of microns away from the generation point. The main effects are divided in two 
groups depending on incident neutron energy [17]: Hi-energy neutrons and 
Thermal neutrons interactions. 
 
First group of neutron interactions is based on Hi-energy neutron against 
Silicon nucleus of matter as represented in Figure 2.6. Silicon matter is 
composed by the sum of the three isotopes weighted by their relative 
abundance, being 92,2% of composition based on 28Si (29Si is 4,6% and 30Si is 
3,1%). The absorption of neutron by silicon nucleus, 28Si, forms the excited 
nucleus 29Si, causing probabilistically the restructuration of nucleons. Kinetic 
energy is shared between fragments and momentum is conserved, thus 
fragments are emitted in opposite directions. MonteCarlo simulations [16] reach 
probabilistic reactions of fragments obtained from n-Si interactions at energies 
lower than 1 MeV, as shown in figure 2.6.  
• n + 28Si  25Mg + α   
• n + 28Si  27Al + d  
• n + 28Si  24Mg + α + n 
• n + 28Si  28Al + p  
 
 
Figure 2.6: n-Si fragments 
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Many reactions are possible and various particles can be emitted. Particles 
with contributions higher than 10% of the total production are represented in 
Figure 2.6 with an ion shower limited to two particles. The variety and number of 
fragments created in absorption reaction depends hugely on incident neutron 
energy [10], [16], and [24]. Ion shower could involve probabilistically up to nine 
particles [16], [20], and [24].  
 
Figure 2.7 represents the distance range and LET at different energies of the 
fragments created with incident neutrons in Si. They are calculated based on 
the Ziegler’s range tables [8] for 100 MeV incident neutrons. The average 
energy of fragments created, Mg and Al, is approximately 2,6 MeV with a range 
of 3µm at 80 fC/µm, increased up to 6µm and >100 fC/um at 10 MeV. These 
higher energy fragments can be generated relatively far from the sensitive 
volume of cell, then travel some microns within Si28 matter, having enough LET 
to deposit energy enough to upset the cell. 
 
Figure 2.7: Maximum range (µm) and LET deposited (fC/µm)  
calculation in silicon matter from Hi-e neutrons. 
 
 Figure 2.8 is obtained through Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) obtained 
from National Nuclear Data Center (NNDC) [20] in same way as Figure 2.4. The 
cross-section curve of 28Si (probabilities of iteration) with a neutron shows the 
low probability of radiation capture of incident neutron in full range of energies 
because the most probable iteration is based on elastic scattering in which 
neutron lose energy to 28Si nuclei reducing the kinetic energy of neutron. At high 
energy of incident neutrons, in range of 1 to 10 MeV, it is also shown the n-Si 
iterations commented before in which other isotopes of different components 
are obtained as 25Mg + α, 28Al + p, 27Al + d, 24Mg + α + n.  
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Figure 2.8: Cross-section curve of 28Si 
 
Second group of neutron interactions is based on interaction of Epithermal 
and Thermal neutrons (<1eV) scattered inside aircraft volume. They are not 
related to Silicon nucleus, but interact with impurities of silicon matter. Trace of 
radioactive materials contamination, [23], [25], in IC package or wafer 
fabrication processes as Uranium, Thorium, Boron are “fissile nucleus” being 
possible the radioactive capture. Most important “impurity” used during 
electronics manufacture processes is Boron. Boron was used extensively in 
electronics for borophosphosilicate glass (BPSG) dielectric layers to reduce the 
temperature of reflow process and as constituent of die and also as p-type 
dopant [17].  
 
Due to natural Boron is found naturally in two isotopes: B10 (19.9%) and B11 
(80.1%). Recent technologies have removed the BPSG and have tried to 
reduce the content of isotope B10 by a B11 purification process in rough 
materials. After BPSG removal from aerospace IC’s, current manufacturing 
processes are not able to remove all B10 isotopes and a semiconductor matter 
with low concentration of B10 is the closest process to pure B11 matter. This low 
B10 concentration matter reduces the B10 interaction rate, but involves an 
expensive and complex manufacturing process at the foundry. The most 
probable reactions obtained from n-B10 interaction with thermal neutrons are 
shown in Figure 2.9 and 2.10, [8], [9], [20], [23]: 
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• n-B10, neutron interactions at energies lower than 1 MeV: 
• n + B10  Li7 + α (He) + γ 
• n + B10  Li7 + α (He) 
 
 
Figure 2.9: n-B10 fragments obtaining isotope Li7 and He 
 
• n-B11, neutron interactions at energies close to 10 MeV: 
• n + B11  Li7 + α + n 
• n + B11  B10 + 2n  
• n + B11  Be10 + n + p 
 
 
Figure 2.10: n-B11 fragments obtaining isotope B10 
 
According to IEC62396-5 [2], total SEU rates in devices should be calculated 
from the SEU rate calculated from Hi-energy neutrons multiplied by a factor to 
take in account the effect of thermal neutrons. In case of devices that contain 
BPSG, this factor could vary within a range 1 to 10. Other estimations [17] from 
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experimental results approximates this factor lower than 2, for devices with no 
content of BPSG but using rough materials containing natural B10. Pure B11 
matter (very low concentration of B10 isotope) reduces more this factor. 
 
Thermal neutron absorption cross section of B10 is extremely high in 
comparison to most of other isotopes presented in semiconductor matter. 
Figure 2.11 also shows the Ziegler’s range tables [8] for α (He) and Li in Silicon 
obtained from B10-n reactions. Alpha particle and Lithium are emitted in 
opposite directions to conserve momentum. Li7 is emitted at 1MeV with a LET 
of 21 fC/µm with a range of 3µm while alpha particle is emitted with a LET of 13 
fC/µm with a range of 4µm. To define if a cell is upset, it is necessary that 
secondary fragment tracks cross the sensitive volume of cell and deposits 
enough energy to upset the cell, SEU 
 
Figure 2.11: Maximum range (µm) and LET deposited (fC/µm) 
calculation in silicon matter from Thermal neutrons. 
 
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 represents the cross-section curve of B10 (probabilities 
of iteration) with a neutron. They are also obtained through Evaluated Nuclear 
Data File (ENDF) obtained from National Nuclear Data Center (NNDC), [20]. 
They show the high probability of neutron capture dominates in range of 
energies below 1 keV, shown the n-B10 iterations commented before in which 
other components are obtained as Li7 + α. In range of energies above 1MeV the 
most probable iteration is based on elastic scattering in which neutron yields 
energy to B10 nuclei reducing the kinetic energy of neutron. Other reactions 
could be also obtained with lower probabilities as Be10 + p and Be9 + d (H1). 
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Figure 2.12: Cross-section curve of B10 
 
The cross-section curve of B11 (probabilities of iteration) with a neutron is 
quite different as the cross-section curve of B10. Neutrons with incident low 
energies cause the nuclear capture in B10 while B11 experiments a scattering 
interaction where neutron loose energy in the collision. B11 shows a very low 
probability of neutron capture in the range of energies below 10 MeV where the 
most probable iteration is based on elastic scattering in which neutron loose 
energy to B11 nuclei, reducing the kinetic energy of neutron. Furthermore it is 
also shown that the most probable n-B11 iterations with neutrons with high 
incident energy, above 10MeV, create other components as B10 + 2n, Li7 + α 
and Be10 + p. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Cross-section curve of B11 
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 SINGLE EVENT UPSET (SEU)  2.1.1
 
The first failures due to the effects of cosmic rays were observed in 
electronics in 1975. This kind of radiation has been monitored at A/C flight 
altitudes since 1992, [25]. Their effects are related to SEU (Single Event Upset) 
that is part of Single Event Effect (SEE) that is a pure Hardware issue as it 
occurs when a bit is upset due to ionizing particle impact. 
 
After nuclear absorption of high energy particles in Silicon medium in 
airborne electronics, charged fragments are emitted simultaneously and deposit 
LET in matter. As commented in previous paragraph, a cell is upset if nuclear 
fragment tracks cross cell sensitive volume and deposits enough energy to 
upset the cell. Downscaling evolution has two contradictory effects: less charge 
to upset but smaller sensitive volume. Fragments could achieve longer 
distances keeping enough charge to upset but the probability to impact is lower 
because sensitive volume is also reduced, then SEU rates evolution is not easy 
to predict. A clear effect of this downscaling evolution is that intercell distances 
between sensitive volumes (µm order) will be lower with technology integration 
[9], [15]. This implies that fragments from n-28Si or n-B10 reactions, Figure 2.6, 
2.9 and 2.10, could upset multiple cells, increasing strongly MCU probability. In 
n-28Si reactions, [10], [11], Mg and Al isotopes are clearly the main contributors 
to MCU while for n-B10 reactions [12], the natural boron doping level determines 
the effect. 
 
 SEU could occur in the memory devices that contain the executable program 
or Configuration Code of FPGA causing a bug in functionalities. In SRAM-based 
FPGA, memory is divided into two blocks which are the Configuration-code and 
the User-programmable code. Configuration-code is used to specify the LUTs 
(Lookup tables), routing connection blocks and I/Os into FPGA while User-
programmable code is the logic that keeps circuit functionality. The main share 
of memory, more than 90%, is routing connections. Since all resources of these 
devices are all susceptible to SEU, if an unintended instruction is commanded 
in avionics, it could cause a potential catastrophic or hazardous condition. 
Therefore a redundant technique must be adopted to all of them. The main 
problem is related to the possibility that the system apparently could continue 
working even though some bits have changed its state (hidden failure), which 
means a different configuration performing unintended activities. Consequences 
of these effects, caused in radiated Hardware, are listed as follows: 
 
• Spurious signal or voltage, induced by the deposition of charge by a 
single particle that can propagate through the circuit path during one 
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clock cycle. It is a non-destructive effect as transient errors that cause a 
temporary upset called Single Event Transient (SET). 
 
• “Soft” permanent hardware error that causes a change of memory cell 
value, called SEU, Single Event Upset. It is “Soft error” because it can be 
corrected including appropriate mitigation means. Single event upset 
(SEU) is the most common type of a single event effect. SEU is caused 
by the deposition of charge in a device by a single particle that is 
sufficient to change the logic state of a single bit from one binary state to 
the other. 
 
• “Soft” permanent hardware error that causes several changes of memory 
cells, called multiple bit upset (MBU) refers to multiple bits being upset 
during the same SEE interaction by one fragment or by several 
fragments simultaneously. MBU differs from multiple cell upset (MCU) in 
which two or more bits (cells) are upset, usually bits physically located 
near each other, but not necessarily in the same logical word. 
 
• Permanent destructive effect due to the rupture of the bit called Single 
Event Burnouts (SEB), “hard error”. Burn out of a powered electronic 
component as a result of the energy absorption triggered by an individual 
radiation event. 
 
• Single event functional interrupt (SEFI) refers to a SEU in a device, 
usually a complex device, for example, a microprocessor, such that a 
control path is corrupted, leading the part to cease to function properly, 
for example the bit that controls important downstream operations. 
 
• Permanent destructive effect called Single Event Latch-up (SEL) 
depending on exposed time in which transistors are kept latched in 
electrical short-circuit causing thermal damage. The latched path will 
persist until power is removed from the device, so power shall be 
recycled to restore normal operation. In case mitigation technique against 
SEL is not intended, SEL should be considered a “hard error”. 
 
Traditionally these effects are related to volatile RAM memories because the 
non-volatile Flash ROM memory has been very tolerant to the neutrons in 
atmospheric radiation because the bit construction does not depend on the 
critical charge of the node. However at feature sizes, Flash memories start to 
become susceptible to various SEE, including SEFI. Total ionizing dose (TID) 
effects refer to the cumulative effect of ionization in to bit physical architecture. 
Flash memory device leading to a gradual degradation of electrical parameters. 
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Ionizing dose is contributed by all of the major particles that constitute the 
radiation environment within the atmosphere as neutrons.  
 
 Several experiments have verified the fairly linear relationships between flux, 
critical charge of cell and operational frequency versus error rate. These are the 
three factors that state a fundamental limitation in bit scaling Moore's law 
(reduction of bit size and storage charge to increase bit density). The most 
important way to analyze how SEU can affect design is given by the fairly linear 
relationship between the flux and error rate, [2]: 
 
 𝑺𝑬𝑼 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 = 𝑭𝒍𝒖𝒙 ·  𝛔 · 𝐍𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐬 Eq. 2.1 
  
Where Flux is defined as the atmospheric differential flux at which particles 
hit an electronic area over Energy spectrum (MeV), measured as 
particles/cm2/s.  
 
“Plateau cross section” determined empirically, represented as σ, is defined 
as the SEE susceptibility of an electronic device to ionizing radiation. Cross-
section σ in radiation terms for proton and neutron interactions is the 
combination of sensitive area and probability of an interaction depositing the 
critical charge for a SEE. The cross-section may be calculated using the 
following formula: σ = number of errors / particle flux. This data should be 
obtained by an experimental test in each component along a wide range of 
energy transferred to the device, because it highly depends on the internal 
design of bits. The units for cross-section are cm2 per device or per bit. 
 
 Approximate values for current technology, extracted as an average of 
Weibull distributions of different components, are given for a rough analysis as:  
 
σHEAVY ION ≈ between 10-7 and 10-6 cm2/bit 
σNEUTRON ≈ 10-13 cm2/bit. 
 
The total amount of bits saved in memories on board in an aircraft is the key 
characteristic to determine the problem caused by neutron flux and its SEU rate 
induction. 
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 MULTIPLE BIT UPSET (MCU) 2.1.2
 
After nuclear absorption, charged fragments emitted simultaneously deposit 
LET in matter. MCU appears when each fragment upsets a single cell 
simultaneously, as Type 5 shown in Figure 2.14, or if only one fragment upsets 
several cells, as Type 2, 3 and 4. MCU could be usually found in bits physically 
located near each other, but not necessarily in same data word.  
  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Typical MCU patterns 
 
A clear effect of this downscaling evolution is that intercell distances between 
sensitive volumes (µm order) will be lower with technology integration [9], [15]. 
This will imply a clear increment of ratio MCU/SEU will be then expected due to 
several charged fragments are emitted simultaneously being each fragment 
able to upset a single cell simultaneously or if only one fragment upsets several 
cells due to intercell distances are highly reduced. 
 
As commented in previous paragraph, a cell is upset if nuclear fragment 
tracks cross cell sensitive volume and deposits enough energy to upset the cell. 
Device downscaling evolution has become a concern because reduces the 
critical charge required to upset the cell due to voltage supply and cell volume 
capacitance reduction.  
 
Critical charge is the smallest charge that keeps the bit architecture stable in 
one of the two possible states. If a charge higher than the critical one for certain 
bit architecture is injected or deposited by SEE in the sensitive volume of cell, 
there is a high probability that the bit architecture become unstable changing 
the value stored. For many devices, the unit applied was the picocoulomb (pC). 
Due to scaling evolution, the critical charge in new small geometries in bit 
design architecture is measured in femtocoulomb (fC). Simulations, [9], [15], 
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[16], [18], of intercell layouts for modern technologies fabricated in 130 and 
250nm feature size estimate a reduction of critical charge to upset the cell to 
11-17 fC. In 65 to 90 nm feature size technology, it becomes smaller to 1-7 fC.  
 
According to [13], [14], [35], [36], and [37] MCU patterns (Row x Column) are 
characterized by the number of bits effected in spatial distribution in rows and 
columns in memory. Most events are identified as 1x1, SEU shown in Type 1 in 
Figure 2.14, but the total number of events in MCU are relative large. It affects 
to many rows and few columns of a memory structure depending on neutron 
incidence angle. Different patterns are found as 1x2, 2x1, 2x2, 2x4, 3x2 and 
4x1, [12], marked in Figure 2.14 as Type 2, 3 or 4. MCU exhibits a strong 
dependence on device orientation as represented in Figure 2.15, because 
increases the total number of bits in patterns at 79º neutron incidence angle 
[22], as Type 5 in Figure 2.14. Therefore, maximum range estimated in a 
conservative way (maximum number of bits affected in line) is 5 bits while 
maximum number of bits affected estimated (sum of all bits affected between 
rows and columns) in MCU is up to 12 bits, [10], [12], [13]. As per IEC62396-1 
[2], for future devices with feature sizes <35nm, a 100% of SEU/MCU fraction is 
expected being highly affected by angle of incidence. MCU fraction could 
increase from a 30% at 45º up to 80% at 90º incidence. An example of 
SEU/MCU fraction depending on elevation incidence angle is shown in Figure 
2.15. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15. MCU/SEU fraction in a SRAM device as a function of neutron angle of incidence 
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2.2 CURRENT SOLUTIONS IN AIRBORNE ELECTRONICS 
  
As described in previous paragraphs, SEEs could be a “soft” permanent 
error that causes a change of memory cell value. This error could be exhibited 
in its single effect, SEU, or in its multiple effect, MCU. State-of-the-art of 
solutions to mitigate the effects of SEU/MCU is divided into categories: 
reconfiguration-based and redundancy-based solutions. First ones restore as 
soon as possible the original values in memory after SEE event while second 
ones mask SEE effects to the circuit outputs via redundancy with the purpose to 
remove all single points of failure in the circuit.  
 
Redundancy-based techniques are not intended to remove SEU events. 
These methods mask SEE effects to the circuit outputs via redundancy with the 
purpose to remove all single points of failure in the circuit mitigating in this way 
the propagation to the circuit outputs. In some non-safety critical applications, it 
is sufficient to detect an error caused by SEU and just flag whether there is data 
affected, invalid or corrupted. One method is the duplication of functionalities, 
[7], [28], [31], where the system could detect errors based in outputs monitoring 
comparison. This method is able to detect that a function is in fault but there is 
no possibility to detect which one is in fault, because there is no evidence about 
which logic is working properly. 
 
 When SEU fault masking is mandatory in safety critical applications, a fault 
tolerant system should be implemented. That means that only detection 
capability is not enough, and correction capability is required. In fault tolerant 
systems, most common architecture is TMR, triplication of functionalities, where 
monitor comparison [28], [31], typically voting circuit, could also discriminate 
which function is in fault. These techniques come with high area overheads due 
to TMR design and also require a coupled reconfiguration-based technique to 
support the soft error accumulation removal in memory.  
  
Reconfiguration-based solutions try to restore as soon as possible the 
original values in memory after SEE event. These methods introduce a 
resources overheads corresponding to the circuit required to control the 
periodically bitstream rewritten procedure.  
 
State-of-the-art of different FPGA suppliers allows the partial reconfiguration 
to rewrite only the selected part without stop the circuit implemented in device 
for a shorter period of time. Readback is a post-configuration read operation of 
the configuration memory used to verify that the status design downloaded is 
right. Readback is the process of reading all the data in the internal 
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configuration memory while Partial Reconfiguration is a post-configuration write 
operation to the configuration memory.  
 
FPGA technology provides the flexibility of on-site programming with Partial 
Reconfiguration. It is based on the modification of an operating FPGA design by 
loading a partial configuration file, usually a partial BIT file, as shown in Figure 
2.16. Partial BIT files can be downloaded to modify reconfigurable regions in the 
FPGA without compromising the integrity of the application 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Partial reconfiguration BIT files 
 
A simpler method to SEU correction is to omit readback and detection of 
SEUs and simply reload the entire Frame segment at a chosen interval. This is 
called "scrubbing." Scrubbing requires substantially less overhead in the logic 
system, but does mean that the configuration logic is likely to be in "write mode" 
for a greater percentage of time. Furthermore, it is required to implement a 
hard-copy of the data to use in the reloading process. 
 
The more traditional method of verification of the data stored in configuration 
memory is to readback the data and performs a bit for bit comparison. This 
requires the use of the original file and the readback file which are equal in size 
to the original bit-stream used to configure the FPGA. This method would 
effectively require triple the amount of system memory to detect SEU events.  
 
Most popular technique is EDAC based on Single/Multiple-error correcting 
techniques, as Hamming, BCH, R-S, Berger codes that reduces the resources 
required. The most important drawback of multi-error correcting codes is that 
their logic complexity increase exponentially as range of maximum error 
correction capability, Figure 2.17. This topic is an important factor to take into 
account when architecture is designed for MCU correction.  
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Figure 2.17. BCH resources required as error correcting range increases 
 
  Some reconfiguration-based and redundancy-based strategies are listed 
below: 
 
1. Parity bits (PAR), it is a low latency process able to detect an odd number 
of bit errors. A parity bit could be added in the original binary code indicating 
if the total number of bits with the value one is even or odd. Parity bits are 
used as the simplest form of error detecting code. This technique fails to 
detect a failure when there is more than one error in data [34]. 
  
2. Double Modular redundancy (DMR) is also a fault-tolerant redundancy 
based on dual modular copies of system. Double Modular Redundancy 
(DMR) is also used based on duplication of data. Error detection is based 
on a voting comparison between the outputs generated by the different 
copies of same code [26], [28]. This kind of system is able to detect errors 
in any of the copies but not to detect which one is in fault. This technique 
also requires a coupled reconfiguration-based technique to support the 
correction of soft error and the error accumulation in memory. 
 
 
Figure 2.18. DMR scheme 
 
3. Triple Modular redundancy (TMR) is a fault-tolerant redundancy based on 
modular copies of system. Three systems perform the same process and 
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those results are processed by a majority-voting system to produce a single 
output. If any one of the three systems fails, the other two systems can 
detect which system is fault and mask the fault to system outputs. This 
technique also requires a coupled reconfiguration-based technique to 
support the correction of soft error and the error accumulation in memory. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19. TMR scheme 
 
 Error detection is based on a voting comparison, low latency process, 
between the outputs generated by the different copies of same code [7], 
[28]. Some communication systems use N-modular redundancy as a 
simple form of forward error correction. For example, 5-modular redundancy 
communication systems use the majority of 5 samples, if any 2 of the 5 
results are erroneous, the other 3 results can correct and mask the fault.  
 
4. Single Error detection and Correction codes (SEC) as Hamming codes, [5], 
[6], [7], [28]. An error-correcting code (ECC) is a system that adds 
redundant bits to the original bitstream, being capable to recover even when 
a number of errors (up to the capability of the code being used). Error-
correcting codes are usually distinguished between convolutional codes and 
block codes: 
 
 Linear Block codes. It is an error-correcting code for which any linear 
combination of codewords is also a codeword. Most typical 
application of these linear block codes are the parity. The principle to 
encode is based on a generator identity matrix with by the 
combination of two or more codewords.  
 
 Hamming codes pertains to the linear error-correcting codes that can 
correct one-bit errors in the complete bitstream. An improvement of 
Hamming code is the Extended Hamming code that has the 
capability to correct one error but also to detect two errors by adding 
a parity bit to the Hamming code 
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 Convolutional codes. It is an error-correcting code that process on a 
bit-by-bit basis. Convolutional codes unlike systematic block codes, 
the sender does not send the message bits followed by the parity 
bits. In a convolutional code, the sender sends only the parity bits. 
The encoder uses a sliding window to calculate the parity bits by 
combining various subsets of bits in the window 
 
 Cyclic codes. It is an error-correcting code based on linear codes in 
which all properties of linearity and the associated techniques apply 
equally to cyclic codes. The cyclic code includes a property in which 
any codeword is generated by other codeword shifted cyclically. 
Therefore, all codewords can be generated from a single bitstream 
by shifting the codeword. From a starting generator sequence, it is 
shifted it cyclically left until all positions are registered.  
 
 A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is a single-error detecting cyclic 
code. The generator polynomial is used as the divisor of the 
polynomial. Therefore, the input data is used as the dividend, and 
where the remainder becomes the result. CRCs are easy to 
implement in hardware. 
  
5. EDAC, Error Detection and correction codes, designed to correct multiple 
errors (MEC) in data based on Reed–Solomon, BCH, and Berger. [26], [28], 
[29], [30], [31]. Code complexity increases exponentially as range of error 
correction capability. As higher number of error correction capability, higher 
consumption of resources in FPGA is requested, as adders, multiplexors 
and FFs. Single error correction codes as Hamming code are particular 
cases of these multi error correction codes where correction capability is set 
to one error. 
 
 BCH codes are cyclic error-correcting codes that are based on finite 
fields. BCH code is designed to correct a certain number of symbol 
errors. It is possible to design binary BCH codes that can correct 
multiple bit errors. Main advantage of BCH codes is the ease 
decoding, known as syndrome decoding. 
 
 BCH codes are used in applications such as satellite 
communications,[2] compact disc players, DVDs, disk drives, solid-
state drives[3] and two-dimensional bar codes 
 
 Reed–Solomon (RS) codes is a non-binary cyclic error-correcting 
code that could detect and correct multiple random symbol errors. An 
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RS code can detect any combination erroneous symbols and correct 
error up to half of the symbols. In Reed–Solomon coding, source 
symbols are viewed as coefficients of a polynomial p(x). Reed-
Salomon code (RS) has been studied being recognized to be a 
special case of multilevel BCH codes, in which decoding methods 
are similar to those used for binary BCH [6]. 
 
 Reed–Solomon codes have since found important applications from 
deep-space communication to consumer electronics. They are 
prominently used in consumer electronics such as CDs, DVDs, Blu-
ray Discs, in data transmission technologies such as DSL and 
WiMAX, in broadcast systems such as DVB and ATSC, and in 
computer applications. 
 
6. Watchdog timer to reset system or Boot Reconfiguration [7], [32], [33], able 
to detect timing and scheduling errors, as [27] based on external FPGA. A 
watchdog timer (WDT) is an electronic timer that is used to detect and 
recover malfunctions. During normal operation, the FPGA synchronously 
flip the watchdog timer to prevent it from delays. If, there is an error in which 
FPGA is not able to restart the watchdog, the timer generates a timeout 
signal. The corrective actions typically include a safe state or a boot 
reconfiguration. 
 
7. Shielding protection increases greatly the weight of system not achieving 
enough attenuation. The shielding effect describes the interactions between 
an electron and the nucleus in any atom. Shielding effect acts as a reduction 
in the effective nuclear charge on the electron shower reducing the kinetic 
energy.  
 
 Figure 2.20 represents a comparison of State-of-the-art techniques that have 
been done in terms of resource consumption and scrubbing timing. Most 
popular techniques are DMR/TMR and EDAC for multiple error correction 
(MEC). TMR is an approach based on the triplication of critical functionalities for 
SEU/MCU masking protection. TMR triplicates each register into three different 
flip-flops, for that reason TMR has been placed in the top part of graph where 
three units of same system is required to decide the correct state of the register. 
TMR requires extra memory space (x3) and/or voting system, incurring extra 
cost, components, weight, space, dissipation power and higher dimensions for 
PCBs. 
 
 DMR is also an approach that is based in a copy of system as TMR. In this 
case it is based on the duplication of critical functionalities for SEU/MCU 
masking protection. DMR duplicates each register into two different flip-flops, for 
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that reason DMR has been placed also in the top part of graph where two units 
of same system is required to decide that a failure has been produced In any of 
both registers because it can determine that a failure has occurred but it cannot 
decide which one is in failure. 
 
Parity bit is the quickest techniques to detect an odd number of bit errors. It 
is also one of the simplest forms of error detecting code. Main drawback of this 
technique is that it fails to detect a failure when there is an even number of 
errors in data. 
  
EDAC architecture is an approach that reduces the resources required when 
compared to DMR/TMR. EDAC could be based on Single-error correcting 
techniques, as Hamming code, although fail to detect MCU. To solve this issue, 
other EDAC architectures based on Multiple-error correcting techniques (MEC), 
as BCH, R-S, Berger.., are used but require much more resources than SEC 
due to coding complexity increases as range of errors to be corrected are 
required. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20. State-of-the-art of Mitigation techniques 
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As explained in Chapter 2, the classical fault tolerant solution against SEE 
effects is TMR plus scrubbing. The proposed work in this Thesis equally 
performs under the fault tolerant approach, improving the resources involved, 
mainly reducing the operation time and the memory overheads, compared with 
the classical solution. 
 
The proposed solution is composed of: 
 The Physical Architecture. 
 The Operation Algorithm. 
. 
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3.1 BASIC PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the basic Physical Architecture, composed of: 
 
 The SRAM memory. A simplified memory of 17x8 bits is chosen as 
example in this text to show all the concepts. This memory is split into: 
 Most of this memory corresponds to passive data (grey bits, 
from A1 to H16 in our example). 
 There are also some bits which are used for the scrubbing 
function itself (SEC1), which is identically duplicated (SEC2).  
 There are also some bits in it which are used as the reference 
(from A17 to H17) for the scrubbing function (checksum and 
parity bits). 
 
 Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB): this is a set of just a very few bits which are 
not susceptible to radiation. They have the essential information to 
retrieve the scrubbing reference (from A17 to H17) when required, even 
under radiation event.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Proposed archtiecture  
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SEE could occur in any bit at SRAM (A1 to H17). Failures in these memories 
could cause a potential catastrophic or hazardous condition in aircrafts. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the SRAM memories (also Flash memories for Flash-
based FPGAs) of Complex Electronic devices are vulnerable to the potential 
effects of the airborne radiation environment. This architecture would guarantee 
the integrity of this passive Data (Configuration Code of an FPGA) and, 
therefore, could certify these systems as safety critical applications in aircrafts, 
fulfilling Standards (Section 1.1.).  
 
Furthermore, the Hardwired Seed Bits, HSB, are also added in the Physical 
implementation side as the permanent reference of architecture. This reference 
contains the essential information, neutral to radiation, from which errors in 
original data can be retrieved. There is still a risk of having an upset in the HSB, 
although this risk has been eliminated due to the their physical implementation. 
This reference is not saved physically in SRAM memory. In order to be neutral 
to radiation, It shall be somehow physically implemented to prevent the 
vulnerability to radiation, for example, pull-up resistors, ROM or a Hardened 
memory. 
 
Figure 3.1 also allows a Multilevel Architecture operation approach. This 
means that checksum and parity are checked first from HSB, and then Data is 
checked from checksum and parity. This multilevel approach allows an 
significant (exponential mode) reduction ratio between the amount of data and 
the size of the required essential reference (HSB) for retrieving it from errors.  
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3.2 BASIC OPERATION ALGORITHM 
 
The SRAM is part of a digital system in which there is also a processor 
(FPGA, microprocessor, DSP, etc) that executes all the functions (main 
functions and scrubbing algorithm). The entire memory is sequentially 
scrubbed, periodically inserting the scrubbing operation within the main function 
operation. Therefore, execution time must be shared among the functions to be 
performed by the processor. One of the key objectives of a proposed HSB 
architecture is to reduce the time consumption by decoupling the detection 
tasks from the correction activities. 
 
Instead of a Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), a Double Modular 
Redundancy (DMR) scrubbing function approach is applied in this Architecture. 
As explained after, Double redundancy is enough to meet fault tolerant 
requirements, thanks to the Operation Algorithm, as explained at 3.3. 
 
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 represent the main steps of the scrubbing 
procedure, where the arrows link the data to be scrubbed to its associated 
reference data to be used by SEC function. The operation algorithm is executed 
in two consecutive steps as follows:  
 
1. Step 1 (Fig. 3.2). 
 Target: Checking the retrieving system, guaranteeing the 
Checkword (checksum + parity) to be cleared. 
 Action: Comparison between Checkword and SEC syndrome 
computation (SEC output from HSB). 
The possible scenarios in this Step are as follows: 
 
1.1. An error has been identified in the Checkword level through a 
mismatch in the previous comparison. Scrubbing procedure is 
then launched to correct the found Checksum error . After this 
action, Checksum is healthily ready to be applied at step 2. 
1.2. There is a matching in the comparison, no error is found at 
the Checkword Level, which is already healthily ready to be 
applied at step 2. 
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Figure. 3.2. Both SEC functions assess Checkword from HSB 
 
2. Step 2 (Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4) 
 Target: Data Level guaranteed to be cleared 
 Action: Detection (parity function) and Correction if requested  
 
The Checkword level is composed of the checksum bits for 
correction and an additional bit for a just parity error detection, 
which constitutes the SEC reference for the data level to be 
scrubbed. SEC function can be used in this case. The possible 
scenarios under this step are as follows: 
 
2.1 Error Detection, Fig. 3.3: only the parity bit is used to detect 
possible errors at the data level.  
2.2 Error Correction, Fig. 3.4, when required. If an upset is 
detected through parity bit, it means that there is a single 
corrupted bit in an unknown position within the data level. In 
this case, SEC scrubbing function is applied to identify and 
correct the error from Checksum bits. 
2.3 If no error is detected, correction (step 2.2) is skipped, saving 
time within an optimized operation. 
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Figure. 3.3. Parity assessment of Data Level bits 
 
 
Figure. 3.4. Data level correction from Checkword data 
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Figures 3.5 represents the operational flux algorithm according to the steps 
commented before. The algorithm is run cyclically in order to keep the integrity 
of the memory data.  
 
The time involved applying this process is significantly low due to the 
following facts: 
 No errors take place in memory most of the time and just the Principal 
Operation line is required to be performed under no error condition. 
Principal Operation line is composed of just two computations, the 
Checksum validation and the Data Parity error detection. 
 Checksum validation is also a very light time operation due to: 
o As explained later, Single Error Correction (SEC) techniques 
are enough in the proposed Architecture instead of Multiple 
Error techniques, since no more than one error is guaranteed 
to take place at each scrubbing. 
o SEC function is applied for just checking the Checksum bits 
from the HSB 
 Parity error detection is a very light time operation itself. Again, Parity 
detection is enough since no more than one error is guaranteed for 
each scrubbing in this Architecture, as explained later. 
 
Although error events are potentially dramatic from the aircrafts operation 
point of view, error correction takes place scarcely when compared with the no 
error time operation (Principal Operation Line). To illustrate it, let’s consider one 
radiation event on memory per week as a rough ratio for a commercial aircraft. 
This is a risky ratio from the aircraft operation point of view since there is a 
crash possibility every week. However, the Error Correction time involved is 
negligible, less than (let’s say) a second per week, while Parity and Checksum 
validation operation are continuously executed Therefore, the main computing 
time consumption worthy it to be optimized is the Principal Operation Line 
computation. 
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Figure. 3.5. SEU Algorithm used in architecture 
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3.3 ARCHITECTURE ISSUES 
 
The basics of a system to retrieve Bit Errors in a memory have been 
explained in this chapter. However, different issues may be arised when aiming 
to a Fault Tolerant System performance, in an actual radiated aerospace 
environment. They are as follows: 
 
ISSUE 1: MCU space distribution 
 
A Single Event Effect (SEE) could lead to a MCU, which means that a set of 
neighbor bits have been upset due to a neutron radiation event. As explained in 
Chapter 2, according to [12], [13], [14], [35], [36] and [37], MCU shape patterns 
(Row x Column) are characterized by the number of bits affected in a spatial 
distribution by rows and columns in memory. The probability of having a SEU 
event (just 1x1) depends on the incidence angle of the radiation and, in general, 
the probability of having an MCU event is quite high. 
 
Current Error Correction Techniques were explained in Chapter 2. Single-
error correcting techniques are simple to use with low resources consumption 
(time processing and memory). However, they seem not to be suitable in this 
case since more than one cell might be affected at the same time. On the other 
hand, Multiple-error correcting techniques such as BCH could solve the 
problem, though they could be unpractical due to the resources involved to 
implement it. Eventually, TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy) is chosen as the 
most balanced solution so far, assuming the redundancy level cost. 
 
The Issue that may be raised here is: 
  
 Is this architecture able to optimize the TMR performance against a 
MCU? 
 
ISSUE 2: Fault Tolerance performance 
 
 Fault-Tolerant requirements imply downsizing the error probability to below a 
certified threshold, normally defined as Design Assurance Level (DAL) within 
the Aerospace Industry. This condition means that the system must guarantee 
the proper operation even under a failure of any of its components. 
 
The SECs functions stored in memories might be affected themselves by an 
MCU, which means that the Error Correction would not be fully guaranteed in 
this case. Therefore, the second Issue that may be arisen is: 
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 Is this architecture able to guarantee Fault Tolerant performance? 
 
ISSUE 3: HSB Implementation 
 
Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB) is a set of just a few bits which are not 
susceptible to radiation. As an example which will be explained later, 2044 data 
bits can be sheltered with just 4 HSB. On the other hand, these bits must be 
immune to radiation. Different ideas might be considered to implement them 
such as jumper pins (a pull-up/pull-down approach) or flash memory. 
 
The issue to consider in this case is: 
 
 How to physically implement the HSBs? 
 
 
 
 
  
  Novel Fault Tolerant MBU EDAC architecture 52 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED SOLUTION: 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
VIRTUAL-FRAMED HSB CONCEPT FOR MCU CORRECTION 
 
FAULT TOLERANT ARCHITECTURE 
 
DETAILED CODIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter 4 gives answers to the Architecture Issues concluded in 
Section 3.3. (Issues 1, 2 and 3). Issue 1 consists in how to deal with Multiple 
Cell events, which is answered in Section 4.1. Issue 2 consists in how to deal 
with events in the scrubbing function itself in order to meet Fault Tolerant 
requirements, which is answered in Section 4.2. Issue 3 consists in how to 
implement the HSB, which is faced in Section 4.3. 
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Multiple Cell Upsets (MCU) is an issue that has to be dealt with when 
designing electronics for working in a radiated environment. Furthermore, the 
constant evolution of ICs Integration Density causes an increment in the MCUs 
span. MCU solving could be addressed through Multiple Error Correction (MEC) 
Codes, as explained in Chapter 2, though they are not feasible from the 
practical point of view due to the computing resources involved (time and logic 
area) are exponentially increased with the simultaneous bits number to be 
corrected. Single Error Correction (SEC) Codes are suitable from the computing 
resources point of view, although the obviously are not able to solve 
simultaneous bits errors. However, if a subset of bits can be suitably extracted 
from the whole set of bits in such a way that no-more-than-one-bit-error is 
guaranteed to be found in the subset, then SEC Codes could be applied to each 
bits subset. This leads to the Interleaving concept, which is the procedure that 
allows defining a suitable subset of bits. Whereas MEC Codes are not feasible 
from the practical point of view to its exponential resources increase with the 
MCU size, Interleaving-SEC Codes solution allows an affordable solution due to 
its just linear increase of the operation time with MCU size. A suitable subset of 
bits is called a “virtual frame” in this work. Virtual frames generation from 
interleaving concept is explained in Section 4.1.  
 
On the other hand, there are some practical critical applications in which a 
failure may be defined as catastrophic, which means that it should not 
happened under any circumstance, frequently due to human life is involved. 
This leads to the idea of designing Fault Tolerant Systems, in which the system 
is guaranteed to keep an appropriate response even under a failure condition. 
These issues are typical, for example, in aviation applications, where failures in 
electronics under an increased radiated environment may take place.  
 
Fault-Tolerant systems are typically based on redundancy concept for storing 
and retrieving healthy information, for example, with a Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) scheme. The main issue with redundancy is design 
oversizing, since a simple voting system is applied with no Error Correction 
Codes involved. This Thesis proposes a new hybrid architecture that takes 
advantage of the optimized performance of Error Correction Codes from the 
oversize point of view, with extremely compressed redundant information that 
guarantees the information integrity even if an MCU takes place in the 
scrubbing function itself. Section 4.2 explains the proposed approach. 
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4.1 VIRTUAL-FRAMED INTERLEAVING FOR MCU CORRECTION 
  
MCU means that a set of neighbor bits have been simultaneously upset due 
to a neutron radiation event. Initially, single-error correcting techniques are not 
enough since more than one cell might be affected at the same time. However, 
techniques such as the Interleaving Distance (ID) approach enable overcoming 
it [35], [36]. The interleaving approach of this work mainly consists in reordering 
the real (physical) bits distribution into a virtual suitable subset of bits (virtual-
frame) in such a way that no-more-than-one-bit may be affected by radiation 
when scrubbing each virtual frame. If the previous condition is fulfilled, single-
error correcting techniques can be applied and, therefore, there is a significant 
performance improvement due to the light-weight SEC codes used. 
 
Typically, MCU correction implies a complex EDAC code that increases the 
process exponentially in terms of required resources. Interleaving Distance (ID) 
approach allows splitting the memory into frames to be scrubbed independently. 
This increases the resources linearly instead of exponentially, [6], [7]. Moreover, 
whereas detection (very light process based on parity) could be also performed 
in every frame, correction (still light for a single upset) is only carried out in the 
affected (detected) frames. As a result, this approach means a significant 
optimization 
 
In order to guarantee that there is no-more-than-one-bit in each frame, and 
interleaving distance ID has to be defined depending on the maximum MCU 
span. Each frame has to be composed of bits which are physically separated at 
least the MCU span itself. For instance, if a maximum MCU span of 5 bits is 
currently considered according to experience (Chapter 2), the minimum 
interleaving distance to be considered should be also 5 in order to split each 
error bit involved in the MCU into different frames. The interleaving distance has 
to be applied in both rows and columns in memory. 
  
To clarify this, a simplified memory of 17x8 bits is considered as example to 
show these concepts, in which a 5 bits MCU has been pointed in red (Fig. 4.1). 
The MCU span can be considered as 4 in Fig.4.1 since the maximum 
consecutive affected bits in either a row or column (column in this case) is 4. 
Therefore, an ID of 4 is chosen in this case as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Having this ID value for example purposes, the memory has been divided 
into 16 frames keeping the same ID distance, 4, in both directions. 
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Figure. 4.1. 17 x 8 bit memory divided in 16 frames. Bits affected by MCU are marked in red 
  
As a result: 
 
• The number of virtual frames to be considered depends on the ID 
distance, 4 in the example. Since the ID distance is applied to both rows 
and columns, there are 42 bits that must belong to a different frame. 
That means a maximum correction capability of 4x4 bit MCU. 
 
• In a bigger memory, the number of virtual frames would remain the 
same, since it only depends on the ID. On the other hand, the number 
of bits included in each virtual frame increases accordingly. For 
instance, if the memory size is increased from 64 bit to 256 bit (x4) 
having ID=4 and 16 frames in both cases, the number of bits per virtual 
frame increases from 4 to 16 (x4).  
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Figure. 4.2. Data bits of Frames affected by MCU event of Fig. 4.1. ID distance = 4 
ID 
ID 
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As shown in Figure 4.2, thanks to this suitable distribution of the whole 
memory matrix into frames, a 5-bit MCU event leads to a SEU problem in 5 
different frames, with only one error per frame. 
 
 This framed approach works successfully because the MCU event example 
in Fig.4.1 (3-bit span range with 5 bits as total number of bits affected) has a 
span lower than or equal to the distance, ID, previously set as 4 bits. 
Furthermore, the total number of bits affected by MCU event is also lower than 
the square of distance, ID2, which is 16 bits. This framed architecture allows 
converting a multiple bit upset problem into a single error one, SEU, distributing 
each upset bit into a different frame.  
 
 According to previous description of minimum distance for the framed 
architecture, the Interleaving Distance, ID, should be enough to cover the worst 
MCU pattern from the bit span point of view. According to Chapter 2, the 
maximum number of bits affected in an MCU event in the current technology 
state is not higher than 5 bits. This estimated span is expected to change in the 
future according to different factors such as the device integration density, 
supply voltages, radiation composition, etc.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows other example based on same memory with a 3-bit MCU 
event. In this case, the required ID distance would be 2 according with its bit 
span, which means a total frames number of 22 = 4. As a result (Figure 4.3), a 
3-bit MCU event affects to 3 different frames with only one error per frame, bit 
E11 in Frame 1, bit E10 in Frame 3 and bit D10 in Frame 4. 
 
Figure 4.4 represents another example based on same memory with a 
different MCU, of 5-bits size and 3-bits span. If the ID distance is kept respect 
Fig 4.3 (ID = 2), then Frame 4 would include 2 upset bits. In this case, the MCU 
size exceeds the maximum error correction capability and, as a result, the 
architecture cannot guarantee the SEU approach in all possible MCU cases. 
The condition to be fulfilled to cover all possible cases is that the ID value must 
be at least the maximum estimated span of all the considered MCU 
events. 
 
This ID defines the number of frames in which the memory is divided, ID2 
frames. From this definition, the procedure to evaluate the status of the memory 
requires the scrubbing of the complete memory sequentially masking the data 
into ID2 frames.  
 
  Novel Fault Tolerant MBU EDAC architecture 58 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Bits of Frames affected by MCU event. ID distance = 2 
 
This procedure is implemented through an algorithm which computes only 
one frame every iteration cycle. Figure 4.5 represents the operational flux 
algorithm according to the steps commented before. This procedure is the same 
as the one used in Figure 3.5 for SEU correction. This algorithm is expanded 
with the interleaving distance technique by introducing the frame masking every 
cycle. Thus, same operations performed for single error detection and 
correction at Figure 3.5 are still valid within the frame masking for the MCU 
event separated in frames. 
 
ID 
ID 
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Figure 4.4. Bits of Frames affected by MCU event. ID distance = 2 
 
In case of no errors injected in frame, there are just two computations that 
are performed every iteration cycle in the principal operation line (same as Fig 
3.5), the Checksum validation by the SEC (Single Error Correction) functionality 
with HSBs as reference and then the Parity of Data. 
 
The introduction of a parity bit in the checksum level in each frame 
significantly reduces the timing spent in the scrubbing function. This is because 
this architecture will only launch the correction procedure, which implies much 
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more time than the detection procedure, parity bit, just when a failure is 
previously detected in the computed frame in each cycle.  
 
Only in case that parity detects an error in any of these two steps, SEC is 
launched in order to correct it. Since no-more-than-one error is guaranteed to 
take place in each frame, there is no need of using Multiple Correction codes 
and just a Single Correction one is required. In order to achieve it, the ID value 
has to be higher than the expected MCU span in order to reduce a MCU event 
problem as just a SEU one at each frame. Thus, a total frames number of ID2 
are independently scrubbed under the sequential procedure of Fig. 4.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Algorithm established to mask the memory for scrubbing 
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The main magnitudes to be considered are pointed at table 4.1. The 
correspondent expressions are presented in equations 4.1. to 4.9. 
 
 𝐹𝑁 = ID2 Eq. 4.1 
 𝐼𝐷 ≥ 𝑀𝐶𝑈𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 Eq. 4.2 
 𝑁𝐹 ≥ 𝑀𝐶𝑈𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 Eq. 4.3 
 𝐹𝐵 =
𝐷𝑆
𝑁𝐹
= 𝑚 · 𝑛
𝑁𝐹
 Eq. 4.4  
 2𝐶𝐻𝐵 − 1 ≥ 𝐹𝐵 Eq. 4.5 
 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝐶𝐻 =  (𝐶𝐻𝐵 +  𝑃𝐵) · 𝐹𝑁 Eq. 4.7 
 MS = DS + Overhead_CH Eq. 4.8 
 2HSB − 1 ≥ CHB + PB  Eq. 4.9 
 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝐻𝑆𝐵 =  𝐻𝑆𝐵 · 𝐹𝑁 Eq. 4.10 
 
ID  
Interleaving Distance. This interleaving defines the maximum capability to correct 
pattern of MCU. ID shall be selected with a value higher than the maximum expected 
span of MCU in target memory 
FN Number of Frames in architecture 
MCUspan Maximum consecutive affected bits in either a row or column in a memory 
MCUbits Total expected number of affected bits by a single impact. 
DS 
Data Size. 
m is the number of words of memory (rows in the example) 
n is the number of bits per word (columns in the example) 
FB Frame Bits. Number of data bits that compose each frame 
CHB  
Checksum Bits. In a SEC code, the checksum is the bit set required to protect the 
data of a frame. If X is the checksum size (number of bits), up to 2X-1 data bits can be 
retrieved, if no-more-than-one error takes place. 
PB 
Parity Bits. In a SEC code, one parity bit is included per frame in order to detect errors 
in data of a frame. 
Overhead_CH Total number of redundant bits required in architecture to protect the data of a memory 
MS 
Memory Size is the total memory bits number, which includes the Data bits and the 
Overhead_CH bits. 
HSB 
The HSB is the bit set required to protect the Checksum and parity bits of a frame. If X 
is the HSB size, up to 2X-1 data bits can be retrieved, if no-more-than-one error takes 
place. 
Overhead_HSB 
Total number of redundant HSB required in architecture to protect the Checksum and 
parity bits of a memory 
Table 4.1 Summary of concepts for HSB Framed architecture 
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In order to explain the integration of the architecture with the interleaving 
approach in standard memories, a couple of numerical examples are presented 
in Table 4.2 for two different memory sizes.  
 
The few redundant HSB bits required in each memory is calculated also in 
Table 4.2 where only 4 HSB per framed is required in a 128 Kbits memory, a 
total of 0,2% of the complete memory. For 1 Mbit memory, only one more bit is 
required per frame, 5 HSB per framed, being a total of 0,00003 % of the 
complete memory. 
 
Variable Concept 128 Kbits 1 Mbit 
ID  Interleaving Distance 8 bits 8 bits 
FN Frames number 64 frames 64 frames 
MCUspan MCU span bits 5 bits 5 bits 
MCUbits Maximum MCU bits 12 bits 12 bits 
DS Data size 
4.088 words of  
32 bits each 
(130.816 data bits) 
33.554.432 words of  
32 bits each 
(230 data bits) 
FB Frame bits 2.044 bits per frame 524.288 bits per frame 
CHB  Checksum bits 
11 checksum bits  
per frame  
20 checksum bits  
per frame  
PB Parity bits 1 parity bit per frame 1 parity bit per frame 
Overhead 
CH 
Number redundant bits 
required to protect DS 
768 redundant bits in 
checksum (0,6 %) 
1.344 redundant bits in 
checksum (0,0001 %) 
MS Memory Size 
24 extra words 
4112 words of  
32 bits each 
(131.584 memory bits) 
42 extra words 
A total of 33.554.474 
words of 32 bits each 
(230 memory bits) 
HSB Hardwired Seed Bits 4 HSB per frame 5 HSB per frame 
Overhead 
HSB 
Number redundant HSB 
required to protect MS 
256 HSB (0,2 %) 320 HSB (0,00003 %) 
 
Table 4.2 Data obtained for main parameters of HSB Framed  
architecture for different memories  
 
The bits which are included in the first frame are pointed in Figure 4.6. They 
have been obtained through a bits masking of 8-bit ID separation. According to 
the selected 8-bit distance in both dimensions, a total of 64 frames (Eq 4.1) are 
needed to cover whole memory matrix. 
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As a reference, some Xilinx FPGA memories [31], [32] are an actual example 
of the interleaving concept application. They apply it in just one direction, which 
means that they are divided into several CLB columns (Configurable Logic 
Block) that contain up to 48 frames per CLB. Each frame is protected with a 
Multi-bit ECC (Error Correcting Code) able to correct up to 4 bits per frame. 
Particularly, Xilinx memories define an ID of 2 bits, which means that in the end, 
up to 8 bits per frame can be simultaneously corrected. 
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Figure 4.6. Architecture distribution in SRAM-based FPGA with ID equal to 8. Grey bits correspond to data 
level bits, blue bits with Checkword level bits and green bits corresponds with the parity bits. 
CHECKSUM PARITY 
DATA 
ID 
ID 
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4.2 ARCHITECTURE FOR FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
  
In the Aerospace Industry, Fault Tolerant Architecture requires that the 
failure probability has to be no greater than the requested failure rate. Fault 
Tolerant (FT) systems allow continuous proper operation even under a failure of 
any of its components. This means that the system keeps its functionalities 
even when an event takes place at the scrubbing function itself. TMR is 
currently the most used technique to mitigate failures in safety critical avionics 
systems, minimizing the failure probability.  
 
As exposed in Chapter 2, the classical SEU mitigation methods to protect a 
fault tolerant system are based on system triplication. Each triplicated copy 
performs the same process and the three results are combined under a voting 
approach to produce a single output. In case of a bit upset in one of the copies, 
there is still a right memory reading due to the error masking supported by the 
other two healthy copies, and eventually no failure takes place in the system. 
Furthermore, it would also require an additional reconfiguration-based 
technique implementation (additional resources) for the error correction in order 
to avoid an error accumulation in memory. 
 
Other simpler method for SEU correction is to omit readback and SEUs 
detection by simply partially reloading the entire damaged Frame segment at a 
chosen frequency. This is called "scrubbing." Scrubbing requires that the 
configuration logic to be in "write mode" for a greater percentage of time, with 
the corresponding time involved. Furthermore, a non-susceptible (no affected 
by Radiation effects, SEU or MCU) hard copy of the complete memory, , is 
required to be implemented as the scrubbing data source, which means a 
significant overhead data. Furthermore, this non-susceptible memory normally 
presents high reading time, which has a significant impact in the operation time.  
 
The Thesis proposed Architecture (which algorithm is presented in Fig. 4.7) 
aims to optimize the previous solutions from the data overhead and the 
computing time points of view, and yet allowing meeting FT requirements. It is 
based on the concepts previously explained in Chapters 3 and 4, adding just a 
SEC copy in the memory at Data level (Fig. 3.1), under a what is called a DMR-
SEC approach (Double Modular Redundancy for Single Event Correction). This 
means that just the SEC function is duplicated instead of the whole memory 
triplication. 
 
The algorithm represented in Fig. 4.7 is similar to the algorithms exposed 
previously in Chapter 3 and 4.1 although it includes the DMR SEC functionality 
for Fault-Tolerant system.  
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Figure 4.7. Algorithm adapted for Fault-tolerant system 
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The algorithm, Fig 4.7, is executed each iteration in only one frame. In case 
of no errors injected in memory, the Principal Operational Line is similar as the 
presented in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 4.5, apart from the fact the checksum is checked 
twice (by SEC1 and SEC2 respectively) instead of just once.  
The Algorithm is an iterative process. Each iteration starts masking a new 
frame from memory to compose the three levels of the architecture: HSB, 
checksum and parity, and data bits. A counter is requested to keep the 
sequential procedure to complete memory after ID2 cycles.  
 
The algorithm structure is composed of 2 Steps, each of them presenting 
different Scenarios (Table 4.3.).  
 
Step Scenario Reference SEC1 SEC2 Action 
1 1 HSB No error No error No action 
1 2 HSB CS error CS error CS correction 
1 3 HSB No error CS error SEC2 correction 
1 4 HSB CS error No error SEC1 correction 
2 1 Parity Parity error - Correction launching 
2 2 Parity No error - No action 
2 3 Checksum Data Error - Data correction 
 
Table 4.3 Possible scenarios oriented to tolerant fault requirements 
 
STEP 1. Once frame is composed, both SEC1 and SEC2 are computed from 
the permanent reference, HSB, in order to validate the Checksum. The main 
idea is based on interleaving, which was applied to mask a Frame to guarantee 
that no more than one error can take place at the same time in it. Therefore, if 
both functions agree, they both have to be right. If they do not agree, one of 
them has an error. There are The possible Scenarios to consider under Step 1, 
are: 
 
Scenario 1.1: If the results of both functions are zero, (SEC1 = 0 AND SEC2 
= 0), that means that both SEC function agrees that there is no error in the 
Checksum level. Since this result is obtained at a Frame in which no more than 
one error is guaranteed, the only possibility is that both SEC1 and SEC2 and 
also the Checksum level are cleared from errors. This operation validates the 
use of any of the SEC functions and also the Checksum data for following 
operations of procedure of Step 2 with no further action. 
 
 Scenario 1.2: both functions agrees in identifying an error in checksum, 
obtained results in both functions are different than zero, (SEC1 = SEC2 ≠ 0). 
Again, if they agree, they are right and cleared, whereas there is an error at 
checksum level. Correction procedure is launched in order to correct the 
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identified error in Checksum bits. SEC1 is defined in Fig.4.7. as the default 
function to perform this Scenario, although SEC2 is also valid in this case.  
 
 Scenarios 1.3 and 1.4: If different results are obtained between scrubbing 
functionalities, (SEC1=0 AND SEC2≠0 or vice versa), that means that an error 
is found in SEC2 (or vice versa) and, therefore, Checksum have no errors since 
no more than one error is guaranteed. The function with the result different than 
zero is the function that is in error while the other function is the healthy function 
with a result equal to zero, coherent with the Checksum level state. The 
procedure uses the healthy SEC function to retrieve the damaged one from the 
HSB.  
 
 STEP 2. After Step 1 procedure, SEC1, SEC2 and Checksum level are 
considered cleared. Parity check is then performed on Data level from 
Checksum Level through SEC function (SEC1 in Fig. 4.7.). The possible 
Scenarios in Step 2 are the following: 
 
 Scenario 2.1: If parity correlation does not match, an error is detected in data 
bits of frame computed. Therefore, correction procedure is launched only for 
this frame. 
 
 Scenario 2.2: If parity matches, no error is detected in data of this frame. 
Therefore, next frame is then masked.  
 
 Scenario 2.3: If correction procedure is launched, the procedure computes 
the data through the Systematic linear block code, explained in Chapter 4.4, 
and correlates its results against the checksum bits. The syndrome of this 
operation reveals the bit in data that is in fault. Finally, the error is corrected by 
flipping the current state. 
 
 If an error were found in any SEC functionality, Scenarios 1.3 or 1.4 of Table 
4.3, the error is naturally corrected at Step 2 since the right SEC function to be 
used in Step 2 was identified at Step 1 and the damaged SEC function is part of 
the Data Level.  
 
 This algorithm reveals the Fault Tolerant capability under a self-protection 
approach based on HSB as the root of a Multilevel Framed HSB Architecture. It 
only needs to duplicate its scrubbing function (SEC1 and SEC2). There is an 
additional requirement to rightly implement the interleaving approach in order to 
guarantee that at least one of the SEC functions is in healthy condition, which is 
to allocate them at least at a ID distance away or within the memory. This 
requirement is very easy to fulfill taking into account an ID = 8 bits in a current 
memory size, but still it has to be considered. This requirement is illustrated in 
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Figures 4.8 and 4.9. In order to avoid a common failure that introduce a double 
errors as explained in Step 1 and Scenario 5, Figure 4.8.a represents the 
scenario in which both SEC functionalities could be affected by only one 
neutron impact. This situation shall be avoided by using the configuration shown 
in Figure 4.8.b. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. HSB architecture distribution where both duplicated scrubbing functionalities are 
placed in Data level. MCU event could affect to both SECs at same time (left). This situation 
shall be avoided. MCU event only affects to SEC2 but no to SEC1 (right). 
 
As a summary of conditions that shall be met in the hardware design for this 
architecture to guarantee the operation without double errors: 
 
• Space condition: The twin scrubbing functions, SEC1 and SEC2, and 
the Checkword must be placed physically apart from each other, at 
least right at the maximum expected MCU span. 
 
• Time condition: the time involved in the whole process for a frame 
scrubbing must be low enough to neglect the probability of experiencing 
two radiation events within the same iteration. 
 
Under both conditions, no more than one of these 3 key blocks (twin SECs 
and Checkword) can be considered corrupted at the same time.  
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4.3 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
 
ISSUE 4: Fault Tolerant Probability Threshold  
All actual systems are susceptible to failure. Therefore, the Fault Tolerant 
definition must be stablished in terms of a failure probability threshold. Actually, 
in the standards stablished in the aerospace industry (ARP4754, ARP4754/A, 
RTCA DO254 and RTCA DO178) the severity of a system is defined in terms of 
DAL (Design Assurance Level). The most severe scenario is named as a 
catastrophic event, and the systems and equipments that may produce it in 
case of failure must be certified as DAL-A. According to standards, the failure 
probability of DAL-A systems must be no greater than 1·10-9 1/hr. This would 
means, as a rough example, that just one catastrophic failure would take place 
in the whole life-span of a complete fleet (1.000 aircrafts). 
 
The proposed Architecture is based on the capability of having no more than 
one event per scrubbing cycle, in order to guarantee that no more than one bit 
is affected in a frame, and that Fault Tolerant requirements are fulfilled under a 
DMR-SEC approach (Double Modular Redundancy with a Single Event 
Correction). Even having a double (or even more) radiation events in the same 
scrubbing cycle, the proposed Architecture could retrieve them if the impacts 
take place in different frames.  
 
The issue to consider in this case is: 
 
 How to calculate the real failure probability taking into account all 
possible scenarios and which are the design degrees of freedom of 
the proposed Architecture that allows reaching the Fault Tolerant 
Threshold? This Issue is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.4 DETAILED CODING IMPLEMENTATION 
 CHECKSUM CODING FOR SEU CORRECTION 4.4.1
  
The proposed solution is based on a Reconfiguration-based solution. This 
tries to restore the original values in memory as soon as possible after SEE 
event. It is a Single Error detection and Correction code (SEC) based on 
checksum codification that is a modular arithmetic sum of bits of message 
codewords of a fixed word length, called systematic linear codification, [5] 
and [6].  
 
This SEC is performed as background functionality to restore the upsets as 
soon as possible to the original values in memory after SEE event. It is 
performed periodically depending on the criticism of functionality and the SEU 
rate predictions for a given application or mission. 
 
Systematic linear block code is used for the purpose of detecting errors but 
also for correcting errors in certain cases. The redundant checksum bits 
obtained through this codification allows detecting and correcting a limited 
number of errors that may occur anywhere in the data bits. By far, main 
advantage of this kind of linear codes is the light-weighted correction process 
because the calculation of each checksum bit is based on parity computations. 
The checksum word has also the property that the original information data bits 
also appear on the checksum word unchanged with some parity bits added, 
called “systematic code”.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. a) Checksum concept for a 7-bit data and 3-bit checksum.  
b) Example of a 7-bit data and checksum 
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where: 
C1 = D1 xor D3 xor D5 xor D7, 
 
C2 = D2 xor D3 xor D6 xor D7 and 
 
C3 = D4 xor D5 xor D6 xor D7 
 
Figure 4.10 shows and example of the checksum coding process. To check 
the integrity of a message, the receiver computes the exclusive or (XOR) of all 
its words including the checksum, following the codification pattern fixed. If the 
result is not a word with n zeros, the receiver knows a transmission error 
occurred. With this checksum, any transmission error which flips a single bit of 
the message, or an odd number of bits, will be detected as an incorrect 
checksum. However, an error which affects two bits will not be detected if those 
bits lie at the same position of one checksum bit. 
 
 The checksum bits shown in Figure 4.10, C1, C2 and C3, are obtained by 
means the XOR computation of data bits, while data bits, D1 to D7, included in 
a unique set and determined by the binary form of its bit position. General 
Checksum bits are defined as: 
 
• Checksum bit C1 covers all bit positions which have the least significant 
bit set to 1: bit 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, etc. The computation is always assigned as 
the Less Significant Bit, LSB. The weight value for syndrome 
computation for an error is equal to 20. 
 
• Checksum bit C2 covers all bit positions which have the second least 
significant bit set to 1: bit 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, etc. being defined as 21 for 
syndrome computation. 
 
• Checksum bit C3 covers all bit positions which have the third least 
significant bit set to 1: bits 4–7, 12–15, 20–23, etc. being in this example, 
the Most Significant Bit, MSB, for syndrome computation, 22, when error 
is detected. 
 
• Checksum bit C4 covers all bit positions which have the fourth least 
significant bit set to 1: bits 8–15, 24–31, 40–47, etc. would be defined as 
23 for syndrome computation.  
 
 As shown in Figure 4.11, a combination of m different checksum bits can 
protect data bits up to 2m-1. Total length (data plus checksum) is obtained by 
summing the data bits plus checksum, 2m+m-1. As m varies, all the possible 
Checksum with maximum capability can be obtained. In previous examples, 3 
  Novel Fault Tolerant MBU EDAC architecture 73 
 
 
    
checksum bits cover up to 7 data bits while 5 checksum bits would cover up to 
31 data bits. Any intermediate combination could be also constructed although it 
is not optimized. For example, a frame of 22 data bits could be constructed and 
it is protected by 5 checksum bits. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Different Bit ranges of Checksum up to m=9 
 
The redundant checksum bits obtained through this codification allows 
detecting/correcting a limited number of errors that may occur anywhere in the 
data bits, not in the own redundant bits. If an error occurred in these 
redundant bits, new checkword will be wrongly understood as a failure in data. 
Errors in redundant bits cannot be corrected. For that reason, multilevel 
architecture is intended to protect only the redundant checksum bits because 
they protect these redundant bits.  
 
This correction capability of checkword is shown in Figure 4.12. In those 
binary combinations, some error cases are included in same reference word, 
“1010011” whose checksum is “110”. The complete binary word is defined as 
“1010011110”. Some SEU errors are included as an example in different parts 
of the complete word to analyze its effects. 
 
  
   
Figure 4.12 represents some examples of error injected in different parts of the computed 
referenced word: 
 
 Ref case: Having the original bitstream set as “1010011”, whose parity 
checksum is obtained as “110”, the complete word is defined as 
“1010011110”. This checksum bitstream “110” will be used as a 
reference gold value to compare in any scrubbing cycle. 
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 D2 case: Having a failure in second bit of bitstream, D2, “1110011”, it 
causes a new recomputed checksum that is “100”. It does no match with 
the saved gold checksum “110” and has only one different bit when 
compared as known C2. According to weighted value of every checksum 
bit in failure, as only C2 is in failure, it weighted value corresponds to 21, 
that gives a syndrome in bit 2 as bit upset. 
 
 D5 case: Having a failure in fifth bit of bitstream, D5, “1010111”, it causes 
a new recomputed checksum that is “011” that differs from the gold value 
saved. It does no match with checksum “110” and has two different bits 
when compared as known C1 and C3. According to weighted value of 
every checksum bit in failure, as C1 is in failure, it weighted value 
corresponds to 20, and as C3 is in failure, it weighted value corresponds 
to 22, that gives a syndrome in bit 20+ 22 = 5 as bit upset. 
 
 D7 case: Having a failure in seventh bit of bitstream, D7, “1010010”, it 
causes a new recomputed checksum that is “001” that differs from the 
gold value saved. It does no match with checksum “110” and has three 
different bits when compared as known C1, C2 and C3. According to 
weighted value of every checksum bit in failure, as C1 is in failure, it 
weighted value corresponds to 20, as C2 is in failure, it weighted value 
corresponds to 21 and as C3 is in failure, it weighted value corresponds 
to 22, that gives a syndrome in bit 20 + 21 + 22 = 7 as bit upset. 
 
 In last example, failure only in C2, “100”, it causes a wrong correction of 
a bit within data bits. In this example, modified checksum, “100” differs 
from golden value only in C2 that is the bit upset. As C2 is in failure, it 
weighted value corresponds to 21, that gives a syndrome in bit 21 = 2, D2, 
as bit upset. Therefore, it is the same as a failure detected in second 
example, failure in D2.  
 
As commented before, checksum can detect errors in whole data including 
redundant bits but the correction capability for single errors in data bits is only 
possible if there is no error in checksum bits. Only errors in data bits can be 
corrected. If the computed checksum for current data matches against the 
stored value of the previously computed checksum, it is guaranteed that the 
data has not been accidentally altered or corrupted. 
 
The Generator matrix required for this checksum coding is shown in Figure 
4.13. If there are k bits of data, matrix should contain at least k linearly 
independent codewords to produce linear combinations of two or more 
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codewords in the set. Easiest way to included k linear independent codewords 
is to choose the identity matrix as IK in Generator matrix while A is the 
representation of linear modulo 2-sum of data bits: 
  
G = ( IK | A ) 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Generator matrix for the linear block code 
 
 The process of encoding is represented in matrix form as: 
 
v = u G 
 
 Where u is the information of data bits block, v the complete checksum word, 
including the redundant bits, and G is the generator matrix. It is important to 
highlight that generator matrix is a k x n matrix where k is the dimension of the 
data bits and n is the total length of the checksum word that includes the data 
bits and the parity checksum. This special form corresponds to a systematic 
code that contains the k x k identity matrix and k x (n-k) matrix of checksum bits. 
Thus, same example is obtained by: 
  
v = [1 0 1 0 0 1 1] G = [1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0] 
 
 Error detection involves the decision of which bit is in fault by means the 
analysis of syndrome information. Syndrome is obtained from the parity check 
matrix composed by the (n-k) x n matrix from generator matrix, G, plus the 
identity matrix as follows: 
 
H = ( AT | I N-K ) 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Syndrome matrix for the linear block code 
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Syndrome: s = H v 
 
 
 
 
 
s = H            =   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. No error obtained through syndrome calculation  
 
As commented previously, syndrome result is compared against the original 
golden value stored in memory to obtain which are the checksum bits weighted 
that are modified. According to syndrome calculation, if a correct word including 
the checksum bits is calculated with H matrix, no error is found in syndrome 
result, having the zero vector. 
 
As an example, D5 case is reproduced again. Bitstream is modified in the 
way as “1010111110” having a failure in fifth bit of bitstream, D5. When 
syndrome operation in performed, a syndrome different from zero vector is 
found, “101”, that means that there are two syndrome bits different from original 
one known as C1 and C3. According to weighted value of every checksum bit in 
failure, as C1 is in failure, it weighted value corresponds to 20, and as C3 is in 
failure, it weighted value corresponds to 22, that gives a syndrome in bit 20+ 22 = 
5 as bit upset, D5. 
 
As commented before, results obtained by syndrome calculation should be 
compared against the original golden value stored in memory to obtain which 
checksum bits are in error. Thanks to the matrix method, after Syndrome matrix 
calculation, the result obtained gives directly the number of the data bit that is in 
error to correct it. Once the non-zero vector is obtained after Syndrome matrix 
computation, each bit should be weighted to obtain the failure bit in bitstream. In 
example of Figure 4.16, the results obtained from Syndrome matrix computation 
is “101” that corresponds to 1·20+ 0·21 + 1·22 = 5, being D5 the bit that is in 
error. 
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s = H            =   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16. Error obtained through syndrome calculation in 20+ 22 = 5, D5  
 
 Once the data bit indicated by the matrix detection process is corrected, if 
syndrome is checked again, error should be disappeared and syndrome result 
should be the zero vector, no error found in bitstream. 
 
Last example included in figure 4.17 is a failure only in C2, it causes a wrong 
correction of a bit within data-input bit, D2. In this example, modified checksum, 
“100” differs from golden value, “110”, only in the C2, that is weighted as 21 = 2, 
bit number 2 of bitstream, D2. Furthermore, it can also be stated by the 
syndrome matrix calculation. New bitstream, “1010011100”, is computed with 
the Syndrome matrix as shown in Figure 4.17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
s = H            = 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Error obtained wrongly through syndrome calculation in 21 = 2, C2  
 
Main advantage of this codification is that redundant checksum bits are 
obtained through a light-weighted correction process based on parity 
computations of alternate bits of data-input. Main drawback of this codification is 
that this codification allows detecting/correcting a limited number of errors that 
may occur anywhere in the data bits, not in the own redundant bits. 
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In case of MCU event when two or more bits are upset, the checksum coding 
fails in the detection as shown in Figure 4.18. The results of the syndrome 
calculation of the bitstream “1001011111”, marks “111”. If each bit of the 
syndrome results obtained is weighted accordingly, it corresponds to 1·20+ 1·21 
+ 1·22 = 7, that gives a syndrome in bit D7, as bit upset, that is wrongly 
detected.  
 
 
 
 
 
s = H            = 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18. Error obtained wrongly through syndrome calculation due to MCU 
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 MULTILEVEL ARCHITECTURE  4.4.2
  
Checksum code proposed in previous paragraphs is able to correct any 
single failure included in data bits of bitstream but no anywhere in checksum 
bits, because it would be wrongly understood as failure in data bits. In this way, 
the multilevel architecture becomes the solution for this issue. The classical 
solutions for mitigating the effects of SEE are divided in two main categories: 
reconfiguration-based (i.e. EDAC) and redundancy-based solutions (i.e. TMR).  
 
 The first solutions restore the original values in memory as soon as 
possible after a SEE event by means of error detection and correction 
codes, [7], [28], [29], [30], [33]. 
 
 The second group masks the SEE effects, isolating the circuit outputs 
from internal SEUs by means of a voting process, which means that the 
effect of an error is not transmitted to the output signals. This scheme 
requires extra cost in terms of components, weight, area and power 
dissipation.  
 
This work is based on a hybrid system that reduces the overheads 
associated with the classical fault tolerant solution, TMR plus scrubbing. The 
proposal mainly couples a (SEC), a reconfiguration-based technique, to a 
Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) method (as an improved application of the 
TMR approach), as explained later. SEC functions are stored in the static 
memory, which is vulnerable to radiation. In order to achieve fault tolerant 
capability, the SEC function is embedded within an HSB Multilevel Architecture, 
a new concept based on HSB. HSB is simply a few bits that contain essential 
information from which errors in original data can be retrieved. They must be, 
somehow, physically modified to prevent vulnerability to radiation. 
 
Multilevel architecture allows concatenating two or more levels of checksum 
in which every level only protects the redundant checksum bits of previous 
levels. That means, data bits of bitstreams are protected by the checksum bits 
obtained during codification while the own checksum bits will be protected by 
other level of codification. In case of a failure within data bits, checksum bits will 
be used to correct the failure while if a failure occurs within checksum bits, the 
multilevel architecture will be able to manage the failure and correct it without 
any modification in data bits. 
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Figure 4.19. Multilevel structure. Seed is a permanent reference 
 
Taking a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) as an example, its static 
memory originally stores the configuration data for full FPGA functionality. The 
proposed architecture, Fig. 4.19, adds in the Static Memory: 
• The scrubbing function: Logic data that includes the scrubbing 
function itself and the additional set of bits which are required for 
the SEC function to work properly (for instance, the parity bits for 
error detection and reference bits for correction). 
• The redundant data: Simply duplicates the scrubbing function. 
 
On the other hand, from the operational point of view, there are 3 levels to be 
considered: 
• Data Level: Composed of the original FPGA configuration static 
data and the duplicated SEC functions. This SEC separately 
implements detection (parity) and correction (a simple systematic 
linear block codification, [6], [7]). Correction is activated only after 
an error is identified in order to optimize de operation. 
Coding process 
Decoding process 
In normal operation 
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• Checkword Level: Comprises the additional set of bits which are 
required for the SEC function to work properly (parity and 
reference bits)  
 
• HSB Level: The Checkword level is the reference for the SEC 
function to work properly to retrieve the Data Level. If an upset 
occurred in the Checkword level, the SEC function would not be 
able to retrieve it. This is why the HSB is added as the reference 
bits for the SEC function to retrieve the Checkword level. In other 
words, the HSB is the Checkword level of the Checkword level.  
 
The point here is that, due to the exponential ratio between the amount of 
data to be retrieved and the size of the required SEC reference, the number of 
bits of the HSB turns out to be extremely low after compressing twice the main 
data.  
 
There is still a risk of having an upset in the HSB, although this risk has been 
dramatically reduced in accordance with the exponential ratio. In order to make 
the risk vanish, the HSB can be hardened, for instance, by physically linking it to 
a value. 
 
The capital function of multilevel is the protection of the checksum bits 
required to keep the capability to correct a single error bit anywhere in data 
bitstream. Top level checksum bits are called “seed bits” because they include 
enough information to protect and to restore any single error in code of lower 
levels. As an example of procedure, two steps are performed graphically: 
 
1. Having the following Data bits as an example, it is contained in a word 
of 31 bits: “10111110011111111000100101010000”. 
 
2. First computation obtains a checksum of 5 bits “00111”, being the 
complete word “1011111001111111100010010101000000111”. As 
shown in Figure 4.20, complete word including the checksum bits is 
composed by a total of 36 bits. These 5 checksum bits are able to 
protect the original data bits from any single error within those 31 bits, 
not in the last 5 redundant bits. 
 
Next Figure 4.20 shows how to construct each checksum bits to 
obtain “00111” by means checksum computation: 
 
 C1 covers all bit positions which have the least significant bit 
set to 1: bit D1, D3, D5, D7, D9, etc. 
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 C2 covers all bit positions which have the second least 
significant bit set to 1: bit D2, D3, D6, D7, D10, D11, etc.  
 
 C3 covers all bit positions which have the third least significant 
bit set to 1: bits D4–D7, D12–D15, D20–D23, etc.   
 
 C4 covers all bit positions which have the fourth least 
significant bit set to 1: bits D8–D15, D24–D31, D40–D47, etc. 
 
 C5 covers all bit positions which have the fifth least significant 
bit set to 1: bits D16-D31, D48-D63, etc.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.20. Multilevel structure. Lowest level, data and checksum bits 
 
3. Any error injected in those following bits, Checksum bits, could cause 
a wrongly correction of any data bit as commented previously. For this 
reason, the capital issue in this architecture is to protect by other 
means, the bits of checksum. In this case, other checksum 
codification is included in a second level. Therefore, the result 
obtained in the first step of calculation, “00111”, is used as data input 
for second level for checksum computation.  
 
4. Then, the second level of computation is performed only for “00111” 
as data input. The computation gives a new checksum data that is 
“010”, being the complete new checksum word of this second level: 
“00111010”. This computation is performed in same way as explained 
in Figure 4.20 with a reduced number of checksum bits. Those new 
bits obtained in this second level are called “Seed bits”. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21. Multilevel structure. Seed level, checksum and seed bits 
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5. Once both level computations are performed, the complete word 
obtained is defined as follows, data + checksum1 + checksum2: 
“101111001111111100010010101000000111010”. The complete 
word is then composed by 31 Data bits + 5 Checksum bits + 3 Seed 
bits = 39 bits. The complete frame of data with three levels is shown in 
Figure 4.22. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Multilevel structure presented in a single frame 
 
6. Those last three bits are saved as Seed bits are used to protect the 
capability to correct errors anywhere in data bits and also the 
checksum bits of first level.  
 
 In this multilevel architecture, these Seed level bits obtained after two 
checksum computations are permanently saved by a physical implementation in 
PCB, called Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB). They keep the capability of error 
correction as shown in Figure 4.22. 
 
Innovation of the proposed solution is a system based on a fault-tolerant 
pyramidal reference, Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB), based on multilevel checksum 
that is an iterative and periodic functionality performed in background of main 
code. Scrubbing is executed periodically depending on criticism of system 
functionality and SEU rate predictions of the intended mission, as will be 
discussed later on.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.23. Multilevel structure physical implementation.  
Both checksum levels and Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB) 
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Main aim of multi-level system is to protect the checksum bits of previous 
levels. The seed level bits are permanently saved by a physical implementation 
of these bits called Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB) keeping the error correction 
capability of multilevel checksum. This fault-tolerant permanent reference, HSB, 
includes enough seed information able to restore a single error of code in each 
scrubbing cycle.  
 
HSB are obtained in Development process by means of multilevel checksum 
computation while Normal operation uses Decoding Scrubbing function for 
detecting & correcting errors, shown in Fig 4.19. The pyramidal architecture is 
intended to perform just decoding scrubbing processes during normal operation 
due to HSB is a non-modifiable information by any external agent once 
equipment is delivered to the customer. Codification processes for different 
levels would be performed by the supplier of equipment in its facilities where 
HSB are physically implemented according to bitmap saved in memory. 
 
This permanent reference, HSB, includes enough seed information able to 
restore any potential SEU error in code. The multilevel architecture is intended 
to perform sequentially decoding scrubbing processes during normal operation 
for detecting & correcting errors. This encoding process allows to reduce the 
final number of checksum bits in each subsequence level. In this way, as Table 
4.4 shows, up to 32.767 data bits could be protected by 15 Checksum bits that 
will also be protected by only 4 Seed bits. The range of this multilevel 
architecture is scalable by increasing the range of Seed bits used. Same 
scrubbing function logic could be implemented to detect & correct failures for 
computing both levels.  
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Maximum capability for multilevel HSBs 
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4.5  TIME OPTIMIZATION BASED ON PARITY 
 
As described in previous paragraphs, multilevel architecture is composed by 
three levels: Data level, checksum level and Seed level. Taking the opportunity 
of direct protection from the permanent reference of HSB, checksum level 
includes now a parity bit only of the data bits. In this case, any single failure, 
SEU/MCU, could be detected by just a parity computation of data-bit level. As 
commented in Chapter 2. Parity is a low latency process able to detect an odd 
number of bit errors. Therefore, a parity bit has been added to the end of the 
bitstream of checksum-word that indicates whether the number of bits in the 
data-input with the value one is even. 
 
The parity bit ensures whatever the bitstream, a single or any other odd 
number (i.e., three, five, etc.) of errors within the data bitstream. An even 
number of flipped bits will make the parity bit appear correct even though the 
data is erroneous being no able to detect the error. Therefore, this parity bit 
added to checksum level could be used to detect SEU within data but this 
architecture based on Parity bit detection will fail in case of an MCU event in 
which any number of bits, up to 12 bits, could be upset simultaneously.  
 
A numerical example is based on a Data bit set based on 16 Kbits of an 
SRAM memory). This size of memory could be protected according to Eq. 4.1 to 
4.10 and also the data included in Table 4.4. Table 4.5 includes the calculation 
required to protect this memory size as follows: 
 
• Data level contains 16.383 bits. 
 
• Intermediate Checksum level computes a total of 15 bits, divided into 14 
checksum bits available to protect the data level and 1 parity bit 
computed from data level bits. 
 
• Seed level implemented physically requires only 4 HSB.  
 
• Total redundant bits added to protect the data bits is approximately a 
0,12%, that is (14+1+4)/16.383. 
 
In this way, an update of Table 4.4 is performed because of the introduction 
of the Parity bit in the intermediate checksum level as shown in Table 4.5. 
Architecture ranged to 4 Seed bits could protect an intermediate Checksum 
level composed by 15 bits, being 1 bit defined for parity bit and 14 bits defined 
to protect via checksum computation the data level. 
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Last row of Table 4.5 shows the percentage of redundant bits required in the 
multilevel architecture. It is important to highlight that an architecture whose 
range of HSB is 3, m = 3, is not effective because of low number of bits 
available in data level. For any other multilevel architecture with a range of 
HSBs higher than 5, m > 5, the percentage of redundant bits is almost 
negligible.  
 
 
 
Table 4.5. Updated maximum capability for multilevel HSBs 
 
 The parity bit located within the checksum level is protected directly by HSB. 
In this way, after checksum level is validated without errors by HSB, the error 
detection is easily obtained by checking the parity bit that is a low-weight 
detection procedure. This novel approach gives the capability to separate the 
procedure for error detection from the procedure for error correction that takes 
much longer computation timing.  
 
Every iteration cycle, a new frame is masked and restored from data input in 
memory matrix and computed by means the scrubbing function. This novel 
approach gives the capability to separate the procedure for error correcting (A) 
from the procedure for error detecting (B) that takes much lower computation 
timing. Equation 4.11 that rules the timing spent to compute whole memory 
depends on number of frames corrupted, x, lower than number of frames, ID2: 
 
 Timing = A • x + B • ID2 Eq. 4.11 
 
 The Detection time (B in Eq 4.12) in a frame is typically faster than 
Correction time (A in Eq 4.12). Therefore, this technique only launches the 
correction procedure in a frame when an error is detected by the parity bit of 
frame [7]. Thanks to this, the computation time is hugely reduced because in 
some EDACs (as Hamming or BCH), detection & correction are coupled being 
correction procedure performed every time.  
 
 According to SEU/MCU rate in airborne electronics, Chapter 2, most of times 
of operation, there is no error found in memory. Therefore, the separation of 
procedures obtained in this novel approach between Correction (A) and 
Detection (B) procedures gives a significant timing reduction when no error is 
detected.   
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CHAPTER 5: PROPOSED SOLUTION: 
DESIGN PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
 
 
MEAN TIME BETWEEN UPSET 
 
 RELIABILITY THRESHOLDS  
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5.1 DESIGN CRITERIA: MEAN TIME BETWEEN UPSET 
  
This multilevel Framed HSB architecture is a Reconfiguration-based solution 
that tries to restore as soon as possible the original values in memory after SEE 
event. This method introduces a limited overheads corresponding to the logic 
required to periodical control the bitstream rewritten procedure. State-of-the-art 
of different FPGA suppliers allows online rewriting for a short period of time to 
rewrite the faulty part from a hard copy of the memory.  
 
As a reconfiguration-based solution, the proposed Architecture has a 
scrubbing function that detects and corrects the possible SEU/MCU induced in 
each frame. The interval selected between scrub cycles should be referenced to 
the expected probabilistic upset rate for a given application or mission, and may 
be fairly infrequent. Therefore, the scrubbing cycle should be designed 
according to following condition, equation 5.1:  
 
 Scrubbing time < MTBU Eq. 5.1 
 
Where MTBU is defined in this work as Mean Time Between Upset. 
Equipment operating clocking cycle is typically fixed at some orders of 
magnitude lower than MTBU. Therefore, scrubbing operation will be typically 
performed thousands of times below the probabilistic MTBU. If previous 
condition is compliant in the proposed design, there is no probabilistically way to 
accumulate errors in memory assuring only one error, SEU, affected per cycle. 
As a rule of thumb, scrubbing cycle should be fixed to one order of magnitude 
lower than the probabilistic MTBU.  
 
 The scrubbing time is defined according to the radiation of natural space 
environment at A/C flight altitudes. At these A/C flight altitudes (40.000 fts) 
below “Pfotzer maximum”, most of the particles are neutrons created from 
nuclear reactions, n-28Si or n-B10, and they affect to CMOS devices. They 
deposit charge in silicon matter of ICs. Several experiments have verified the 
fairly linear relationships between flux, critical charge (cell capacitance) and 
operational frequency versus error rate. The most important way to analyze how 
SEU can affect to a system is given by the fairly linear relationship between the 
flux and error rate as following equation rules: 
 
 𝑺𝑬𝑼 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 = 𝑭𝒍𝒖𝒙 ·  𝛔 · 𝐍𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐬 Eq. 5.2 
 
 Flux is defined as the atmospheric particles rate that hits an electronic area 
over Energy spectrum (MeV). It is measured as particles/cm2/s. For aircraft 
applications, the typical neutron flux value is from 1.5 to 2.5 n/cm2/s. These data 
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are commonly agreed between different standards such as JEDEC, IEC and 
ABD100. Several avionics equipment specifications request a peak up to 3,3 
n/cm2/s. 
 
 “Plateau cross section” represented as σ, is determined empirically. It is 
defined as the SEE susceptibility of an electronic device to ionizing radiation. 
This data should be obtained by an experimental test in each component along 
a wide range of energy transferred to the device. The cross section highly 
depends on the internal design of bits. Approximate values for current 
technology, extracted as an average of Weibull distributions of different 
components, are given for a rough analysis that follows:  
 
σNEUTRON ≈ 10-13 cm2/bit 
 
The third important factor in the SEU rate equation is the total amount of bits 
involved in the working system. Number of bits saved in the system memory on 
board and the type of memory used are the key characteristics to determine 
SEU failure rate. SEU rate is proportional to the number of bits used in system. 
Thus, according to previous equation, Eq 5.2, a baseline study, 128 Kbit RAM 
memory, has been selected. Therefore, the SEU rate calculation is: 
 
 SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 217 = 1,5·10-4/h Eq. 5.3 
 
Equation 5.3 defines that the SEU rate is 1,5·10-4/h which is not restrictive in 
terms of memory scrubbing cycle timing (one failure every 6.422 operating 
hours) but it reveals that the architecture shall include redundancies for this 
functionality if it is categorized as Catastrophic or Hazardous in System Safety 
Assessment of equipment. 
 
System Safety Assessment of equipment analyses the criticality (or severity) 
for all functionalities of equipment and identifies a set of quantitative and 
qualitative safety requirements for the critical functionalities of system. These 
safety requirements can be directly associated with the DAL (Design Assurance 
Level) assigned to the equipment. In case of failure of a function that is defined 
as Catastrophic or Hazardous, there is no possible operation that could be 
performed by crew in order to recover the operation. The criticality (or severity) 
of any function would be reduced if a crew manual operation could be 
performed when a failure occurs. The DAL defines the rigor that shall be 
followed during the development process of any equipment in order to avoid 
failures that could cause critic events. They are defined through different levels, 
from Level A through Level E corresponding to the five classes of failure 
conditions: Catastrophic, Hazardous, Major, Minor and No effect. They have an 
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associated quantitative safety objective in terms of probability of occurrence per 
flight hour: 
 
• Catastrophic: Failure Rate < 10-9 as Flight controls, engine controllers. 
 
• Hazardous: Failure Rate < 10-7 as Navigation and Radio-Navigation. 
 
• Major: Failure Rate < 10-5 as Voice communications and Displays. 
 
• Minor: Failure Rate < 10-3 as Maintenance or Monitoring. 
 
• No effect, as Video Systems and Coffee makers. 
 
For example, the safety range of a catastrophic failure condition means that 
it shall be extremely remote and it shall not be caused by any single failure. This 
condition, extremely remote, means that a complete A/C fleet shall accumulate 
more than 109 Flight Hours without a catastrophic failure condition in the whole 
fleet. 
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5.2 PROBABILITY / RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS  
 
According to the results obtained from Eq. 5.3, the SEU rate for the baseline 
example, 128 Kbit memory, is 1,5·10-4/h. Probability calculations are estimated 
based on the number of Operating Hours (OH) in flight in the whole aircraft 
fleet. Therefore, a typical aircraft fleet could be approximately 1.000 aircrafts. 
Airbus A320 family has built 7.700 units (includes A319, A320 and A321), 
Airbus A340 family built 400 units and the Airbus A330 family built 1300 units 
 
Taking the failure rate value of 1,5·10-4/h for 128 Kbits memory, that is equal 
to 6.422 Operating Hours (OH) in flight under solar radiation for the complete 
aircraft fleet. Statistically, every 6,422 OH accumulated, a SEU / MCU impact 
could be produced at any aircraft of the complete fleet. Therefore, an SEU / 
MCU impact per aircraft could be defined as 6,422 OH / 1000 aircrafts of 
complete fleet, that is equal to a probabilistic failure every 6.42 hours per 
aircraft. Finally the scrubbing cycle could be also defined as one order of 
magnitude lower than the probabilistic failure rate, MTBU, that is 6,42h / 10 = 
0,642 h = 39 min. If this value is also extrapolated to the complete A320 family 
(more than 7.700 aircrafts), the MTBU would be reduced to 0,091h = 5,5 min = 
330 seconds.  
 
Thus, the criticality of scrubbing function is not determined by the failure rate 
in terms of timing constraint because scrubbing period is always much lower 
than 39 min. In fact, the equipment operating cycle is fixed at some orders of 
magnitude lower, for example 10us (100KHz). Therefore, scrubbing operation 
will be typically performed thousands of times within the minimum probabilistic 
MTBU.  
 
In this way, the operating timing requested to perform the scrub of the 
complete memory would be defined by the acceptable time in which the most 
critical functionality of system can work in a non-intended way, let’s say, several 
operating cycles, although this value depends directly on the nature of system. 
In the Landing Gear Retraction system, whose max operating timing is defined 
as 2 to 3 seconds to extend, the system could work in a non-intended way 
during several cycles although depends on the activities or monitoring that are 
performed in parallel to the main function of Main Landing Gear. In a Primary 
Flight-Control system, whose mechanical operating performances is up to 
20Hz, it will request much lower failure timing.  
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Thus, according to SEU rate equation, Eq 5.2, different ranges of memory 
are used to obtain the probabilistic SEU rate depending of memory sizes for the 
peak value of neutron flux, 3,3 n/cm2/s: 
 
 128 Kbits: SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 217 = 1,5·10-4/h 
 
 1 Mbits: SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 220 = 1,2·10-3/h 
 
 1Gbit: SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 230 = 1,27/h 
 
Typical normalized rate value (1 n/cm2/s) is expressed by SEU rate per 1Gbit 
per day. In this case, a maximum SEU rate between 1 to 10 bits flip per day in 
1GBit [2] is statistically considered at altitudes below Pfotzer maximum. 
 
 1Gbit: SEU rate = 1 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 230 · 24 = 10/day 
 
For the baseline study, 128 Kbit RAM memory, SEU rate reveals a failure 
rate of 1,5·10-4/h requiring redundancies in system if it is categorized as 
Catastrophic (DAL A) or Hazardous (DAL B). Thus, according to SEU rate 
equation, Eq 5.2, a baseline study for a 128 Kbit RAM memory has been 
performed depending of neutron flux and also the possible type of radiation 
hardened SRAM. Then, the SEU rate calculations are: 
 
 Typ. min flux: SEU rate = 1,5 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 217 = 0,708·10-4/h  
 
 Typ. max flux: SEU rate = 2,5 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 217 = 1,18·10-4/h 
 
 Peak flux: SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-13 cm2/bit · 217 = 1,56·10-4/h 
 
 Hardened: SEU rate = 3,3 n/cm2/s · 10-15 cm2/bit · 217 = 1,56·10-6/h 
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Table 5.1 extends this concept to other memory sizes. It shows the 
probability calculations performed of the SEU rate value obtained taking into 
account the worst scenario in terms of neutron flux, that is 3,3 n/cm2/s and the 
standard cross-section of memory devices is used based on 1·10-13 cm2/bit in 
order to obtain the worst probabilities for SEU/MCU. 
 
 
Table 5.1. SEU rate calculations for different memory sizes  
for a standard cross-section 10-13 cm2/bit 
 
These calculations represent the probability to have a SEU/MCU impact 
according to flux and number of bits of memory. Furthermore, as commented in 
Chapter 2, according to [13], [14], [35], [36] and [37], the SEU/MCU impacts 
could induce different MCU patterns (Row x Column). They are characterized 
by the number of bits affected in spatial distribution in rows and columns in 
memory. Most events are identified as 1x1, SEU, but the total number of events 
in MCU are relative large. It affects several rows and columns depending on 
neutron incidence angle. Different patterns are found as 1x2, 2x1, 2x2, 2x4, 3x2 
and 4x1. MCU exhibits a strong dependence on device orientation because 
increases the total number of bits in patterns shown in Figure 5.1. Patter #1 of 
Figure 5.1 represents the SEU event while the rest of patterns are the most 
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typical MCU patterns. Pattern #9 is the one with higher number of bits affected 
with 8 bits affected in only one event having a maximum range of 4 bits. 
 
Therefore, the theoretical maximum range estimated in a conservative way 
(maximum number of bits affected in line) is 5 bits while maximum number of 
bits affected estimated (sum of all bits affected between rows and columns) in 
MCU is up to 12 bits, [10], [12], [13]. As a conclusion of these two constraints, 
maximum number of bits affected and maximum span, the worst case pattern 
would be the patterns #13, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. MCU patterns and span range 
 
 
Figure 5.2. MCU patterns and span range 
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Table 5.2 shows the probabilities for the different number of bits affected by 
MCU events is obtained from [10] for normal incidence of neutron flux. 
Therefore, the neutron impact could develop into either a SEU or a MCU and 
depends on the incidence angle. The ratio works in a range from 70%-30% 
SEU-MCU ratio for a frontal incidence angle as shown in Table 5.2 to 20%-80% 
for nearly tangential incidence [22].  
 
 
 
Table 5.2. Probabilities for number of bits affected in MCU event  
for normal neutron flux incidence. 
 
Therefore, if the distance of HSB Framed architecture, ID, is higher than 5 
bits (maximum MCU span), there is no probabilistic case in which the MCU 
span is higher than the correction capability and therefore, the operational 
algorithm could guarantee the correction of MCU errors. Table 5.3 represents 
the probabilities to correct MCU error patterns, Table 5.2, depending of the ID 
selected in HSB Framed architecture. 
 
 
 
Table 5.3. MCU range probabilities for different framed architecture distance 
 
Therefore, according to the ID selected in the Framed HSB Architecture, the 
patterns of Figure 5.1 and 5.2 could lead into correctable / uncorrectable cases 
depending on the span of the single radiation events. Several terms are defined 
for probability and rate calculations: 
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 Impact Rate, IR, (1/h): is the number of radiation impacts per 
operational hour. These impacts could lead to any upset type, either 
SEU or MCU. This rate can be obtained from Eq. 5.2. 
 
 Impact Probability, IP: is the probability of having an Impact within an 
scrubbing cycle. It can be calculated taking into account the Exposition 
Time, ExT, define in hours unit, Eq. 5.4. This ExT means the whole 
time involved to complete a scrubbing cycle (the required time to scrub 
the whole memory, or the time to complete all the frame iterations). 
The IP can be obtained from Eq. 5.5: 
 
 ExT = 
𝐈𝐃𝟐
𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧_𝐅𝐫𝐞𝐪
·
𝟏
𝟑𝟔𝟎𝟎
 [h] Eq. 5.4 
 
 IP = ExT · IR  Eq. 5.5 
 
 Single Correctable Impacts Rate, SC-IR, (1/h): is the number of 
radiation impacts per operational hour that are correctable because 
the ID is enough to cover the MCU span of single radiation event. It is 
based on the patterns, Fig.5.1 and 5.2, whose span is no greater than 
the ID, as per Table 5.3. This rate can be obtained from Eq. 5.6:  
 
 SC-IR = IR * Prob( ID ≥ span ) Eq. 5.6 
 
 Single Correctable Impacts Probability, SC-IP: is the probability of 
having a Single Correctable Impact in an Exposition Time. This 
probability can be obtained from Eq. 5.7: 
 
 SC-IP = ExT * SC-IR  Eq. 5.7 
 
 Single Uncorrectable Impacts Rate, SU-IR, (1/h): is the number of 
radiation impacts per operational hour that are uncorrectable because 
the ID is not enough to cover the MCU span. It is based on the 
patterns, Fig.5.1 and 5.2, whose span is greater than the ID, as per 
Table 5.3. This rate can be obtained from Eq. 5.8: 
 
 SU-IR = IR * Prob( ID < span ) Eq. 5.8 
 
 Single Uncorrectable Impacts Probability, SU-IP: is the probability of 
having a Single Uncorrectable Impact in an Exposition Time. This 
probability can be obtained from Eq. 5.9: 
 
 SU-IP = ExT * SU-IR  Eq. 5.9 
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In this study of probability, it is also included the possibility of having 
consecutive radiation events, which are defined as the event in which there are 
more than one radiation impacts in memory at same cycle time and affecting to 
same frame. Therefore, according to the Framed HSB Architecture, these 
events lead in uncorrectable cases: 
 
 n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts Probability, n-MU-IP: is the 
probability of having n-multiple radiation impacts in the same the cycle 
and affect to same frame. This probability can be obtained from Eq. 
5.10. They are considered as uncorrectable because they could lead 
to having a more than one bit error in the same frame. 
 
 n-MU-IP = 𝐈𝐏𝐧 Eq. 5.10 
 
 n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts Rate, n-MU-IR (1/h): is the number 
of n-multiple radiation impacts in the same cycle and affect to same 
frame, n-MU-IR is expressed in operational hour. It can be obtained 
from Eq.5.11. 
  
 n-MU-IR =  
𝐧−𝐌𝐔−𝐈𝐏 
𝐄𝐱.𝐓.
   Eq. 5.11 
 
According to Table 5,3, Eq. 5.6 and 5.8, the main contributor to the 
calculation of the failure rate is the uncorrectable single impact, SU-IR. This 
single impact is uncorrectable if the selection of ID in Framed HSB Architecture 
is not enough to cover the maximum span of all patterns of single impact shown 
in Fig 5.1 and 5.2. Therefore, a ID non-lower than 8 bits matches with the 
current maximum span, 5 bits, for a single radiation impact based on current 
technology [10], [12], [13]. In this way, this Architecture introduces enough 
capability to detect and correct all single radiation impact, as per Table 5.3. 
 
The setting of Framed Architecture with a ID non-lower than 8 bits improves 
the failure rate. In this scenario, the main contributor for the calculation of the 
failure rate is the n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts, n-MU-IR, where some 
impacts occur in same frame at same iteration cycle. Typically, the contribution 
of double and triple impact rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-IR, would be the most 
important ones for the failure rate calculation. For that reason, Figure 5.4 to 5.7 
also includes the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-MU-IP, needed to 
obtain their failure rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-IR. 
 
This allows to focus the n-Multiple Impact Rates, n-MU-IR, as the main 
contributors to failure rate of Architecture. Adding to this, an statistical analysis 
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has been also performed in order to obtain the Total Failure Probability, TFP, 
as per Eq. 5.13. It shall take into account all possible scenarios for n-Multiple 
Uncorrectable Impacts based on the sum of all possible n-multiple cases, from 
double consecutive impact to n-consecutive impacts. This probability is 
calculated in Eq. 5.13 through Eq. 5.16. 
 
 
 𝐓𝐅𝐏 =  𝐈𝐏𝟐 + 𝐈𝐏𝟑 + 𝐈𝐏𝟒+. . . + 𝐈𝐏𝐧 Eq. 5.13 
 
 
 𝐓𝐅𝐏 · 𝐈𝐏 =  𝐈𝐏𝟑 + 𝐈𝐏𝟒 + 𝐈𝐏𝟓+. .. Eq. 5.14 
 
 
 𝐓𝐅𝐏 − 𝐓𝐅𝐏 · 𝐈𝐏 = 𝐓𝐅𝐏 · (𝟏 −  𝐈𝐏) =  𝐈𝐏𝟐 Eq. 5.15 
 
 
 𝐓𝐅𝐏 = 
𝐈𝐏𝟐
𝟏−𝐈𝐏
=
𝟐−𝐌𝐔−𝐈𝐏
𝟏−𝐈𝐏
  Eq. 5.16 
 
 
According to Eq. 5.16, the Total Failure Probability, TFP, depends on double 
consecutive impact, 2-MU-IP, and the Impact Probability, IP. Therefore, the 
Total Failure Rate, TFR, of all the possible n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts in 
the Framed HSB Architecture is defined as per Eq. 5.17:  
 
 𝐓𝐅𝐑 = 
𝐓𝐅𝐏
𝐄𝐱.𝐓.
 Eq. 5.17 
 
According to these calculations, Eq. 5.2 to Eq. 5.17, a summary of Framed 
HSB architecture is performed in Tables 5.4 to 5.7 showing the calculations for 
the rates and the probabilities for different memory sizes with different ID. The 
calculations were performed under a worst case scenario consisting in: 
 
 A value of 10 KHz for the clock frequency. Typical clock frequencies 
for digital airborne systems are orders of magnitude above, >100 KHz. 
 
 Just one frame iteration is performed per clock cycle. Therefore, the 
Exposition Time can be defined as Eq. 5.18. 
 
 Ex.T. = 
𝐈𝐃𝟐
𝐜𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐤_𝐅𝐫𝐞𝐪
·
𝟏
𝟑𝟔𝟎𝟎
 [h] Eq. 5.18 
 
 Worst case flux value was considered (3.3 n/cm2/s). 
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 The Architecture may isolate the consecutive radiation events into a 
set of single radiation event even in the same cycle, if they affect to 
different frames. Only an issue is created when consecutive radiation 
events in the same scrubbing cycle affect bits in common frames. This 
fact improves the Architecture failure probability, though it was not 
taken into account in this study. 
 
Table 5.4 represents the Framed Architecture with an ID equal to 2. As a 
reference example along chapter, a memory of 16 Kbits has been selected for 
comparison between different scenarios. The Impact Rate (IR) of this memory is 
1,95·10-05 1/hr taking into account the standard cross-section. The failure rate is 
improved in two orders of magnitude, 1,85·10-07 1/hr, when Framed HSB 
architecture is introduced in system due to the capability to detect and correct 
certain errors (Table 5.3).  
 
 
 
Table 5.4. SEU rate calculations for Framed architecture, ID = 2 
 
Figures 5.4 to 5.7 also include the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-
MU-IP needed to obtain the failure rates according to the Exposition time, ExT 
defined for the system working at 10 KHz.  
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Table 5.5 represents the Framed Architecture with an ID equal to 4. The 
Impact Rate (IR) of the 16 Kbits memory is 1,95·10-05 1/hrs taking into account 
the standard cross-section. The main restriction for the calculation of the failure 
rate is the uncorrectable single impact, SU-IR, because the selection of ID is not 
enough to correct all single MCUs. Therefore, the failure rate, SU-IR, is then 
improved to 1,56·10-08 1/hr, that means an improvement of three orders of 
magnitude less than the same system without the framed architecture.  
 
 
 
Table 5.5. SEU rate calculations for frame architecture, ID = 4 
 
Table 5.6 represents the Framed Architecture with an ID equal to 8. In this 
scenario, the Architecture introduces the capability to detect and correct all 
single radiation impacts, as per Table 5.3, because the selected ID is higher 
than maximum span of possible MCU patterns.  
 
Therefore, the main contribution to the failure rate in this scenario, ID = 8, is 
the consecutive radiation events, 2-MU-IR, where both impacts occur in same 
frame at same iteration cycle. The failure rate is reduced to 6,74·10-16 1/hrs, that 
means an improvement of eleven orders of magnitude less than the same 
system without any protection, 1,95·10-05 1/hrs. 
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The contribution of triple impact rates, 3-MU-IR, to final failure rate is 
negligible compared to double uncorrectable impact rate, 2-MU-IR. The 
calculation of the Total Failure Rate (TFR) for this scenario, that includes 
all posible cases for n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts, Eq. 5.13 to 5.17 
reveals that TFR is equal to 2-MU-IR. Therefore, the unique constraint to the 
failure rate in this scenario is the double consecutive radiation events, 2-MU-IR.  
 
 
 
Table 5.6. SEU rate calculations for frame architecture, ID = 8 
 
Table 5.7 represents the Framed Architecture with an ID equal to 16. This 
architecture introduces the capability to detect and correct all single radiation 
impact, as per Table 5.3. The unique contribution to the failure rate in this 
scenario is the double radiation event, 2-MU-IR, as explained also in previous 
scenario. The failure rate is reduced to 2,69·10-15 1/hrs, that means an 
improvement of ten orders of magnitude less than the same system without 
any protection, 1,95·10-05 1/hrs. This solution with the ID equal to 16 does not 
improve the failure rate, 2-MU-IR, respect to the previous scenario, ID = 8, 
because the Exposition time is higher due to the higher number of frames.  
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Table 5.7. SEU rate calculations for frame architecture, ID = 16 
 
According to the study of previous scenarios, Table 5.8 includes a summary 
of the failure rates capabilities from Safety point of view. The limitations of this 
technique depend on the ID selected for Framed HSB architecture and also the 
size of the memory. Once Frame architecture is sized to be able to correct all 
single radiation impact, ID = 8 or higher, the failure rate is significantly reduced.  
 
 
 
Table 5.8. SEU/MCU rate calculations  
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Furthermore, table 5.8 highlights the configurations that could be used for 
Safety critical applications depending of memory size. Table 5.8 also marks that 
the Framed HSB architecture allows implementing functionalities in memory 
categorized as: 
 
 Catastrophic (DAL A) with a minimum probability of 1·10-9 1/hr. 
 
 Hazardous (DAL B) with a minimum probability of 1·10-7 1/hr. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
SIMULATIONS 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Different simulations and implementations have been performed in the 
Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with different ranges of ID and HSB. This 
architecture has been implemented, simulated in VHDL for different memory 
sizes, then Synthetized and Placed & Routed into a Xilinx Spartan FPGA to 
check viability of system. The results obtained after the synthesis and 
implementation of system with redundant function logics are included in this 
section.  
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6.1 FUNCTIONAL SIMULATIONS 
 
Fault-tolerant HSB architecture development has been briefly presented in 
this Thesis. Several examples of this architecture, Table 6.5, have been 
implemented and simulated in VHDL for different memory sizes. They have 
been synthetized and placed & routed into a Xilinx Spartan FPGA to check the 
feasibility of the system using the Xilinx ISE software. Results obtained depend 
quantitatively on the type of device in which the algorithm is implemented, 
although it enables having an example in terms of time and logic consumption 
for a qualitative assessment.  
 
Scenario 1, 2 and 3 of the Framed HSB architecture have been reported in 
this chapter including the detailed results of the simulations. Other scenarios 
(Scenarios 4 and 5) have been included in Table 6.1 and 6.2 for comparison 
purpose. Main purpose of these scenarios is to show the trends and the limits of 
the Frame architecture in terms of performance capabilities and overheads. All 
the scenarios considered in this section were implemented under the FT 
approach according to Equation 4.1 to 4.10. Table 6.1 represents three 
scenarios with different ID selection for Framed HSB architecture in a memory 
of 128 Kbits: 
 Scenario 1: 128Kbits memory, ID is defined as 8. Chapter 6.1.1 
 Scenario 2: 128Kbits memory, ID is defined as 4. Chapter 6.1.2 
 Scenario 4: 128Kbits memory, ID is defined as 2. 
 
Table 6.2 represents three different memory sizes with same ID for Frame 
architecture: 
 Scenario 5: 1 Mbits memory, ID is defined as 8.  
 Scenario 1: 128Kbits memory, ID is defined as 8. Chapter 6.1.1 
 Scenario 3: 8Kbits memory, ID is defined as 8. Chapter 6.1.3 
 
Xilinx Spartan FPGA was used to compute these bitstreams with errors. 
These manually modified bitstreams were used in Xilinx Spartan FPGA as a 
fault generator to demonstrate the retrieval capabilities of HSB architecture 
against MCU events. Furthermore, six different static memory data patterns 
were also used in those tests as a base of the static memory data with errors 
injected [39]: all-ones (AO), all-zeros (AZ), checkerboard (CB), column-stripe 
(CS), row-stripe (RS) and random board (RB) patterns. 
 
Xilinx ISE software provides the required digital resources in terms of flip-
flops, adders and multiplexers, as well as its associated delays. Different MCU 
error span scenarios (0, 2 and 8 upsets respectively) were considered for the 
proposed architecture that covers the MCU patterns described in Chapter 2.  
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Different conclusions can be obtained after the simulations by optimizing the 
ranges of HSB and ID as shown in Table 6.1 and 6.2. These scenarios are 
developed to show the MCU correction capabilities of architecture and also the 
overheads required for a certain protection. 
 
Variable Concept 
Scenario 1 
ID = 8 
Scenario 2 
ID = 4 
Scenario 4 
ID = 2 
ID Interleaving Distance 8 bits 4 bits 2 bits 
FN Frame number 64 frames 16 frames 4 frames 
MCU 
ID > MCU span Yes No No 
MCU max correction 8 x 8 bits 4 x 4 bits 2 x 2 bits 
MCUspan MCU span bits 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 
MCUbits Maximum MCU bits 12 bits 12 bits 12 bits 
DS Data size 130.816 data bits 130.816 data bits 130.816 data bits 
FB Frame bits 2.044 bits 8.176 bits 32.704 bits 
CHB Checksum bits per frame 11 checksum bits 13 checksum bits 15 checksum bits 
PB Parity bits per frame 1 parity bit 1 parity bit 1 parity bit 
Overhead 
CH 
Number redundant bits in 
checksum 
768 redundant 
bits (0,6 %) 
224 redundant 
bits (0,17 %) 
64 redundant bits 
(0,05 %) 
HSB 
Hardwired Seed Bits per 
frame 
4 HSB per frame 4 HSB per frame 5 HSB per frame 
Overhead 
HSB 
Number redundant HSB 
in architecture 
256 HSB (0,2 %) 64 HSB (0,05 %) 20 HSB (0,02 %) 
 
Table 6.1. Multilevel Frame HSB architecture range capabilities for same 128 Kbit memory 
  
As Table 6.1 shows, as ID increases, higher MCU range correction 
capability. Higher distances increase the number of frames available in the 
structure making also higher the matrix dimension of MCU patterns that could 
be detected and corrected. Therefore the correction capabilities are defined as: 
 ID = 2 =>  4 frames =>  2x2 MCU matrix, up to 4 bits 
 ID = 4 =>  16 frames => 4x4 MCU matrix, up to 16 bits 
 ID = 8 =>  64 frames => 8x8 MCU matrix, up to 64 bits 
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 As ID increases, higher number of checksum bits. For a same memory 
size, higher distances increase the number of frames available. As higher 
number of frames in a memory, the number of bits per frame will be lower but 
the total number of checksum bits will be increased when multiplied by the total 
number of frames.  
 ID = 2 =>  15 bits per frame =>  64 bits in 4 frames  
 ID = 4 =>  13 bits per frame =>  224 bits in 16 frames 
 ID = 8 =>  11 bits per frame =>  768 bits in 64 frames. 
 
Variable Concept 
Scenario 5 
1 Mbit 
Scenario 1 
128Kbits 
Scenario 3 
8Kbits 
ID Interleaving Distance 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 
FN Frames number 64 frames 64 frames 64 frames 
MCU 
ID > MCU span Yes Yes Yes 
MCU max correction 8 x 8 bits 8 x 8 bits 8 x 8 bits 
FN Frames number 64 frames 64 frames 64 frames 
MCUspan MCU span bits 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 
MCUbits Maximum MCU bits 12 bits 12 bits 12 bits 
DS Data size 1.048.576 data bits 130.816 data bits 7.936 data bits 
FB Frame bits 16.383 bits 2.044 bits 124 bits 
CHB Checksum bits per frame 14 checksum bits 11 checksum bits 7 checksum bits 
PB Parity bits per frame 1 parity bit 1 parity bit 1 parity bit 
Overhead 
CH 
Number redundant bits in 
checksum 
960 redundant bits 
(0,1 %) 
768 redundant 
bits (0,6 %) 
512 redundant 
bits (6,4 %) 
HSB 
Hardwired Seed Bits per 
frame 
4 HSB per frame 4 HSB per frame 4 HSB per frame 
Overhead 
HSB 
Number redundant HSB 
in architecture 
256 HSB (0,02 %) 256 HSB (0,2 %) 256 HSB (3,2 %) 
 
Table 6.2. Multilevel Frame HSB architecture range capabilities for 256 HSB 
 
 Furthermore, as represented in Table 6.2, same number of overhead in 
the HSB could protect a wide variety of memory sizes. As HSB range increases, 
higher memory sizes could be protected. By increasing the number of HSBs, 
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capacity of checksum level also increases. Therefore, maximum number of bits 
that could be included in data-input level is increased as well: 
HSB=3 protects up to 7 checksum bits, means up to 63 bits per frame 
HSB=4 protects up to 15 checksum bits, means up to 16 Kbits per frame 
HSB=5 protects up to 31 checksum bits, means up to 1 Gbit per frame 
 
 As number data bit increases, higher overheads in checksum are required 
due to higher number of bit per frame. The number of checksum bits increases 
to protect the data per frame. As table 6.2 shows, same number of HSB are 
able to protect a wide range of checksum bits. That means that same 256 HSB 
are able to protect from 512 checksum bits in Scenario 3 to 960 checksum bits 
in Scenario 5. 
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 SCENARIO 1 6.1.1
 
First simulation corresponds to 4088 words of 32 bits each, 128Kbit 
memory, managed by the Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with an ID equal 
to 8bit. Figure 6.1 represents a subset of the complete memory. The complete 
memory is composed by the data memory and also 24 words of 32 bits each 
added for checksum level that also includes the parity bits. The Framed HSB 
architecture also implements externally 8 words of 32 bits each for HSB 
protection. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. 128Kbit memory masked by  
Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with distance set to 8 
 
 Bit #2044  Bit #2043  Bit #2042  Bit #2041 
 Bit #1  Bit #2  Bit #3  Bit #4 
 Bit #5 
 Bit #9  Bit #11  Bit #12 
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In Figure 6.1, first rows, marked in white color, include the 4088 words of 32 
bits for the data, 130.816 bits. The matrix is divided in sections of 8x8 matrix 
due to the ID selected for this architecture equal to 8 bits in both dimensions. 
Each bit of this section pertains to a different frame, 64 frames in total. Some 
sectors of Figure 6.1 are marked with the order for clarification. The sector 
marked as bit #2041 means that the bit located in the upper part at left of this 
sector is the bit number 2.041 from frame1 while the bit located in the lower part 
of right of this sector is the bit number 2.041 from last frame, number 64. 
According to table 6.1, the scenario 1 could protect up to 2.044 bits per frame. 
 
The architecture values, according to Eq 4.1 to 4.10, could be optimized to 
match better with the 32 bits (or 64 bit) width memory as shown in Figure 6.1. In 
a word of 32 bits with a distance, ID, fixed to 8 bits, only 4 of 32 bits word could 
be used per frame. Therefore, checksum should be divided also in groups of 4 
bits per word to match the architecture of 32 bits word and 8 bit distance. Thus, 
the 11 bit checksum plus 1 bit parity is 12 bits that match with a multiple of 4. 
That means that each checksum level (parity included) of each frame requires 
at least 3 words to be allocated in the architecture. 
 
In this way, complete memory is divided in three level as known: Data-input 
level, Intermediate checksum level and Seed level, they are sized as follows: 
 
 Data level. It is composed by a 4.088x32 bit memory, 128 Kbits 
memory. As shown in Figure 6.1, it covers from row 1 up to row 
4.088, marked in white colour. 
 
 Checksum level. The protection of the 130.816 data bits with 64 
frames implies 2.044 bits per frame. This requires at least 11 bits to 
protect the data level. Furthermore, the Frame architecture adds 1 
parity bit per frame. Therefore, a total of 12 bits are required for the 
checksum level per frame. As shown in Figure 6.1, it covers from 
row 4.089 up to row 4.112. Checksum bits are marked in green 
color and parity bit is marked in yellow color.  
 
 Seed level. It is composed by 4 bits per frame as shown in Table 
6.1. They are required to protect the 12 bits in the checksum level 
per frame. It covers from row 4.113 up to row 4.120, marked in 
purple color. This 32 bit words are not part of memory although it is 
represented together for simplicity. 
 
Once architecture is explained, two MCU events have been also included 
and marked in red color in Figure 6.1: 
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 First MCU event is a pure horizontal event that causes an 8 bit 
upsets in the row 4.108. This is the maximum capability of Multilevel 
Framed HSB architecture. This MCU event affects the area 
reserved to checksum and parity. Bits affected are referenced as: 
1. Frame 25, Bit 12, error in Parity  
2. Frame 26, Bit 12, error in Parity 
3. Frame 27, Bit 12, error in Parity 
4. Frame 28, Bit 11, error in Checksum  
5. Frame 29, Bit 11, error in Checksum  
6. Frame 30, Bit 11, error in Checksum  
7. Frame 31, Bit 11, error in Checksum  
8. Frame 32, Bit 11, error in Checksum  
 
 Second MCU event is a skew event that causes a 13 bit MCU. This 
is within the maximum capability of Multilevel Framed HSB 
architecture with ID equal to 8 bits. This MCU event affects the area 
reserved to data and checksum. Bits affected are referenced as: 
1. Frame 1, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
2. Frame 2, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
3. Frame 3, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
4. Frame 8, Bit 2, error in Checksum  
5. Frame 11, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
6. Frame 12, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
7. Frame 13, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
8. Frame 53, Bit 2.042, error in Data 
9. Frame 54, Bit 2.042, error in Data 
10. Frame 55, Bit 2.042, error in Data 
11. Frame 57, Bit 2.043, error in Data 
12. Frame 63, Bit 2.042, error in Data 
13. Frame 64, Bit 2.042, error in Data 
 
A complete simulation of architecture has been performed with the previous 
MCU event included. The figures 6.2 to 6.7 are included as summary where 
some variables have been included as monitoring of the working system as: 
 tb_proceso_pyr_dec/clk: clock of architecture, 50MHz 
 tb_proceso_pyr_dec/status: status of memory. It is activated if a 
failure has been detected. It will be kept activated until the full memory 
(64 frames) is checked.  
 tb_proceso_pyr_dec/error: it is activated if an error has been 
detected in frame 
 tb_proceso_pyr_dec/bitnumber: it points to the number of the bit of 
the frame that has been corrected. 
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 tb_proceso_pyr_dec/bitframe: it points to the number of the frame 
where an error has been corrected. 
 
In the simulation shown in Figure 6.2, errors both MCU events are 
corrected. Figure 6.3 shows the zoom of simulation 6.2. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 165ns where an error is detected in frame number 54 
being the bit 2.042 of this frame, the one that is corrected in this clock cycle. 
Other adjacent frames are also detected and corrected as frame 53 and 55. 
These bits correspond to bits placed in data. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows other zoom of simulation 6.2. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 405ns where an error is detected in frame number 2 being 
the bit 3 of this frame, the one that is corrected. Other adjacent frames are also 
detected and corrected as frame 1 and 3. These bits correspond to bits placed 
from checksum level. Furthermore, there are other frames 63 and 64, where an 
error is detected other bit section that corresponds to bits 2.042, that 
corresponds to bits placed in data. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows other zoom of simulation 6.2. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 605ns where an error is detected in frame number 12 
being the bit 3 of this frame, the one that is corrected. Other adjacent frames 
are also detected and corrected as frame 11 and 13. These bits correspond to 
bits placed in checksum level. 
 
 Figure 6.6 shows other zoom of simulation 6.2. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 885ns where an error is detected in frame number 26 
being the bit 12 of this frame, the one that is corrected. Other adjacent frames 
are also detected and corrected as frame 25 and 27. These bits correspond to 
bits placed in checksum level, in parity section. Furthermore, there are other 
frames 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, where an error is detected other bit section that 
corresponds to bits 11, in the checksum level, no in parity.  
 
Figure 6.7 shows other zoom of simulation 6.2. It is shown how signal 
status flips to zero because the complete memory, the last 64 frames, has been 
checked without any error. This signal becomes ‘1’ when an error is detected 
and keeps in this status up to the complete memory is checked without errors 
after frame 31 that was the last frame detected with error.  
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Figure 6.2. Complete simulation of Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with a distance equal to 8 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. First frames detected in failure in data-input level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 54 in bit 2042 at 165ns. 
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Figure 6.4. First frames detected in failure in intermediate checksum level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 2 in bit 3 at 405ns. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Frames detected in failure in intermediate checksum level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 12 in bit 3 at 605ns 
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Figure 6.6. Frames detected in failure in Parity. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 26 in bit 12 at 885ns 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Status signal is removed once all frames have been detected without error between frame 31 and 32. 
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 SCENARIO 2 6.1.2
 
Second simulation corresponds to 4088 words of 32 bits each, 128Kbit 
memory, managed by the Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with an ID equal 
to 4bit. Figure 6.8 represents a subset of the complete memory. The complete 
memory is composed by the data memory and also 8 words of 32 bits each 
added for checksum level that also includes the parity bits. The Framed HSB 
architecture also implements externally 4 words of 5 bits each for HSB 
protection. 
 
The Framed HSB architecture definition, according to Eq 4.1 to 4.10, is 
adapted in this scenario to match with the 32 bits (or 64 bit) word width memory, 
as shown in Figure 6.8. This is non-optimized scenario because there is two 
sections, bit #14 and #15 (marked in grey) in checksum level that are not used 
in this configuration and are filled with zeros. This is non-optimized scenario 
implies to have one more HSB per frame to protect to complete checksum. 
Theoretically, 13 checksum bits and 1 parity bit could be protected by only 4 
HSB as shown in table 6.1 but in order to match with the 32 bits word width 
memory, a total of 15+1 checksum bits are required. This implies 1 more HSB 
per frame. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. 128Kbit memory masked by  
Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with distance set to 4 
 
 Bit #8173 Bit #8174  Bit #8176  Bit #8172
 Bit #5  Bit #6  Bit #1 
 Bit #9  Bit #13  Bit #16  Bit #14  Bit #15 
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In Figure 6.8, first rows, marked in white color, include the 4088 words of 32 
bits for the data-input, 130.816 bits. The matrix is divided in sections of 4x4 
matrix due to the ID selected for this architecture equal to 4 bits in both 
dimensions. Each bit of this section pertains to a different frame, 16 frames in 
total. In this way, it is not assured that all MCU events could be corrected. 
 
In this way, complete memory is divided in three level as known: Data-input 
level, Intermediate checksum level and Seed level, they are sized as follows: 
 
 Data level. It is composed by a 4.088x32 bit memory, 128 Kbits 
memory. As shown in Figure 6.8, it covers from row 1 up to row 
4.088, marked in white colour. 
 
 Checksum level. The protection of the 130.816 data bits with 16 
frames implies 8.176 bits per frame. This requires at least 13 bits to 
protect the data level. Furthermore, the Frame architecture adds 1 
parity bit per frame. This non-optimized scenario requires 2 more 
bits in checksum being a total of 15+1 bits required for the 
checksum level per frame. As shown in Figure 6.8, it covers from 
row 4.089 up to row 4.096. Checksum bits are marked in green 
color, parity bit is marked in yellow color and the extra non-used bits 
are marked in grey color. 
 
 Seed level. It would be composed by 4 bits per frame as shown in 
Table 6.1 but it is composed by 5 bits per frame as shown in the 
non-optimized scenario of Figure 6.8. It covers from row 4.097 up to 
row 4.100, marked in purple color. This 32 bit words are not part of 
memory although it is represented together for simplicity. 
 
Once architecture is explained, only one MCU event has been included and 
marked in red color in Figure 6.8: 
 
 First MCU event is a skew event that causes a 6 bit MCU in words 
4087 and 4088. This is within the maximum capability of Multilevel 
Framed HSB architecture with ID equal to 4 bits. This MCU event 
affects the area reserved to data. Bits affected are referenced as: 
1. Frame 10, Bit 8.172, error in Data 
2. Frame 11, Bit 8.172, error in Data 
3. Frame 12, Bit 8.172, error in Data 
4. Frame 13, Bit 8.173, error in Data 
5. Frame 14, Bit 8.173, error in Data 
6. Frame 16, Bit 8.172, error in Data 
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 Second MCU event is a skew event that causes a 7 bit MCU in 
words 4089 and 4090. This is within the maximum capability of 
Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with ID equal to 4 bits. This 
MCU event affects the area reserved to data and checksum. Bits 
affected are referenced as: 
1. Frame 1, Bit 5, error in Checksum level 
2. Frame 2, Bit 5, error in Checksum level 
3. Frame 3, Bit 5, error in Checksum level 
4. Frame 4, Bit 5, error in Checksum level 
5. Frame 5, Bit 6, error in Checksum level  
6. Frame 6, Bit 6, error in Checksum level  
7. Frame 8, Bit 5, error in Checksum level 
 
A complete simulation of architecture has been performed with the previous 
MCU event included. The figures 6.9 to 6.12 are included as summary. Figure 
6.9 shows the complete simulation of architecture of Figure 6.8. Figure 6.10 
shows a zoom of the simulation of Figure 6.9. The vertical mark of oscilloscope 
is set at 205ns where an error is detected in frame number 11 being the bit 
8.172 of this frame, the one that is corrected in this clock cycle. Other adjacent 
frames are also detected and corrected as frame 10 and 12. These bits 
correspond to bits placed in data. 
 
Figure 6.11 shows a zoom of the simulation of Figure 6.9. The vertical mark 
of oscilloscope is set at 65ns where an error is detected in frame number 4 
being the bit 5 of this frame, the one that is corrected. Other adjacent frames 
are also detected and corrected as frame 2 and 3. These bits correspond to bits 
placed in checksum level.  
 
Figure 6.12 shows a zoom of the simulation of Figure 6.9. It shows how 
signal status becomes zero because the complete memory, the last 16 frames 
has been checked without any error. This signal becomes ‘1’ when an error is 
detected and keeps in this status up to the complete memory is checked without 
error.
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Figure 6.9. Complete simulation of Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with a distance equal to 4 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10. First frames detected in failure in data-input level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 11 in bit 8172 at 205ns. 
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Figure 6.11. First frames detected in failure in intermediate checksum level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 4 in bit 5 at 65ns 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Status signal is removed once all frames have been detected without error at 630ns 
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 SCENARIO 3 6.1.3
 
Third simulation corresponds to 248 words of 32 bits each, 8Kbit memory, 
managed by the Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with an ID equal to 8bit. 
Figure 6.13 represents a subset of the complete memory. The complete 
memory is composed by the data memory and also 16 words of 32 bits each 
added for checksum level that also includes the parity bits. The Framed HSB 
architecture also implements externally 8 words of 32 bits each for HSB 
protection. 
 
 
Figure 6.13. 8Kbit memory masked by  
Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with distance set to 8 
 Bit #121  Bit #122  Bit #123  Bit #124 
 Bit #1 
 Bit #5  Bit #7  Bit #8 
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In this scenario, the complete memory is divided in three levels sized as: 
 
 Data level. It is composed by a 248x32 bit memory, 8 Kbits 
memory. As shown in Figure 6.13, it covers from row 1 up to row 
248, marked in white colour. 
 
 Checksum level. The protection of the 7.936 data bits with 64 
frames implies 124 bits per frame. This requires at least 7 bits to 
protect the data level. Furthermore, the Frame architecture adds 1 
parity bit per frame. Therefore, a total of 8 bits are required for the 
checksum level per frame. As shown in Figure 6.13, it covers from 
row 249 up to row 264. Checksum bits are marked in green color 
and parity bit is marked in yellow color.  
 
 Seed level. It is composed by 4 bits per frame as shown in Table 
6.1. They are required to protect the 8 bits in the checksum level 
per frame. It covers from row 265 up to row 272, marked in purple 
color. This 32 bit words are not part of memory although it is 
represented together for simplicity. 
 
Once architecture is explained, only one MCU event has been included and 
marked in red color in Figure 6.8: 
 
 First MCU event is a pure horizontal event that causes a 8 bit 
upsets in the row 260. This is the maximum capability of Multilevel 
Framed HSB architecture. This MCU event affects the area 
reserved to the checksum and also parity. Bits affected are 
referenced as follows: 
1. Frame 25, Bit 8, error in Parity  
2. Frame 26, Bit 8, error in Parity 
3. Frame 27, Bit 8, error in Parity 
4. Frame 28, Bit 7, error in Checksum  
5. Frame 29, Bit 7, error in Checksum  
6. Frame 30, Bit 7, error in Checksum  
7. Frame 31, Bit 7, error in Checksum  
8. Frame 32, Bit 7, error in Checksum  
 
 Second MCU event is a skew event that causes a 13 bit MCU. This 
is within the maximum capability of Multilevel Framed HSB 
architecture with ID equal to 8 bits. This MCU event affects the area 
reserved to data and checksum. Bits affected are referenced as: 
1. Frame 1, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
2. Frame 2, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
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3. Frame 3, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
4. Frame 8, Bit 2, error in Checksum  
5. Frame 11, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
6. Frame 12, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
7. Frame 53, Bit 122, error in Data  
8. Frame 54, Bit 122, error in Data 
9. Frame 55, Bit 122, error in Data 
10. Frame 57, Bit 123, error in Data 
11. Frame 63, Bit 122, error in Data 
12. Frame 64, Bit 122, error in Data 
13. Frame 13, Bit 3, error in Checksum  
 
A complete simulation of architecture of Figure 6.13 is shown in Figure 6.14 
Figure 6.15 represents a zoom of the Figure 6.14. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 164ns where an error is detected in frame number 54 
being the bit 122 of this frame, the one that is corrected in this clock cycle. 
Other adjacent frames are also detected and corrected as frame 53 and 55. 
These bits correspond to bits placed in data. 
 
Figure 6.16 represents a zoom of the Figure 6.14. The vertical mark of 
oscilloscope is set at 885ns where an error is detected in frame number 26 
being the bit 8 of this frame, the one that is corrected. Other adjacent frames 
are also detected and corrected as frame 25 and 27. These bits correspond to 
bits placed in parity bits. Furthermore, there are other frames 28, 29, 30, 31 and 
32, where an error is detected other bit section that corresponds to bits 7, that 
corresponds to bits placed in checksum. 
 
Figure 6.17 shows a zoom of the simulation of Figure 6.4. It shows how 
signal status becomes zero because the complete memory, the last 64 frames 
has been checked without any error. This signal becomes ‘1’ when an error is 
detected and keeps in this status up to the complete memory is checked without 
error.
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Figure 6.14. Complete simulation of Multilevel Framed HSB architecture with a distance equal to 8. 8Kbits 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15. First frames detected in failure in data-input level. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 54 in bit 122 at 164ns. 
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Figure 6.16. First frames detected in failure in parity. Mark shows a SEU in Frame 26 in bit 8 at 885ns. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17. Status signal is removed once all frames have been detected without error at 2270ns 
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6.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Fault-tolerant HSB architecture development has been briefly presented 
above. Some examples of this architecture have been implemented, simulated 
in VHDL for different memory sizes, then synthetized and placed & routed into a 
Xilinx Spartan FPGA to check the feasibility of the system using the Xilinx ISE 
software. Results obtained depend quantitatively on the type of device in which 
the algorithm is implemented, although it enables having an example in terms of 
time and logic consumption for a qualitative assessment.  
 
In order to evaluate the results obtained of Frame HSB architecture under 
different scenarios (normal operation and error injection operation), different 
techniques have been also implemented for comparison purpose. The results 
obtained, related to the timings and resources, after the synthesis and placed & 
routed of them into a Xilinx Spartan FPGA have been used to compare the 
techniques.  
 
BCH and Hamming codes were considered for assessing the proposed 
Framed HSB architecture. BCH code is a natural multiple-error correcting code. 
It is valid for MCU purposes and there is no need for interleaving a scheme in it. 
Reed-Salomon code (RS) was also studied, being recognized to be a special 
case of multilevel BCH codes, in which decoding methods are similar to those 
used for binary BCH, [6], [7].  
 
Hamming code has been implemented although it is a single-error correcting 
code that is not valid for MCU purposes. For that reason, Hamming code has 
been also implemented with an interleaving distance technique, similar to the 
one used in Frame HSB architecture, in order to be able to overcome MCU 
events.  
 
Therefore, the comparison performed, in terms of timing and resources, 
between techniques are defined as follows:  
 BCH coding designed for two bit error correction capability. 
 Framed Hamming coding with 64 frames, for 64 bit error correction 
capability. 
 Multi-level Framed HSB architecture with 64 frames, for 64 bit error 
correction capability. 
 
According to Framed HSB architecture error correction capabilities, BCH 
architecture with a 64 error-correction capability should be implemented for a 
fair comparison. However, the implemented BCH architecture in the comparison 
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is able to correct only up to two errors. This is because the simplest BCH (two 
errors) already implies a significant amount of area resources (adders and 
multiplexors), which means that an actual 64-bit BCH would perform worse 
(more time and resources demand) than the 2-bit BCH considered in the 
example. 
 
All the examples considered in this section were implemented under the FT 
approach. As commented in paragraph 4.2, Fault-tolerant systems are able to 
continue the normal operation even in the case of the failure in its components. 
Redundancy techniques include provisions of extra functional capabilities that 
would be unnecessary in a fault-free environment. For this reason, Hamming 
and BCH functionality has been triplicated, TMR basis, for a fault tolerant 
system, whereas the proposed HSB architecture is simply duplicated. 
 
Three scenarios with errors have been also considered: 0, 2, and 8 errors 
respectively. While Hamming and BCH will take the same time whatever the 
number of errors is injected, HSB architecture will spend less time as fewer 
errors are injected, because HSB architecture dynamically performs the 
detection/correction decoupling. 
 
Furthermore, Xilinx Spartan FPGA was used to compute these bitstreams 
with errors. These manually modified bitstreams were used in Xilinx Spartan 
FPGA as a fault generator to demonstrate the retrieval capabilities of HSB 
architecture against MCU events. Furthermore, six different static memory data 
patterns were also used in those tests as a base of the static memory data with 
errors injected [39]: all-ones (AO), all-zeros (AZ), checkerboard (CB), column-
stripe (CS), row-stripe (RS) and random board (RB) patterns. 
 
Table 6.3 details the results obtained from the implementation of the different 
techniques over a 128 Kbit memory. This memory size is set only as an 
example. Actually, this architecture can be easily scaled by modifying the 
number of HSB per frame.  
 
As shown in table 6.3, main drawback that makes BCH the heaviest 
technique in terms of computational resources needed (adders and 
multiplexors), in algebraic or even for Euclid method. Framed HSB architecture 
reduces the resources required due to the timing sequential procedure for error 
detection and correction. Furthermore, the error-detection computation time in 
Frame HSB architecture in one frame is lower than 14ns that is 7-8 times lower 
than BCH, improving the cycle occupation performances of systems working 
between 10 to 100 KHz. In Framed Hamming coding, each frame takes 67ns 
that is almost 5 times higher than Framed HSB architecture. 
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Table 6.3 distinguishes between the cycle time and the total time. One frame 
scrubbing requires one clock cycle time. The whole memory scrubbing requires 
64 frames in these examples and, therefore, the total time requires 64 cycle 
times. In the Framed HSB architecture, since total time depends on the number 
of errors (Equation 4.11 due to detection/correction decoupling), cycle time is 
obtained as an average value of total time.  
 
 
Av. one 
cycle (ns) 
Total timing 
(ns) 
Mux Adders Cycles 
BCH (2 error) 110,7 110,7 4e6 4e5 1 
Framed Hamming 66,9 4281,6 1.680 6 64 
HSB 
0 error 13,89 889,5 1.061 4 64 
2 error  14,65 938,1 1.061 4 64 
8 error 16,93 1083,9 1.061 4 64 
 
Table 6.3. Detailed timing comparison between techniques for 128 Kbits.  
Timings expressed in nanosec (ns). 
 
Best time performance is carried out by BCH, 110,7 ns. cycle time and total 
time are the same since no interleaving frame approach has to be considered. 
However, BCH is not very viable since it demands heavy computational 
implementation (as seen in Fig. 6.18 to 6.22). 
 
The total time of the HSB architecture is lower (better) for all error scenarios 
when compared with Frame Assisted Hamming. Furthermore, the frame sweep 
sequential procedure of the HSB architecture eases the insertion of the SEC 
execution in a clock cycle. This might be interesting in synchronous systems 
working at a fixed frequency, where the available window of time to compute all 
intended operations is restricted. For instance, in Table 6.3, the average 
operation cycle in HSB architecture is around 15 ns, whereas it is more than 
100 ns at BCH. This means that HSB adds a degree of freedom with respect of 
BCH to give way to the intended operations, without lowering the clock cycle 
frequency.  
 
 As commented in Chapter 2, different techniques are used to detect or 
correct errors as: Parity bits (PAR), Double Modular Redundancy (DMR), Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR), Multiple Error Correction techniques (MEC) as 
BCH, R-S, Berger. They are included in the Figure 6.18 for comparison. Framed 
HSB architecture (FHSB) has been added to Figure 6.18 and also the 
computation time for just one frame (HSB). Furthermore, it is also added the 
Framed Hamming architecture (FHam) implementation and also the 
computation time for just one frame (Ham).  
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Optimum solution should overcome MCU events, having the lowest 
scrubbing time and also the minimum resources. For that reason, green area 
(optimum resource/timing ratio) is marked taking into account that redundant 
resources should be integrated in same memory size (<1unit) within a timing 
constraint below 1us, typical functionality time requested in systems working 
between 10 to 100KHz.  
 
 
Figure 6.18. State-of-the-art with novel Framed HSB architecture. 
 
 TIMING ANALYSIS BASED ON EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 6.2.1
 
As commented before, in order to evaluate the experimental results obtained 
in Frame HSB architecture, different techniques (Hamming and BCH) have 
been also implemented for comparison purpose, mainly timing of operation and 
also resources required for implementation.  
 
As explained in paragraph 4.3, this capability to separate in two procedures 
allows launching the error-correction procedure (A in Eq. 6.1) only when an 
error is previously detected by the error-detection (B in Eq. 6.1). Thanks to this, 
the computation time is hugely reduced in Framed HSB and timing spent to 
compute the complete memory depends on numbers of error detected in 
frames. Equation 6.1 rules the timing spent to compute whole memory depends 
on number of frames corrupted, x, always lower than number of frames, ID2: 
 
 Timing = A • x + B • ID2 Eq. 6.1 
 
Table 6.4 represents the results obtained in the operational timing for 
Framed HSB architecture. In a 128KBits memory, detection time (B) is at least 
three times lower than the correction time (A). This implies a significant 
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reduction in the operational timings of architecture because the correction 
procedure will be only launched once an error has been previously detected in 
the frame. Therefore, according to SEU/MCU rate in airborne electronics, most 
of the scrubbing operations, there is no error found in memory.  
 
Table 6.4 includes the results obtained for different memory sizes where 
different examples of timings are also included for different number of errors 
injected in the complete memory. It is important to highlight that there is a 
column included for 12 errors because this is the maximum range of possible 
bits affected statistically by a unique MCU event. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Detail timing comparison. Timings expressed in nanosecond (ns). 
 
The timing analysis shown in Table 6.4 reveals that although both 
functionalities, Framed HSB and Hamming, are quite similar in construction with 
Framed HSB architecture, main advantage of Framed HSB is the capability to 
separate the detection procedure and the correction procedure because most of 
the EDAC techniques, as Hamming, only uses correction means.  
 
Table 6.4 shows some important results when compared memory sizes and 
number of error induced in memories. Taking as an example the memory of 
512Kbits, following important timing improvements are highlighted as:  
 
 Time spent to compute the memory could vary in steps of 24ns 
depending of number of errors in an MCU event. In case of no error, 
timing is 566 ns and timing increases up to 614 ns when there are two 
frames affected by the unique MCU event. 
 
 According to normal low neutron fluxes at A/C altitudes, most of times 
there is not errors in memory. This Frame architecture corrects error 
when they have been detected before. In case of no error in memory, 
this architecture needs only 566 ns to check the complete memory 
while other techniques, as Hamming, require computing the full 
correction procedure, 2122 ns. That is 3,8 times quicker than any other 
technique. 
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 According to MCU event probabilities as explained in Chapter 2, 
maximum number of bits affected in an unique MCU event is lower than 
12 bits. This takes 858 ns in the Framed HSB architecture because only 
corrects 12 frames as worse MCU event. It means 2,5 times quicker 
than the complete correction, 2122 ns. 
 
Figure 6.19 is an extension of Table 6.4. It depicts a time consumption 
comparison in a memory size sweep up to 512Kbits. All conclusions previously 
explained for Table 6.4 are also applicable here where an increase of the 
scrubbing time versus the memory size for all cases are found. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Timing consumption up to 512Kbits 
  
 RESOURCE ANALYSIS BASED ON EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 6.2.2
 
The evaluation of the experimental results in terms of resources (FFs, 
adders, mux) in Frame HSB architecture is one of the key characteristics of 
architecture to achieve the Fault-Tolerant capability. As higher resources 
required for implementing the architecture, the failure probability due to 
SEU/MCU event will also increase, as expressed in Eq. 5.2. This evaluation has 
been performed by the comparison with other techniques as Hamming and 
BCH. Table 6.5 includes the results obtained from the Synthesis and 
Place&Route performed with the Xilinx ISE platform in the three architectures. 
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Furthermore, different memory sizes are used for this comparison from 8Kbits 
to 256 Kbits. 
 
Table 6.5 also includes the comparison of the results obtained from the 
Synthesis and Place&Route. Different aspect of results obtained is included: 
 
 Number of adders (add) used by the configuration, where is also 
indicated the number of the bits of the adders used. 
 
 Number of substractors (subs) used by the configuration, where is also 
indicated the number of the bits of the substractors used. 
 
 Number of Flip-Flops (FF) used by the configuration. 
 
 Number of comparators (comp) used by the configuration, where is also 
indicated the number of the bits of the comparators used. 
 
 Number of Multiplexors (mux) used by the configuration. 
 
 Number of XOR gates (xor) used by the configuration. 
 
 Timing spent expressed in nanosecond (ns)  
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Table 6.5. Results of Synthesis into a Xilinx Spartan FPGA 
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Fig. 6.20 to 6.22 details the logic required to deal with MCU events for the 
proposed Framed HSB architecture compared to the Frame Assisted Hamming 
and the BCH, in a memory size sweep up to 256kbits. Figure 6.20 represents 
the resources required in terms of Flip-flops. Figure 6.21 represents the 
required number of Adders while Fig. 6.22 represents the required number of 
Multiplexors in the FPGA.  
 
 
Figure 6.20. Flip-Flops architecture consumption up to 256Kbits 
 
 These comparisons also reveal that Framed HSB and Framed Hamming 
have similar construction, but HSB with its self-checking capability (only 
requires a functionality duplicate in fault-tolerant systems) permits that 
scrubbing function in Virtual-Framed HSB is just duplicate while Framed 
Hamming should be triplicate in Fault-Tolerant systems. Framed HSB uses 
approximately a 33% less of bitstream for scrubbing function. Resource 
consumption analysis also includes the comparison with BCH. In this case, 
figures 6.20 to 6.22 clearly show the fact that BCH decoding, based on 
algebraic method or Euclid method, is a heavy computational procedure that 
requires a huge volume of resources in FPGA. 
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Figure 6.21. Adders consumption evolution up to 256Kbits 
 
 Odd effect shown in Figure 6.21 is that the total number of adders is kept 
constant even when memory size increases for Framed Hamming and Framed 
HSB architectures. The number of bits per adder is the characteristic that 
increases in same way as maximum memory capability keeping the total 
number of adders. In 16Kbit memory size, 10-bits adders are used in Hamming 
and Framed HSB while BCH uses 16-bit adders. In 256Kbits size, Hamming 
and Framed HSB uses 14-bits adders while BCH uses 20-bit adders. In BCH 
architecture, the number of adders used increases also as memory size 
increases. As shown clearly in Figure 6.21. BCH architecture requires at least 
up to three orders of magnitude more than the other two architectures in terms 
of Adders. 
 
 In Figure 6.22, it is represented the number of multiplexors used in each 
architecture. As shown clearly, BCH architecture requires at least up to three 
orders of magnitude more than the other two architectures. Resources required 
by the computation of BCH coding imply a huge number of Adders, FF and 
Multiplexors when compared with other techniques. Framed architectures, 
Hamming and Multilevel HSB, demands almost the same number of multiplexor 
when synthetized being the lowest one the number of multiplexor required by 
the HSB architecture. 
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Figure 6.22. Multiplexors consumption evolution up to 256Kbits 
  
Finally, the timing and also the resource analysis based on experimental 
results points several characteristics of Frame HSB architecture: 
 
 The proposed HSB Architecture requires less area overhead than the 
traditional schemes.  
 
 The lowest time consumption for the complete memory takes place 
under the BCH implementation that is almost 5 times lower than 
Framed HSB.  
 
 The lowest cycle time consumption of the memory takes place under 
the Framed HSB implementation, about 1 order of magnitude less 
than BCH.  
 
 BCH is not really implementable from a practical point of view, which 
makes HSB a reasonable solution, optimizing time and resource 
consumption in a balanced way. 
 
 An additional advantage of HSB is the degree of freedom offered from 
the clock cycling point of view. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A new Architecture to retrieve MCUs in programmable memories in a 
radiated environment is presented. It uses the advantages of both the 
reconfiguration-based techniques and redundant-based techniques to obtain a 
hybrid system suitable for fault-tolerant requirements, which is optimized in 
terms of operating time and area.  
  
This architecture merges different well-known techniques such as: 
 Single Error Correction Techniques, [5] and [6]. 
 Interleaving Distance concept (for instance, in [35], [36]).  
 Detection and correction decoupling concept (for instance, in [7], [26]), 
based on an independent parity check. 
 Redundancy Techniques for Error correction, [7]. 
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It also proposes new features as: 
 The implementation of a permanent reference (not vulnerable to 
radiation) called Hardwired Seed Bits (HSB) that contains the 
essential information for error retrieval. The HSB are composed of an 
extremely low number of bits from which the whole memory can be 
reconstructed, including the EDAC functions, under the multilevel 
approach of the proposed architecture. 
 
 This system can be physically implemented as a small code at the 
static memory, which is transparent for the logic layer. For instance, in 
an FPGA, it can be implemented at the SRAM level. The content of 
HSB and Checkword is generated at the development phase of 
equipment and depends on the final code that the system protects.  
 
 A suitable algorithm for Fault-Tolerant application is also included 
in the system in order to drive the architecture operation. It runs the 
operating sequence within the main program, resulting in a 
transparent performance for the user.  
 
 The proposed architecture allows an area reduction when compared with a 
TMR-EDAC approach, meaning a smaller FPGA can be selected for the 
system. In the example presented in this work, the proposed system performs 
up to 3 times quicker compared with a classical Hamming code. 
 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Proposed solution is based on a Reconfiguration-based solution that aims 
to restore as soon as possible the original values.  
 
Main advantage of this kind of linear codes is the light-weighted correction 
coding because the calculation of each checksum bit is based on parity 
computations of alternate bits of data. This codification allows detecting / 
correcting a limited number of errors that may occur anywhere only in the data 
bits, not in the own redundant bits. The main contributions of the proposed 
Architecture are the following: 
 
A Multilevel Architecture, which allows concatenating two or more levels 
of checksum in which every level only protects the redundant checksum bits of 
previous levels. The range of this multilevel architecture is scalable to any 
memory size. 
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The whole memory information is highly compressed in a set of few bits 
HSB (Hardwired Seed Bits) which are immune to radiation. From them, the 
EDAC (Error Detection And Correction) codes included in the Architecture are 
able to completely restore the whole memory.  
 
This Architecture allows a significant minimization of the failure 
probability in memories due to radiation. This minimization consists in not only 
retrieving Single Event Upsets (SEUs) but also Multiple Cells Upsets (MCUs). 
This low probability rate opens the possibility of fulfilling Fault Tolerant 
requirements due to it is able to meet safety requirements such as the ones 
stablished at the demanding Standards of the Aerospace Industry to avoid 
catastrophic failures. 
 
This Architecture proposes significant optimizing the resources involved. 
This is particularly important since solving MCUs normally increases 
exponentially the complexity of the system in terms of both devices involved 
and operation time. The contribution in this is case us the integration of different 
techniques such as detection-correction decoupling and bit interleaving. 
 
This Architecture allows Fault-Tolerant performance. Not only it presents a 
very low probability failure rate, but it also extends the protection to the EDAC 
functions themselves.  
 
A procedure to determine the failure probability of the proposed 
Architecture has been presented. This procedure allows designing the setting of 
the Architecture in order to fulfill the safety requirements. However, there is still 
a path ahead that has been identified, since there are different aspects involved 
in an accurate probability estimation, which has been proposes a future work. In 
the present work, a worst case estimation was presented as a first approach, 
which was useful in order to assess the experimental results. 
.   
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7.2 FUTURE WORK 
 
This work aims to propose a step-ahead-concept to optimize the 
performance of SRAM memories working in a radiated environment. This work 
has allowed obtaining knowledges for the complex nuclear environment that 
creates the radiation issue in airborne electronics and also coding mechanisms 
for error protection.  
 
Several open topics and new questions have been arisen after the work 
performed in this Thesis. The future work will continue the development of the 
Framed HSB Architecture herein described. The future work-packages are 
presented and briefly described below: 
 
1. Implementation technologies:  
 
 HSB Implementation: A basic HSB implementation could be performed 
with jumper pins (a pull-up/pull-down approach). However, this would 
not be practical for large memories, and even impossible for dynamic 
functions. In these cases, a programmable HSB capability is required. 
Manufacturers may have the solution for this issue, as inserting some 
FLASH Seeds Bits (FSB) in the memory. A TMR-HSB can be 
implemented within the memory, losing the Hardwired approach, and 
taking into account the tiny bits number involved. 
 
 Space Condition: A physical control of the bits location is required to 
implement the interleaving distance. The FPGA has a complex physical 
structure composed basically of RAM blocks which are dynamically 
interconnected through routing matrices. Furthermore, each RAM block 
itself includes elements such as a Look-Up-Table (LUT) which are 
configurable. The FPGA algorithm synthesizer should be 
reprogrammed to implement the Framed HSB Architecture functions 
taking into account not only the logic but also the physical bit 
distribution. 
 
2. Development to explore the limits of Framed HSB Architecture 
 
 Time Condition: Fault-Tolerant requirement implies downsizing the 
failure rate to below a threshold required by the System Safety 
Assessment that is related to DAL. Time condition means that the 
system operation has to be fast enough to neglect double consecutive 
radiation events that take place in same iteration cycle. This condition is 
not only related with the clock frequency of the system but also with the 
fact that the whole memory is not scrubbed at once but frame by frame. 
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 Probability calculations: All actual systems are susceptible to failure. 
Therefore, safety failure probability thresholds and calculations related 
to double consecutive radiation impacts in Framed HSB architecture 
require additional investigation. The Architecture may isolate the 
consecutive radiation events into a set of single radiation event even in 
the same cycle, if they affect to different frames. Only an issue is 
created when consecutive radiation events in the same scrubbing cycle 
affect bits in common frames. This fact improves the Architecture failure 
probability, though it was not taken into account in this work. 
 
 Scrubbing algorithm: As MCU appears as a set of neighbor bits affected 
due to a single neutron radiation event. The algorithm of Framed HSB 
Architecture could be improved based on an intelligent scrubbing 
sequence where both redundant SEC functionalities work 
simultaneously. They could focus the correction procedure in the 
neighbor frames. This algorithm could reduce the Exposition time. 
 
3. Detection and correction of Double consecutive radiation impacts. 
 
 Double consecutive radiation impacts: The probabilistic calculation 
performed in this Thesis is based on the Total Failure Rate (TFR). TFR 
includes all possible cases for n-Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts and 
reveals that TFR is equal to the Double consecutive radiation impact 
rate. Therefore, the unique constraint to the failure rate under this 
Architecture is the double consecutive radiation event. This issue 
requires additional investigation based on an algorithm that could 
complement the detection and correction of Double consecutive 
radiation impacts. 
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CHAPTER 9: ADDENDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Addenda was developed under the demand of the Evaluation Board of the 
PhD Thesis entitled “Novel Fault Tolerant Multi-Bit Upset (MBU) Error-Detection 
and Correction (EDAC) architecture” written by Andrés Jiménez Olazábal.  
 
This PhD Thesis was officially reviewed on the 26th of June of 2018. The 
members of the Evaluation Board were Luis Entrena Arrontes, Mª Luisa López 
Vallejo and Pedro Reviriego Vasallo. The work was evaluated as “passed”, 
although the Evaluation Board demanded some points to be added. 
 
The author has created this new Chapter (Chapter 9) in his best understanding 
that its content fully satisfies the demanded requirements of the Evaluation Board.  
Chapter 9 was written and attached to the original version the 16th of July of 2018, 
without introducing any change at any part of the rest of the document. 
 
Chapter 9 is composed of 3 sections. Section 9.1 lists and propose a correction 
for different errata founded at the original text. Section 9.2 clarifies some concepts 
pointed by the Evaluation Board. Section 9.3 widens the bibliography offered at the 
original text. 
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9.1 ERRATA SHEET 
 
1. Pag 15: Work target.  
Error said “The solution intended in this Thesis is based on an error correcting technique with 
a novel permanent reference not affected by SEU/MCU, called “Hardwired Seed Bits”, HSB, 
physically soldered on the PCB” 
 
Correction: “The solution intended in this Thesis, mainly to protect the FPGA 
configuration static memory, [73] and [74], is based on an error correcting technique with a 
novel permanent reference not affected by SEU/MCU, called “Hardwired Seed Bits”, HSB, 
physically soldered on the PCB” 
 
2. Pag 15: Work target.  
Error said “Main aim of the solution proposed is the MCU protection. As MCU appears in bits 
physically near each other, a single-error correcting technique fails in the detection of MCU 
events” 
 
Correction: “Main aim of the solution proposed, [73] and [74], is the MCU protection. 
Traditional conceptual matrix model for memories have been used as reference for this 
work. Therefore, MCU appears in bits physically near each other, single-error correcting 
techniques fails in the detection of MCU events” 
 
3. Pag 33: Multiple Bit Upset  
Error said “Multiple Bit Upset (MCU)” 
 
Correction “Multiple Bit Upset (MBU)” 
 
4. Pag 35: Current solutions in Airborne electronics  
Error said “State-of-the-art of different FPGA suppliers allows the partial reconfiguration to 
rewrite only the selected part without stop the circuit implemented in device for a shorter period 
of time” 
 
Correction “State-of-the-art of different FPGA suppliers allow the partial reconfiguration to 
rewrite only the selected part without stopping the circuit implemented in device for a shorter 
period of time” 
 
5. Pag 36: Current solutions in Airborne electronics 
Error said “The more traditional method of verification of the data stored in configuration 
memory is to readback the data and performs a bit for bit comparison. This requires the use of 
the original file and the readback file which are equal in size to the original bit-stream used to 
configure the FPGA. This method would effectively require triple the amount of system memory 
to detect SEU events.  
 
Most popular technique is EDAC based on Single/Multiple-error correcting techniques, as 
Hamming, BCH, R-S, Berger codes that reduces the resources required. The most important 
drawback of multi-error correcting codes is that their logic complexity increase exponentially as 
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range of maximum error correction capability, Figure 2.17. This topic is an important factor to 
take into account when architecture is designed for MCU correction” 
 
Correction “The more traditional method of verification of the data stored in configuration 
memory is to readback the data and perform a bit for bit comparison. This requires the use of 
the original file and the readback file which are equal in size to the original bit-stream used to 
configure the FPGA. This method would effectively require triple the amount of system memory 
to detect SEU events.  
 
Most popular technique is EDAC based on Single/Multiple-error correcting techniques, as 
Hamming, BCH, R-S, Berger codes that reduces the resources required. The most important 
drawback of multi-error correcting codes is that their logic complexity increases exponentially 
as range of maximum error correction capability, Figure 2.17. This topic is an important factor 
to take into account when architecture is designed for MCU correction” 
 
6. Pag 44: Basic operation algorithm 
Error said “Furthermore, the Hardwired Seed Bits, HSB, are also added in the Physical 
implementation side as the permanent reference of architecture. This reference contains the 
essential information, neutral to radiation, from which errors in original data can be retrieved. 
There is still a risk of having an upset in the HSB, although this risk has been eliminated due to 
the their physical implementation. This reference is not saved physically in SRAM memory. In 
order to be neutral to radiation, It shall be somehow physically implemented to prevent the 
vulnerability to radiation, for example, pull-up resistors, ROM or a Hardened memory” 
 
Correction “Furthermore, the Hardwired Seed Bits, HSB, are also added in the Physical 
implementation side as the permanent reference of architecture. This reference contains the 
essential information, neutral to radiation, from which errors in original data can be retrieved. 
There is still a risk of having an upset in the HSB, although this risk has been eliminated due to 
their physical implementation. This reference is not saved physically in SRAM memory. In 
order to be neutral to radiation, HSB shall be somehow physically implemented to prevent the 
vulnerability to radiation, for example, pull-up resistors, ROM or a Hardened memory” 
 
7. Pag 46: Basic operation algorithm 
Error said “Figure. 3.2. Both SEC functions assess Checkword from HSB” 
 
Correction “Figure. 3.2. SEC function assesses Checkword from HSB” 
 
8. Pag 46: Basic operation algorithm 
Error said “The Checkword level is composed of the checksum bits for correction and an 
additional bit for a just parity error detection, which constitutes the SEC reference for the data 
level to be scrubbed. SEC function can be used in this case. The possible scenarios under this 
step are as follows” 
 
Correction “The Checkword level is composed of the checksum bits for correction and an 
additional bit for just a parity error detection, which constitutes the SEC reference for the data 
level to be scrubbed. SEC function can be used in this case. The possible scenarios under this 
step are as follows” 
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9. Pag 46: Basic operation algorithm 
Error said “The SECs functions stored in memories might be affected themselves by an 
MCU, which means that the Error Correction would not be fully guaranteed in this case. 
Therefore, the second Issue that may be arisen is” 
 
Correction “The SEC functions stored in memories might be affected themselves by an MCU, 
which means that the Error Correction would not be fully guaranteed in this case. Therefore, 
the second Issue that may be arisen is” 
 
10. Pag 55: Virtual-framed interleaving for MCU correction 
Error said “Figure. 4.1. 17 x 8 bit memory divided in 16 frames. Bits affected by MCU are 
marked in red” 
 
Correction “Figure. 4.1. 16 x 8 bit memory. Bits affected by MCU are marked in red” 
 
11. Pag 69: Architecture for Fault Tolerant systems 
Error said “Figure 4.8.a represents the scenario in which both SEC functionalities could be 
affected by only one neutron impact. This situation shall be avoided by using the configuration 
shown in Figure 4.8.b” 
 
Correction: “Figure 4.8 represents the scenario in which both SEC functionalities could be 
affected by only one neutron impact. This situation shall be avoided by using the configuration 
shown in Figure 4.9” 
 
12. Pag 69: Architecture for Fault Tolerant systems 
Update of Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9.  
 
 
Figure 4.8. HSB architecture distribution where both duplicated scrubbing functionalities are 
placed in Data level. MCU event could affect to both SECs at same time. This situation shall be 
avoided 
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Figure 4.9. “MCU event only affects to SEC2 but no to SEC1” 
 
13. Pag 70: Implementation issues 
Error said “All actual systems are susceptible to failure. Therefore, the Fault Tolerant 
definition must be stablished in terms of a failure probability threshold. Actually, in the 
standards stablished in the aerospace industry (ARP4754, ARP4754/A, RTCA DO254 and 
RTCA DO178) the severity of a system is defined in terms of DAL (Design Assurance Level). 
The most severe scenario is named as a catastrophic event, and the systems and equipments 
that may produce it in case of failure must be certified as DAL-A. According to standards, the 
failure probability of DAL-A systems must be no greater than 1·10-9 1/hr. This would means, as 
a rough example, that just one catastrophic failure would take place in the whole life-span of a 
complete fleet (1.000 aircrafts)” 
 
Correction “All actual systems are susceptible to failure. Therefore, the Fault Tolerant 
definition must be stablished in terms of a failure probability threshold. Actually, in the 
standards stablished in the aerospace industry (ARP4754, ARP4754/A, RTCA DO254 and 
RTCA DO178) the severity of a system is defined in terms of DAL (Design Assurance Level). 
The most severe scenario is named as a catastrophic event, and the systems and equipments 
that may produce it in case of failure must be certified as DAL-A. According to standards, the 
failure probability of DAL-A systems must be no greater than 1·10-9 1/hr. This would mean, as 
a rough example, that just one catastrophic failure would take place in the whole life-span of a 
complete fleet (1.000 aircrafts)” 
 
14. Pag 79: Multilevel architecture 
Error said “Checksum code proposed in previous paragraphs is able to correct any single 
failure included in data bits of bitstream but no anywhere in checksum bits, because it would be 
wrongly understood as failure in data bits. In this way, the multilevel architecture becomes the 
solution for this issue. The classical solutions for mitigating the effects of SEE are divided in 
two main categories: reconfiguration-based (i.e. EDAC) and redundancy-based solutions (i.e. 
TMR).  
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 The first solutions restore the original values in memory as soon as possible after a 
SEE event by means of error detection and correction codes, [7], [28], [29], [30], [33]. 
 
 The second group masks the SEE effects, isolating the circuit outputs from internal 
SEUs by means of a voting process, which means that the effect of an error is not 
transmitted to the output signals. This scheme requires extra cost in terms of 
components, weight, area and power dissipation” 
 
Correction “Checksum code proposed in previous paragraphs is able to correct any single 
failure included in data bits of bitstream but not anywhere in checksum bits, because it would 
be wrongly understood as failure in data bits. In this way, the multilevel architecture becomes 
the solution for this issue. The classical solutions for mitigating the effects of SEE are divided in 
two main categories: reconfiguration-based (i.e. EDAC) and redundancy-based solutions (i.e. 
TMR).  
 
 The first solutions restore the original values in memory as soon as possible after a 
SEE event by means of error detection and correction codes, [7], [28], [29], [30], [33]. 
 
 The second group masks the SEE effects, isolating the circuit outputs from internal 
SEUs by means of a voting process, which means that the effect of an error is not 
transmitted to the output signals. This scheme requires extra cost in terms of 
components, weight, area and power dissipation, [7], [28], [31], [70]” 
 
15. Pag 80: Multilevel architecture 
Error said “Figure 4.19. Multilevel structure. Seed is a permanent reference” 
 
Correction “Figure 4.19. Multilevel structure for coding and decoding processes. Seed is a 
permanent reference” 
 
16. Pag 85: Time Optimization based on Parity 
Error said “As described in previous paragraphs, multilevel architecture is composed by three 
levels: Data level, checksum level and Seed level. Taking the opportunity of direct protection 
from the permanent reference of HSB, checksum level includes now a parity bit only of the data 
bits. In this case, any single failure, SEU/MCU, could be detected by just a parity computation 
of data-bit level” 
 
Correction “As described in the previous paragraphs, multilevel architecture is composed by 
three levels: Data level, the checksum level and the Seed level. Taking the opportunity of 
direct protection from the permanent reference of HSB, checksum level includes now a parity 
bit only of the data bits. In this case, any single failure, SEU/MCU, could be detected by just a 
parity computation of data-bit level” 
 
17. Pag 86: Time Optimization based on Parity 
Error said “The Detection time (B in Eq 4.12) in a frame is typically faster than Correction 
time (A in Eq 4.12). Therefore, this technique only launches the correction procedure in a frame 
when an error is detected by the parity bit of frame [7]. Thanks to this, the computation time is 
hugely reduced because in some EDACs (as Hamming or BCH), detection & correction are 
coupled being correction procedure performed every time” 
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Correction “The Detection time (B in Eq 4.11) in a frame is typically faster than Correction 
time (A in Eq 4.11). Therefore, this technique only launches the correction procedure in a frame 
when an error is detected by the parity bit of frame [7]. Thanks to this, the computation time is 
hugely reduced because in some EDACs (as Hamming or BCH), detection & correction are 
coupled being correction procedure performed every time” 
 
18. Pag 97: Probability / Reliability calculations 
Error said “The setting of Framed Architecture with a ID non-lower than 8 bits improves the 
failure rate. In this scenario, the main contributor for the calculation of the failure rate is the n-
Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts, n-MU-IR, where some impacts occur in same frame at same 
iteration cycle. Typically, the contribution of double and triple impact rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-
IR, would be the most important ones for the failure rate calculation. For that reason, Figure 5.4 
to 5.7 also includes the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-MU-IP, needed to obtain their 
failure rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-IR” 
 
Correction “The setting of Framed Architecture with a ID non-lower than 8 bits improves the 
failure rate. In this scenario, the main contributor for the calculation of the failure rate is the n-
Multiple Uncorrectable Impacts, n-MU-IR, where some impacts occur in same frame at same 
iteration cycle. Typically, the contribution of double and triple impact rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-
IR, would be the most important ones for the failure rate calculation. For that reason, Tables 
5.4 to 5.7 also includes the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-MU-IP, needed to obtain 
their failure rates, 2-MU-IR and 3-MU-IR” 
 
19. Pag 98: Probability / Reliability calculations 
Include Eq.5.12. 
  Eq. 5 .12 
 
20. Pag 99: Probability / Reliability calculations 
Error said “Figures 5.4 to 5.7 also include the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-MU-
IP needed to obtain the failure rates according to the Exposition time, ExT defined for the 
system working at 10 KHz” 
 
Correction “Tables 5.4 to 5.7 also include the probability calculations for 2-MU-IP and 3-MU-
IP needed to obtain the failure rates according to the Exposition time, ExT defined for the 
system working at 10 KHz” 
 
21. Pag 104: Experimental Assessment 
Error said “Different simulations and implementations have been performed in the Multilevel 
Framed HSB architecture with different ranges of ID and HSB. This architecture has been 
implemented, simulated in VHDL for different memory sizes, then Synthetized and Placed & 
Routed into a Xilinx Spartan FPGA to check viability of system. The results obtained after the 
synthesis and implementation of system with redundant function logics are included in this 
section” 
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Correction “Different simulations and implementations have been performed in the Multilevel 
Framed HSB architecture with different ranges of ID and HSB. This architecture has been 
implemented, simulated in VHDL for different memory sizes, then Synthetized and Placed & 
Routed into a Xilinx Spartan3E FPGA to check viability of system. The results obtained after 
the synthesis and implementation of system with redundant function logics are included in this 
section” 
 
22. Pag 122: Scenario 3 
Error said “Once architecture is explained, only one MCU event has been included and 
marked in red color in Figure 6.8” 
 
Correction “Once architecture is explained, only one MCU event has been included and 
marked in red color in Figure 6.13” 
 
23. Pag 131: Timing analysis based on experimental results 
Update of Figure 6.19. Timing consumption up to 512Kbits” 
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9.2 EXTENSION OF CONCEPTS 
 
24. Pag 32: Single Event Upset (SEU) 
 
“Plateau cross section determined empirically, represented as σ, is defined as the SEE susceptibility of 
an electronic device to ionizing radiation. Cross-section σ in radiation terms for proton and neutron 
interactions is the combination of sensitive area and probability of an interaction depositing the critical 
charge for a SEE. The SEU response of a device to a beam of particles is characterized as the SEU 
cross section, which is the number of upsets divided by the fluence of particles (p/cm2, particle flux 
integrated over the exposure time) to which the device was exposed. This data should be obtained by an 
experimental test in each component along a wide range of energy transferred to the device, because it 
highly depends on the internal design of bits. The units for cross-section are cm
2
 per device or per bit.” 
 
25. Pag 38: Current solutions in airborne electronics.  
 
“Single Error detection and Correction codes (SEC) as Hamming codes, [5], [6], [7], [28]. An error-
correcting code (ECC) is a system that adds redundant bits to the original bitstream, being capable to 
recover even when a number of errors (up to the capability of the code being used). Error-correcting 
codes are usually distinguished between convolutional codes and block codes: 
 
• SEC + Interleaving,  [35], [36], [43] 
This technique traditionally selects the interleaving distance according to the maximum MCU size 
expected. There are several investigations that correlate the Interleaving selected against the error 
probability in order to minimize the implications for memory design impacting in area resources and 
timing delays. This technique, Interleaving, implies a routing that is more complex and a power 
consumption that is increased. Furthermore, a parity bit could be introduced for a SEC-DED for 
decoupling error detection from correction. 
• Double Adjacent errors, SEC-DED-DAEC, [52], [59], [60], [63], [65] 
This technique is based on traditional SEC-DED codes (linear systematic block codes). Generator and 
Syndrome matrix are defined with the weight of all the data columns is three and the sum of any two 
adjacent data columns is four. This technique could correct the error pattern (--11--), where ones 
represents the errors affected, being physically close. SEC-DAEC codes are mistaken in double 
nonadjacent errors. 
• Double Alternative Adjacent errors, SEC-DED-DAAEC, [63], [64] 
This technique is an extension of SEC-DED-DAEC. This technique could correct the error pattern (--
101--), where bits affected are no physically close. Ones represents the errors affected and zeros are 
correct bits not affected by radiation event. SEC-DED-DAAEC codes are mistaken in double 
nonadjacent errors. 
• Triple Adjacent errors, SEC-DAEC-TAEC, [63] 
This technique is an extension of SEC-DED-DAEC. This technique could correct the error pattern (--
111--), where bits affected are physically close. Ones represent the errors affected. In that case, an 
additional parity check bit was required compared with a SEC-DED code. The decoding complexity is 
also larger than that for SEC-DED or SEC-DAEC codes as more syndromes have to be checked for 
error detection, therefore, it increases the cost of a high redundancy. 
• SEC + Bloom filter [53], [54], [55], [62] 
A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure used to know if an element is a member of a set. False 
positive matches are possible, "possibly in set", but false negatives are not, "definitely not in set". As 
higher number of elements in the set the higher probability of false positives 
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• Built In-Current Sensors, [69] 
This technique proposes the use of sensors that measure the current, BICS, consumption in vertical 
lines of memory in order to detect the bits in which the error due to radiation event have been 
produced. This technique requires a coupled correction technique to clear the errors. 
• DMR/TMR with approximate logics [70], [71] 
This technique proposes a duplication or triplication of system to be protected with modular 
approximation models of the principal functionality. This technique refers to functional similarity 
between logic functions or circuits instead of functional equivalence. Therefore, this technique is able 
to detect and correct errors within the principal functionality although its capability depends on the 
approximations used in the modular redundancies. 
• Well-taps [61], [67] 
This technique proposes the use of well-taps distance (number of cells between the welltaps) due to its 
inhibiting physical effect on MCUs with an optimized interleaving distance to make parity codes viable 
for detecting and correcting errors. A higher number of well-taps, it increases the area, 
• Temporary redundancy [68] 
This technique proposes the consecutive delayed transmission of a single data with multiple delayed 
clocks in order to detect temporary by means a majority voter the error in the transmission.  
• Hsiao codes: [66] 
This technique is based on traditional linear systematic block codes. Generator and Syndrome matrix 
are defined with an odd-weight-column, no two columns are the same and there are no all-0 columns. 
This technique could correct the single error pattern. 
• Orthogonal Latin Squares [56], [57] 
This technique is based on multiple error correction codes where the key parameters of an OLS code 
are its data block size k and the number of errors that can be corrected t. The block size is of the form 
k = m2 bits and to correct t errors, k = 2tm parity check bits are needed. The majority vote required to 
re-compute the four parity check bits and take a majority vote among them.” 
 
26. Pag 43: Basic physical architecture 
 
Extension added: “There are also some bits which are used for the scrubbing function itself 
(SEC1), which is identically duplicated (SEC2). Both scrubbers (SEC1 and SEC2) are implemented 
internally to the FPGA as part of the configuration FPGA bitstream. Therefore, the internal logic of 
both scrubbers is also susceptible to radiation.  
Traditionally, internal scrubbers are less reliable than external ones, because external scrubbers 
are placed into a radiation-hardened FPGA. This external implementation could achieve, in a first 
attempt, a lower failure probability due to technology immunity, although main drawbacks of this 
external scrubber are the complex HW architecture and cost increment.  
The proposed Architecture allows having internal scrubbers and yet having fault tolerant 
performance. Failure probability calculations include possible faulty events at the internal scrubber 
logic” 
 
27. Pag 105: Functional simulations 
 
Extension added: “Fault-Tolerant HSB architecture development has been briefly presented in this 
Thesis. Several examples of different configurations of HSB Architecture have been simulated during 
architecture definition phase. Functional simulations have been performed in the definition phase in 
order to evaluate the performances and operation limits of HSB Architecture using Modelsim and 
Matlab. 
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After the architecture definition phase, other simulation tools have been also used for error 
injection to check recovery capabilities of architecture. Errors have been introduced using Modelsim 
and SST (SEUs Simulation Tool by ESA and Nebrija University of Madrid). 
Several examples of this architecture, Table 6.5, have been implemented and simulated in VHDL for 
different memory sizes. They have been synthetized and placed & routed into a Xilinx Spartan3E FPGA 
to check the feasibility of the system using the Xilinx ISE software. Results obtained depend 
quantitatively on the type of device in which the algorithm is implemented, although it enables having an 
example in terms of time and logic consumption for a qualitative assessment” 
 
28. Pag 130: Timing analysis based on experimental results 
 
Extension added: “Table 6.4 includes the operational logic timings for different technique 
implementations obtained after Synthesis and Place&Route processes performed with Xilinx ISE 
development tool. This analysis does not include the memory access timing. The analysis is performed 
for different memory sizes where different examples of timings are also included for different number of 
errors injected in the complete memory” 
 
29. Pag 132: Resource analysis based on experimental results 
 
Extension added: “Table 6.5 also includes the comparison of the results obtained from the 
Synthesis and Place&Route. Table 6.5 includes the operational logic resources for different technique 
implementations obtained after Synthesis and Place&Route processes performed with Xilinx ISE 
development tool. The implementation of memory, used for different EDAC comparison, has been 
developed based on FF implementation. Although BRAM allows a more efficient memory 
implementation with dedicated blocks of memory, the purpose of the qualitative comparison between 
techniques is the incremental difference between the results of each implementation.  
Furthermore, a comparison between HSB architecture and Hamming has been performed based 
on a BRAM memory implementation in order to validate the trends obtained with data shown in Table 
6.5. The results of this comparison, shown in Figure 6.6., shown that BRAM memory required is the 
same for both techniques showing that the resources (LUTs and FFs) required for HSB architecture 
keeps the trends” 
 
 
Table 6.6: Comparison based on BRAM implementation 
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30. Pag 138: Summary of original contributions 
 
Extension added: Meeting probability objectives (CAT & HAZ).  
 According to probability analysis performed, there is a hierarchy of the factors involved when 
considering the failure rate, since each factor has a different order effect in it. This hierarchy is as 
follows: 
1. The first failure rate level is the Single uncorrectable events, because the sum of Multiple Event 
probabilities is negligible against Uncorrectable single events. This implies that Interleaving 
distance shall be higher than MCU span in order to correct the error patterns generated by the 
single radiation events. 
2. Once Single events are corrected, the Double Uncorrectable events become the most important 
contributor to failure probability, because the sum of rest of Multiple event probabilities is 
negligible against Uncorrectable Double events 
3. Once Double events are corrected, the Triple Uncorrectable events become the most important 
contributor to failure probability, because the sum of rest of Multiple Event probabilities is 
negligible against Uncorrectable Triple events. 
4. The previous statements logic can be successively extrapolated. 
 
31. Pag 138: Summary of original contributions 
 
Extension added: Architecture scalability for Fault-Tolerant systems 
The proposed Architecture allows a scalable design accordingly with the required failure rate in 
terms of the error hierarchy factor to be considered.   
Traditional Fault-Tolerant architectures based on SEC-DED correction codes require a majority 
voting system to detect a failure in a scrubber functions. Therefore, these architectures are 
traditionally sized according to the required capability to correct simultaneous errors. For n errors 
impacted in same scrubbing cycle, 2·n+1 redundant scrubbers are required, Figure 7.1. 
HSB architecture is not based on majority voting system. The capability to detect a failure in a 
scrubber functions is performed thanks to the first level of codification [73] and [74]. Therefore, this 
Fault-Tolerant architecture only requires n+ 1 redundancy for multiple radiations events. Thus, an 
area reduction for double and triple error correction capabilities are obtained compared with 
traditional systems based on majority voting systems. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Scrubber redundancy comparison between HSB and Majority voting. 
 
 
 
 
.  
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